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ABSTRACT
The integration of sUAS in commercial airspace is complicated and faces many challenges to
ensure a safe and secure incorporation into the National Airspace System (NAS). This research
analyzes the interconnectedness between the air traffic controller and the sUAS through HF
implications when sUAS enter the NAS. To mitigate negative consequences in the integration, it
examined the human performance of the controllers, the sUAS operators, commercial pilots, and
the equipment. This study used a quantitative research approach from both the Software
Hardware Environment, Liveware, and Liveware (SHELL), and the Swiss Cheese models (SCM)
for analysis of UAS sightings that are part of the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) UAS
sightings reports and National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) Aviation Safety
reporting System (ASRS). This identified the HF that could cause human errors during sUAS
integration in the NAS. The study found that there is a gap in the knowledge for understanding
human error from the controller perspective in the integration of sUAS in the NAS; however,
work is being done to mitigate these errors and ensure safe integration for all stakeholders. The
study highlighted possible human errors that air traffic controllers could make if further research,
education, and training were not conducted to mitigate errors. The study revealed that further
collaboration is needed to mitigate Air Traffic Control (ATC) centered human errors. It also
recommended that the Safety Management System (SMS) program continue development in
sUAS. Finally, it is recommended that research continue by the FAA and NASA with the ASRS
and UAS sightings reporting to include the Remote Identification (REMOTE ID) requirements.
Keywords: unmanned aerial systems (UAS), unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV), National
Airspace System (NAS), air traffic controllers, human factors, human errors, safety management
systems (SMS), cybersecurity, Remote ID
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
Unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) interest and use has been growing, and the Federal
Aviation Admiration’s (FAA) aerospace forecast for fiscal years 2020-2040 sees a continued
robust growth. They also stated, “A UAS consists of an unmanned aircraft platform and its
associated elements, including communication links, sensors, software and power supply that are
required for safe and efficient operation in the National Airspace System (NAS)” (Federal
Aviation Administration, 2020, p. 41). The small model UAS/recreation fleet is growing. It was
at 1.32 million UAS in 2019 and is expected to be about 2.5 million by 2024 with an average
growth rate of about 2%. The non-model commercial rate of growth over a five-year period is
expected to be about 17%. Additionally, the number of remote pilots is expected to grow by
almost 20% in five years (“FAA Fact Sheet,” 2020). This growth means safety and security
policies and procedures must keep up with the growth.
UAS have been represented by the terms “drones,” “unmanned aerial vehicles” (UAV),
remotely piloted aircraft systems” (RPAS) and small UAS (sUAS) that will all be used
interchangeably in this research. Additionally, the current COVID-19 pandemic accelerated the
use of many types of operations outside of the military including drones, and the fast-paced
changes in regulation and use are noteworthy. Some of these areas include delivery of goods
(both medical and non-medical), search and rescue, agriculture, and hobbyist activities
(Simonsen, Hartung, Brejndal-Hansen, Sorensen, Sylvester-Hvid, and Klein, 2019). UNICEF
believes that drones could be used medically and confirm that drones have been used in 18
countries for delivery and transportation purposes during the COVID-19 pandemic (United
Nations International Children’s Emergency Fund, 2020). This growth in use of drones for many
applications has led to both possibilities and challenges. The practical use of drones is increasing
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in many areas of aviation. Manufacturers worldwide can offer diversity in UAS platforms due to
significant increases in research and innovation in technologies in the field (Simonsen et al.
(2019).
Current literature recognizes this growth in numerous areas and places a strong emphasis
on safe integration into the FAA airspace. Safe integration must consider human factors (HF)
especially as they relate to air traffic controllers. The Unmanned Aircraft Safety Team (UAST),
which is using a collaborated approach between government and industry to ensure safe
operations recommends using a safety management systems (SMS) approach in UAS operations
integration. (Unmanned Aircraft Safety Systems, 2019). The UAST support of collaboration
has focus on the SMS four components, and the fact that SMS is a part of an established global
program for safety in the NAS. It is also a structured method for individuals and organizations to
make sound safety risk management decisions (UAST, 2020).
Additionally, Cardosi and Lennertz (2017), in their Department of Transportation and
Federal Aviation Administration report, discuss that for successful integration of unmanned
aerial vehicles (UAV)’s or unmanned aircraft systems (UAS)’s in the National Airspace System
(NAS), the identification of UAV/UAS/drone HF risks must be identified and mitigated. Their
study identified risks brought forward in examining data from the Aviation Safety Reporting
System (ASRS) by controllers, pilots, and operators of UAVs. Their research also identified
some recommendations and next steps for continued safe operation in the NAS (2017). Once the
data gathered in this research were analyzed, the recommendations were evaluated, and
additional recommendations were made to ensure the NAS has safety and security as high
priorities in the incorporation of UAS in the NAS. This growth in numbers of UAS in the NAS
that needed access to controlled airspace initially consisted mainly of Global Hawk and Predator
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class aircraft. These UAVs were allowed to operate routinely in the NAS, thus increasing the
impact to air traffic control (ATC; Kamienski & Semanek, 2015). Currently there are many
more applications of drone use in the air transportation industry.
The FAA defines HFs as:
Multidisciplinary effort to generate and compile information about human capabilities
and limitations and apply that information to equipment, systems, facilities, procedures,
jobs, environments, training, staffing, and personnel management for safe, comfortable,
and effective human performance. (FAA, 2005a, p. 2)
The FAA started the policy and accountability for integrating and harmonizing HF
considerations in the FAA in 1993. This was done to improve aviation safety, efficiency, and
productivity (FAA Order 9550.8, 1993). The FAA also promotes the “Dirty Dozen” by stressing
safety first to minimize the 12 common causes of mistakes in the aviation workplace. The 12
elements were a concept developed by Gordon Dupont in 1993 while he was working for
transport Canada. They include but are not limited to lack of communication, fatigue, stress,
distractions, and lack of resources (Civil Aviation Authority, 2002).
Human Factors for Air Traffic Control Specialist: A User’s Manual for Your Brain was
sponsored in part by the Air Traffic Control Association (ATCA) and developed by the FAA US
Department of Transportation in 1999. It was developed by Dr. Cardosi and a team. Dr. Cardosi
and the team presented the findings of HF research useful to air traffic controllers in a concise
and easy-to-read format. The topics included were: “controller-pilot voice communication,
memory, fatigue and the effects of stress on information processing” (FAA, 1999, p. ii.). The
user’s manual was provided to support controllers in reducing the likelihood of mistakes in
memory, communications, limitations, and fatigue. It also gave pointers to controllers about
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recalling specific information and recognizing symptoms of stress that could affect operational
performance, and how to lower fatigue (p. ii).
Cardosi and Lennertz (2017), in their study on HF complications for Air traffic Control
(ATC) and drone use, stressed the importance of continued research to alleviate risks connected
with the HF issues identified. They analyzed accidents and incidents to identify causes of
mistakes in UAV operations and to help develop risk mitigation strategies. They also suggested
that in addition to mining the ASRS, that there is the possibility to include data from the
Mandatory Occurrence Report (MOR) and the Air Traffic Safety Action Program (ATSAP) for
additional risk mitigation (Cardosi and Lennertz 2017; FAA, 2012). The ATSAP program may
need further review as it may now fall under the Air Traffic Organization Occurrence Reporting
(FAA, 2020 b). ASRS gives exceptional insight from the HF perspective. More will be
discussed in the review of literature on current HF issues.
In addition to the HF issues that are at the forefront of drone incorporation, there are
issues in cybersecurity, privacy, and public safety as drones take on more major roles in
connecting cities through delivering of goods and services. It is imperative that as literature is
reviewed there is a search for threats from malicious entities that desire to conduct physical or
cyberattacks to see if some solutions to the HFs associated with drone incorporation could also
be applied to cyber threats. An example would be drones’ dependency on global positioning
satellites (GPS) and the possibility of GPS spoofing that may result in loss of control of a drone
or distraction to ATC (Vattapparambam, Guvenc, Yurekli, Akkaya, & Uluagac, 2016).
Vattapparambam et al. explained ways they observed drones being compromised. One is
through WIFI, and drones could be hijacked because there is no required encryption on the
WIFI. Another way a drone could be compromised is by de-authentication. A third way of
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compromise using GPS equipment in spoofing attacks. These could all complicate
communications between drone operators and ATC (2016). Though not the focus of this
dissertation the research on cyber implications in the HF area of drone integration in the NAS
was reviewed during the literature review.
Background of the Study
Until recently, and in most of the 2017, Cardosi and Lennertz (2017) reported that UAS
HF data is available on the UAS that are operated by the military in a military operations area
(MOA). These MOAs areas are established outside of Class A airspace and communicate with
ATC (Cardosi &Lennertz, 2017). The other type of UAVs in use weigh less than 55 pounds, are
limited to 400 feet and below, and require UAV operators to maintain a visual contact with their
UAV (Holcombe, 2016). The smaller UAVs are monitored and regulated by the FAA, and
currently there are approximately 900,000 drones registered with about 380,000 being
commercial and 500,000 being civilian. Additionally, there are around 220,000 certified remote
pilots through the FAA program (FAA, 2021a). The numbers are increasing and have increased
rapidly the last two years. The FAA has kept public records of UAS sightings since 2014, and
the reports of UAS sightings from law enforcement, citizens, and pilots have increased
substantially in the past few years (“FAA UAS sighting by the numbers,” 2021). These reports,
from observers to the FAA, are where citizens may report drones operating around airplanes,
helicopters, and airports which is both dangerous and illegal. In the first report, from November
of 2014 to August of 2015, there were about 750 sightings (“FAA UAS sighting by the
numbers,” 2021). In the most current 10-month period there were about 1400 sightings (FAA
UAS events Jan-Mar 2020, Apr-Jun 2020, Jul-Sep 2020, and Oct-Dec 2020) or almost double in
a little over five years.
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The use of sUAS in the NAS brings operational challenges; however, the possibilities
they bring to the air transportation industry growth are vast and should provide incentive to
figure out ways to mitigate the risk. These opportunities require further investigation in small
UAS (sUAS) use. The various functions and uses include aerial photography, recreational flying
for individual use, commercial package deliveries including medical supplies, and search and
rescue operations following natural disasters or criminalities (FAA, 2020).
It is imperative to focus on the implications of the growth of UAV operations in the NAS
for controllers, pilots, and UAV operators and the associated technologies, integration,
procedures, and other issues to mitigate risk and ensure safe integration. Both Cardosi and
Lennertz (2017) and Kamienski and Semanek (2015) agree that risks need further assessment
and mitigation, with changes in procedures and policies for the successful inevitable integration.
It is also crucial when looking at the pilots' and UAV operators' input to remain focused in this
study on the ATC perspective as the airspace is managed by the controller. Previous studies
have focused on both the UAVs’ operator and the machine but not from the ATC perspective, so
there is a gap in the knowledge of ATC involvement. ATC and air traffic management (ATM)
are a complex socio-technical system, and better awareness of HF is critical for risk assessment
and mitigation protocols that could identify easy-to-use HF tools for ATC and ATM UAV
incorporation (Teperi, Leppanen, & Norros, 2014).
Problem Statement
Though HF associated with UAS operations come in an assortment of characteristics,
they are inadequately represented in literature that focuses on the perspective of air traffic and
pilot HF perspective. This may impact the safe integration during the growth of sUAS in the
NAS. (Cardosi & Lennertz, 2017). The next few years will include an increase in civilian and
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commercial use in the NAS, and they are expected to be sources of expansion in the aerospace
industry (Stark, Coopmans, & Chen, 2012). As the number of UAVs in controlled airspace
increases, situations have appeared where UAVs have clashed with air traffic and caused concern
for air traffic safety, efficiency, and workload in ATM (Vengal 2011). Though HF associated
with UAV operations come in an assortment of characteristics, they are inadequately represented
in literature, focusing on the controller and air traffic management. Those that have been
identified need to be critiqued to ensure they are accurate. Additionally, there is a need to do a
risk assessment and the interconnections of the humans-in-the-loop (HITL) components
identified. HITL is part of the SHELL model that analyses the human interaction with the other
components of the SHELL (Hawkins, 1987). This research will recommend next steps or
protocal that could be researched or identified and tested to ensure air traffic controllers maintain
safe operations in the NAS of UAVs with other air traffic.
Purpose of the Dissertation Study
UAVs is a recent phenomenon in ATM. Truitt, Zingale, and Konkel (2016)
demonstrated the significance of mitigating risk so that UAVs’ access to the national air space is
completed safely and expeditiously. This dissertation assessed some of the current and future
challenges in incorporating UAVs in the NAS in a safe manner. Examination of UAV accidents
and incidents obtained from the Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS) and the FAA
Quarterly Sightings reports, for risk assessment and human-machine interface, can provide
protocol to test for safe incorporation of UAVs into the NAS. The results will have a meaningful
influence on the growth of UAVs’ positive contribution to the aerospace industry.

19
Significance of the Study
Cardosi and Lennertz (2017) publicized the number of military UAV operations currently
taking place within the military; there are identifiable HF issues that need risk analysis for
mitigation purposes. Stark et al. (2012) pointed out that the HFs between the controllers and the
UAS have largely gone unresearched and that for safe integration both the individual aspects and
the interconnection between the human and the UAS must be studied for risk mitigation. These
mitigation protocols would improve safety not only in airspace operated by military drones but
also in all other drone operations in controlled and uncontrolled airspace. This research can have
substantial positive influences on UAVs' safe integration in the NAS and could build trust
between users, regulators, and the public in general.
UAV incorporation in the NAS is foreseeable, and regulations are changing at a quicker
pace than in the past. UAV are becoming an essential part of the infrastructure in the
communities in which they are employed for many businesses or emergency operations. Safe
incorporation of solutions associated with UAVs must stay at the forefront of research. This
analysis and dissertation can position UAV incorporation in airspace safely and aid in the air
transportation industry's growth.
Nature of the Study
To ensure safe and secure integration of drones in commercial airspace, specifically the
HF aspect between the controller HITL and the UAS, a quantitative research study was
conducted as it focuses on computing the assortment and examination of data (Harkiolakis,
2020). A quantitative study is most appropriate because it permits the researcher to present
analysis based on implications resulting from data in numerical form, such as durations and
counts (Harkiolakis, 2020). In this study it focuses on ATC and sUAS sightings, infringements,
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and incidents. A quantitative study is most appropriate because its intent is to examine
interactions between variables by quantifying, comparing, and using numerical data (McCusker
& Gunaydin, 2015). HF risks to air traffic controllers as they apply to integration of sUAS in the
NAS were studied. Also studied were the effects as they apply to HFs in the different types of
use of sUAS and the different scenarios in incidents as collected from reports. Consideration
was taken that there are gaps in the literature as the use of sUAS is relatively new and evolving
at a rapid pace. Because of the situation and having few studies to build on, the research design
was explorative in nature. However, HFs in aviation have been studied in detail over the last 50
years. The literature shows that it has often been studied more from a pilot perspective than from
the air traffic controller. In addition, the sUAS use is relatively new so there are gaps in the
research that focuses on HF and other risks associated with incorporation of the sUAS in the
NAS.
This study explored air traffic controllers’ involvement in air traffic management of
sUAS in NAS as it relates to HFs. HFs may have different meanings for air traffic control in the
relationship of drone control and the mitigating risks associated with drone ATC as there are still
technologies and processes that are not understood. This is due to the short history of use of
drones in commercial roles and the associated research.
The quantitative method that investigates HFs between the controller and the UAS for
integration in the NAS are evaluated further in Chapter 3. Understanding these HFs should
reduce incidents for controllers, thus allowing optimized use of drones in commercial airspace.
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Hypotheses/Research Questions
To achieve its purpose, this study’s central critical research question is: How can negative
consequences of integration in commercial airspace between UAS and ATM systems be reduced,
so that when incidents happen situational awareness (SA), and HF risks are negligeable?
Supporting sub questions were also developed and are as follows:
1. What protocols could be identified to ensure air traffic controllers develop metrics for
cognitive workload, SA, and other HFs to ensure safe operations in the NAS of UAVs
with other air traffic?
2. What needs to be done to mitigate HF issues using risk management and safety
management processes within the new operations of UAS in NAS?
3. What are the factors that influence the safe implementation of UAS integration in the
NAS?
4. In what ways could the perception with the public be improved to increase support of
integration of UAS in the NAS?
5. What technology investments can be made for communication and airspace
management for safe operations of UAS within the NAS?
6. What action can be taken on the regulatory challenges for safe and efficient UAS
operation in the NAS?
Research Method
Data from the Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS) NASA 2019 report and the
FAA UAS Quarterly sightings reports were collected and analyzed. This research emphasized
utilizing the Human Factors Analysis and Classification System (HFACS), grounded in Reason's
(2000) SCM. Additionally, validation importance was placed on Hawkins's (1987) HFs in-flight
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SHELL model as adapted for the computer-automation of radar equipment by Miller in 2019.
This before mentioned research will assist in the current risk analysis, mitigation, and
identification of proposed protocols of the associated HFs identified to understand sUAS
integration.
Conceptual or Theoretical Framework
A conceptual framework was developed to examine sUAS integration thoroughly and
safely in the NAS. The framework of the research uses data retrieved from ASRS NASA 2019
report modeled after work done by Cardosi and Lennertz (2017) and data retrieved from FAA
UAS quarterly sightings reports. The analysis also focused on SHELL and Swiss cheese
research models. The first model of use was done with HFACS, from Reasons’s (2000) SCM
(Stark et al., 2012). The second one came from Miller, Holley, Mrusek, and Weiland’s (2019,
2020) adaptation of Hawkins’s (1987) SHELL model modified to include live-ware-LivewareLiveware team and computer-automation HITL.
The FAA (2019) in the Aeronautical Information Manual (AIM) divides the airspace into
two categories: (a) regulatory, which includes Classes A, B, C, D, and E airspace; and (b)
restricted and prohibited areas. The other category is non-regulatory, including military
operations, warning areas, alert areas, and controlled firing areas (FAA, 2019). Additionally, the
FAA, National Aeronautics and Space Association (NASA), and the Government Accounting
Authority have depicted UAV integration issues. Figures 1-4 depict the NAS classification,
implementation of UAV operations, and possible issues in the UAV integration.
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Figure 1. Airspace classification (FAA Safety, n.d.).
Figure 1. Airspace Classification (FAA Safety n.d.)

Figure 2. Airspace classification (FAA, n.d.).
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Figure 3. Air space guidance for small UAS operators (FAA n.d.).

Figure 4. UAS use (GAO 18-110, n.d.).

Elements of the Framework. There are numerous approaches to analyzing accidents and
incidents in the NAS. The HF indicated in UAV incidents have various characteristics and seem
to have been inadequately demonstrated in the literature (Stark et al., 2012). The data from the
Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS) by controllers, pilots, and operators of UAVs can be
used in conjunction with the data from HFACS. HFACS was intended to aid accident reporting
systems such as ASRS. It is intended to provide a data-driven plan for labeling fundamental HFs
to lead to developments in training and mediation programs. It uses the Swiss cheese approach
to classify faults, which, in turn, allows investigators to classify four different levels of factor
breakdowns that led to the final incident (Stark et al., 2012).
Figure 5 depicts the SCM. Though the HFACS is sufficient for classifying many of the
HFs, it neglects the HFs when interacting with the newer automation in the use of UAVs. The
software, hardware, environment, liveware, liveware (SHELL) model, developed by Hawkins
(1987) and shown in Figure 6, defined in the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO)
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Document 9859 Safety Management Manual, is a concrete mechanism used to evaluate the
interface of multiple system sections (International Civil Aviation Organization, 2017). For
example, a software item could be an automated Automatic Terminal Information Service
(ATIS) or an approach plate. Hardware is the ATM equipment or the UAV. An environment
element would be workspace conditions, and liveware to liveware would be the actors and their
interactions between the controllers, UAV operators, and pilots of crewed aircraft (ICAO, 2017;
Singh, 2012). A significant focus of the SHELL model is the human at the forefront and
understanding that the human is the least predictable and most vulnerable to internal and external
influences. Hawkins (1987) was researched and further developed in both “Assessing cognitive
processing and Human Factors challenges in NextGen air traffic control tower team operations”
and A Change in the Dark Room: The Effects of Human Factors and Cognitive Loading Issues
for NextGen TRACON Air Traffic Controllers (Miller et al., 2019, 2020). These concepts, as
displayed in Figures 7 and 8, could be adapted for this research.
Figure 9 shows the flow of the conceptual framework. It is a four-step procedure. Going
clockwise, the first step is data mining from the ASRS database, and the FAA UAS sightings
reports relevant to UAV accidents and incidents. Step two utilizes the HFACS and the SCM for
risk assessment, and from there, step three employs principles of the SHELL to ensure all
components were gathered and validated. These steps should lead to step four, which identifies
protocols for further research and testing.
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Figure 5. The Swiss cheese model (SCM) of human causation. Adapted from Reason (1987).

Figure 6. SHELL model by Hawkins (1987) featuring the liveware-centered interface.
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Figure 7. The SHELL model 2017 adopted for the computer-automation/information of the
STARS TRACON.

Figure 8. Tower controller human factors SHELL analysis based on the model by Hawkins
(1987) but modified to depict the liveware-liveware team interface (2019).
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Figure 9. Conceptual framework for critique of identified air traffic control human factors that
could be preventing safe integration of unmanned aerial vehicles into the National Airspace
System.
Definitions of terms Acronyms and Abbreviations
AIM - Airman Information Manual
ARTCC - Air Route Traffic Control Center
ATC - Air Traffic Control
ATM - Air Traffic Management
ATSAP - Air Traffic Safety Action Plan
ASRS - Aviation Safety Reporting System
BLVOS - Beyond visual line of sight
DAA - Detect and Avoid
EASA - European Aviation Safety Agency
FAA - Federal Aviation Administration
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FAR - Federal Aviation Regulation
HFACS - Human Factor Analysis and Classification
HF - Human factors
IFR - Instrument Flight Rules
IATA - International Air Transportation Association
ICAO - International Civil Aviation Organization
MOA - Military Operations Area
MOR - Mandatory Occurrence Report
NAS - National Airspace System
NMAC - Near Mid-Air Collision
SA - Situational Awareness
SCM - Swiss Cheese Model
SMS - Safety Management System
SHELL - Software, hardware, environment, liveware, liveware
sUAS - Small Unmanned Aircraft System
TCAS - Traffic Alert and Collision Avoidance System
UAS - Unmanned Aircraft System
UAV - Unmanned aerial vehicle
UAST - Unmanned Aircraft Safety Team
UTM - Unmanned traffic management
VLOS - Visual line of sight
VMC - Visual meteorological conditions
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Assumptions
Wargo (2015) discussed the importance of knowing what an assumption is when applied
to research and used the Dictionary of Statistics and Methodology Vogt’s definition of
assumption as “(a) A statement that is presumed to be true, often only temporarily or for a
specific purpose, such as building a theory; (b) The conditions under which statistical techniques
yield valid results” (p. 3).
The first assumption of this research was that the ASRS report filers were honest in their
reports and that they did the reporting with the intent to ensure safe integration of drones in
commercial airspace. The second assumption was that using the ASRS data, and the FAA UAS
quarterly sightings reports would assist in answering the critical research question: “How can
negative consequences of integration in commercial airspace between UAS and ATM systems be
reduced, so that when incidents happen SA and HF risks are negligeable?” The third assumption
is that the data obtained would be adequate to answer the sub questions that would ensure
reduction in human errors and give a better understanding of HFs in the integration of drones in
commercial airspace.
Scope
The scope was mainly on the interaction between the HITL (the air traffic controller) and
the machine (sUAS) and the associated HFs for safe integration of sUAS in commercial airspace
in the U.S. It must take into consideration the other aspects of the SHELL and SCM to ensure
this safe integration. The literature review includes research documents that incorporate, history,
regulations, types of commercial use of drones, HFs, and security. The scope will analyze for
identification of items that are linked to cybersecurity as it applies to air traffic controllers HF
implications; however, that is not the main focus of the research. The research examined the
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individual, machine, and interconnection for identification of HF risks with sUAS integration.
The intent of the research was to have better awareness of HF tools for ATC and ATM UAV
incorporation. This analysis identified protocols to be tested to ensure ATC develops metrics for
cognitive workload, SA, complacency, and other HFs.
Limitations
Wargo (2015) also focused on the importance of knowing research limitations and
referred to Roberts (as cited in Wargo, 2015), who stated, “Limitations are usually areas over
which you have no control. Some typical limitations are sample size, methodology constraints,
length of the study, and response rate” (p. 15). The first limitation for this research was that both
the ASRS and FAA sightings are not required to be submitted by law so they may be
inconclusive. The second limitation was that the submitted reports may not have knowledge that
can be analyzed from a cybersecurity or HF perspective. The third limitation was that most
reports were submitted from incidents that were close to airports, so they might not represent the
entire picture of drone flights. The fourth limitation was that at the time of this research laws
were changing, thus the picture is only a snapshot in time, and continuous analysis and
assessment are needed.
Delimitations
Theofanidis and Fountouki (2018) stated that delimitations require motivating the
conventions of the researcher and are set by the researcher. The idea is that when the researcher
sets boundaries, the researcher is also able to achieve the objectives of the research.
Delimitations are primarily focused on the research framework, questions, background, and
items of that research. In other words, delimitations are neither negative nor positive but rather
focus on the researcher’s core interests (Theofanidis & Fountouki, 2018). The first delimitation
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was proven reports from the U.S. government that were used in the past to gather information for
safe and secure integration of drones in commercial airspace were used as they are reliable and
valid. The second delimitation used standard methods to assess and analyze HFs such as the
SHELL and Swiss cheese models to evaluate HFs in drone use. The identified protocols should
be researched further and tested to ensure air traffic controllers develop a method for ideal
cognitive workload as it relates to HITL, thus ensuring safe operations in the NAS of drones with
other air traffic.
Chapter Summary
Chapter 1 presented an overview of the complications of integration of sUAS in
commercial airspace. It included a high-level overview, the background and significance of the
problem, research questions, conceptual framework, and the related constructs in the scope of the
study. Chapter 2 contains the literature review. Chapter 3 describes the quantitative research
approach that was used to collect information and includes data analysis and validity. Chapter 4
presents the findings, and Chapter 5 encompasses the conclusions and recommendations for
future research.
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CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW
The purpose of this chapter is to review the pertinent literature which delineates the
crucial concepts applicable to the implications to air traffic controllers when incorporating UAS
in the NAS. The review will deliver these fundamental concepts from existing research and will
present an overview of principles and current literature in different areas of drone use in the
NAS. It is important to understand the HFs, potential for human error, cyber threats, and other
risks associated with the growth of drone operations in the NAS for controllers, pilots, and drone
operators. It is also important to review literature on the uses of drones and the associated
technologies, policies, and procedures to mitigate risk and ensure safe integration. It is also
important to note that this literature review will focus on the air traffic controller when possible.
Currently, there seems to be a lack of research available to assist the air traffic controller from
the HF perspective in the requirements to integrate drones for commercial use in the NAS.
There is literature available for larger drone use at higher altitudes, and it is hoped that this
literature can lend insight into further incorporation. Once the current situation of drone usage or
desired usage is discussed, a review of UAV reported sightings from the FAA ASRS UAV
database report (National Aeronautics and Space administration [NASA], 2019) will be
discussed, and the importance of further analysis of these reports will be defined.
The literature review conducted also focused on using keywords that pertain to drones,
HFs, air traffic control, and airspace. Review of regulations, policies, journal articles,
organizations, history, and current findings in areas of drone operations were conducted.
Literature in these areas will be discussed on risk in operations including overflight of
populations, low altitude operations in urban environments, and VLOS operations. Current UAS
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situations in the U.S. in civil applications include healthcare, environmental management,
agriculture, and commercial delivery. Public perception will also be discussed.
Policies, procedures, and regulations that focus on the modernization of U.S. airspace that
is called “The Next Generation Air Transportation System or NextGen” include the integration
on NextGen in the ATM system. Additionally, technology challenges will be reviewed
including information on the UAS being able to take off, fly the programmed route, and land at
the destination as planned. Discussion will include detect and avoid (DAA) concepts, VLOS and
BVLOS, and emergencies. HFs, SMS for UAS, pilot and controller challenges will also be
reviewed.
Status of UAS Integration into Commercial Airspace
In 2016, the FAA with the Department of transportation (DoT) in the report, The Future
of the NAS, stressed the importance of periodic updates as they checked the integration of
NextGen concepts to ensure they were remaining on track for milestones. They also stressed that
it was important to remain adaptable for change and be able to accommodate new entrants such
as unmanned aircraft to ensure there was a transparent, sustainable, agile, and resilient NAS
(FAA, 2016). The demand for admittance to the NAS by UAS has grown at an accelerating rate,
and the FAA must work towards alleviating the challenges to find affordable and safe ways to
integrate new entrants. The FAA is working with stakeholders including NASA to find a safe
and efficient way for integration that has a small impact on other users. In addition, this
expansion of users involved defining the automation support, as well as the surveillance,
communication, and navigation capabilities that go together with the performance of UAS. A
focus must be placed on providing clear separation of responsibilities (FAA, 2016). Though this
was discussed in 2016 it may not have been evident to all the stakeholders how rapidly
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integration would be needed in controlled and uncontrolled airspace. One area that has unique
requirements is the DAA capability for maintaining separation from other aircraft. This area is
in the forefront as the number of registered UAS operators continues to increase at a rapid pace.
Future operations show a large range of maneuvers that will have to be dealt with using
appropriate ATC procedures and policies. Figure 10 gives a few examples of operations that will
need to be accommodated. Interestingly, Figure 10 displays only a few items and in just 2020
with COVID, the delivery of medical supplies and e-commerce items have shown how much
more UAS’s safe integration is needed.

Figure 10. Future NAS UAS operations (FAA, The Future of the NAS, 2016).
In 2015, the Air Line Pilot Association (ALPA) identified some of the challenges for safe
integration of UAS into the civil airspace. Though the use of drones goes back over 50 years,
until recently these machines were very expensive and were limited to government and research
organizations. Technology has improved at such a rapid rate in the last decade that the improved
performance and lower cost have led to rapid increase in use by both the military and civilian
operators. In addition, the hobbyist had gained interest in the use and had led to the update in
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regulations; however, these regulations are still lagging and need further updating (Air Line Pilot
Association, 2015). One of the largest remaining concerns is the ability to use the drones in a
way that does not negatively impact the superb aviation safety record in place. A challenge to
the incorporation is the multiple aircraft designs, diverse applications, and the pilots’ varied
levels of training. Though the technology must be evaluated, it needs to be done expeditiously
and in an encompassing way for a smooth incorporation for use. The technologies need to be
reliable and mitigate for the absence of a professionally trained pilot aboard the aircraft. Many
of these aircrafts weigh less than the average weight of a pilot (ALPA, 2015).
Communications between the operator and ATC must be accomplished with some type of
link that is safe to transfer data between the aircraft, operator, and air traffic controller. A plan
needs to be in place for the safe control of the aircraft so that if these communications are lost
that does not put anyone or anything in jeopardy.
IATA stressed the importance of stakeholder involvement for successful integration in
the report “We Are All One in the Sky”, by outlining five key principles for a successful
regulatory framework for UAS operations. They believe that the safe, secure, and sustainable
integration of UAS is one of the significant issues in the aviation industry. With the abundance
of drone operations and opportunities it is imperative that safety and security are not
compromised and that current operations have the correct regulations in place for the growth in
the use of UAS in the NAS. The EASA initiative has listed five key principles for successful
integration, and this must ensure all stakeholders are involved. The regulatory framework must
look at:
1. Enabling common airspace SA through information exchange.
2. Clarifying the responsibilities and liabilities to be borne by different stakeholders.
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3. Maximizing airspace capacity and value through integration, not segregation.
4. Maintaining and improving today’s high safety level.
5. Creating a flexible framework to accommodate an evolving industry.
Cline, Lercel, Karabiyik, and Dietz (2020) brought to the forefront that there are also
security risks associated with UAS use due to their simplicity, above average performance, and
increasing popularity. They stated that as of 2019 there were over 500 UAS products offered by
over 250 companies and that without standardization, manufacturing and marketing these
products may not match operation or performance and may cause further complications in use
(Cline, Lercel, Karabiyik, & Dietz et al., 2020). Because these may pose legal implications, it is
imperative that the C-UAS implementation and policy procedures work closely with public and
private agencies to ensure that legal definitions are included for UAS to operate safely.
Concept of Operations for Unmanned Aircraft Systems and Traffic Management
The FAA NextGen office developed the Concept of Operations for urban air mobility
(UAM) in the context of ATM and UAS, which included collaboration with NASA, industry,
and community stakeholders in 2018. Successful UTM is crucial to integration and mitigation of
HF errors. It is also crucial due to the expected growth in both controlled and uncontrolled
airspace. The FAA 2020 Concept of Operations shows a rapid growth in sUAS operations
starting in 2018 for all types of tasks. This brings a larger workload to air traffic controllers and
could cause more HF errors. Figure 11 depicts the projected growth and is a good visual to use
to better understand the complexity of drone operations in both controlled and uncontrolled
airspace. The FAA estimated the combined recreation and commercial number of drones could
be as high as three million by 2023 up from 1.8 million in 2018 (FAA, 2020e).
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Figure 11. Projected UAS growth.
Due to the rapid growth of operations and because there will be movement between
controlled and uncontrolled airspace, there needs to be a way to enable safe management of the
movement with and without ATM. SA between operators and air traffic controllers is imperative
as is UTM. The FAA defined UTM as “as the manner in which the FAA will support operations
for UAS operating in low altitude airspace” (FAA, 2020e, p. xi). This is done by providing
services via the FAA regulatory rules and regulations that are either not made or in the infancy of
development. Some of these regulations will be discussed in the literature review as they may be
applicable to HR errors associated with air controllers. Integration of sUAS is a complex
cooperative management endeavor in an already complex system of systems as applicable to
overall ATM. UTM is optimistic that the collaboration between UAS operators and stakeholders
will facilitate the support of and demand for a variety of operations with increasing complexity
(FAA, 2000e). FAA version 2.0’s focus is not only on the UTM operations at 400 feet above
(AGL) ground level and below, which usually do not require ATC interaction, but also includes
the multifaceted operations in both uncontrolled (Class G) and controlled (Classes B, C, D, and
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E) airspace situations (FAA, 2000e). Figure 12 shows UTM operations in perspective of
airspace classes. This is due to the anticipated growth and opportunities for use of sUAS and has
a direct impact on air controllers and the possibility of HF errors.

Figure 12. UTM operations in context of airspace classes (FAA, 2020e).
The FAA’s current version 2.0 was published and will be discussed for further insight on
the industry (FAA, 2020e). It is relevant to this research as it includes case elaboration,
rulemaking advancements, and the advancement of technology. All these advancements have
HF connections to the air traffic controller. It is also a good document for review and analysis as
after the data gathered from reports and articles are analyzed, the concept documents may lend
credibility to the recommendations in HF applications. This may also lead to further research for
air traffic controllers as they mature in the work with UAS in the NAS as it implements UTM
with NASA.
Additionally, version 2 stressed the urgent need to support the security of UAS in the
NAS as that is a key focus area for Remote ID application (FAA, 2020e). Remote ID is
discussed throughout the research as it is part of the foundation of the changes to the
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incorporation of UAS in the NAS. I believe it is applicable to both safety and security and may
assist in mitigating HF errors. The FAA is also expanding concepts to incorporate operational
scenarios with more complexity. This is important as there has been great pressure from
stakeholders to find ways to operate drones beyond BVLOS in denser airspace (FAA, 2000e).
These complex operations will be in both controlled and uncontrolled airspace and have HF error
implications for the air controller, especially increased workload, and they are areas where SA
may be lost (Yaacoub, Hassan, Salman, & Chehab, 2020).
As the number of drones used increases due to demand and multi-purpose functions, the
malicious usage of drones by criminals and hackers may increase, and the need for detective,
protective, and preventive measures may be required. Thus, there need to be ways to analyze
vulnerabilities and mitigate them (FAA, 2020e & Yaacoub et al., 2020).
Federal Aviation Administration Evolution of Regulations for UAS in Commercial
Airspace
The road to legislation and incorporation has been long and complicated. The first
federal policy governing UAS was published in September 2005, entitled Federal Aviation
Administration memorandum AFS-4000 UAS policy 05-01. This policy was interim and basic
for clarification by the FAA. It was the first attempt at policymaking for operations of UAS in
the NAS. It included airworthiness certification and other safety and security provisions (FAA,
2005b). It was followed up with a more detailed policy under 14 Code of Federal regulations
(CFR) Part 91. This added clarification on the difference between hobby and sport recreational
use of UAS in the NAS (FAA, 2007).
It took an additional five years for more legislation to be passed, and in 2012 the FAA
Modernization and Reform Act was signed into law. This public law called for the integration of
civil unmanned aircraft systems into national airspace systems and included special rules, public

41
unmanned systems, safety studies, and specific rules for model aircraft with recommended
completion dates. Requirements and roadmaps were supposed to be developed to allow safe
integration of UAS into the NAS by September of 2015 (FAA Modernization and Reform Act,
2012). Many of these dates have not been met as of spring of 2021. However, in 2020, the FAA
has released its third edition of Integration of Civil Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) in the
National Airspace System (NAS) Roadmap. The FAA acknowledged that the safe incorporation
is complicated but that they have also made significant strides in developing standards, policies,
and operational procedures. Of significant note are the following accomplishments showing that
there has been forward movement to bring UAS operations to the NAS.
1. Establishing full FAA authority over all UAS operating in the NAS through 2019
2. FAA Reauthorization Act, in which 50 UAS-related provisions were outlined
3. Expanding automation for how drone users get near real-time permission to fly in
controlled airspace through the Low Altitude Authorization and Notification
Capability (LAANC)
The FAA in a short period of time granted more than 65,000 waivers and exemptions to allow
more drone fliers to complete advanced operations (FAA, 2020c).
In 2016, the FAA, under 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 107 titled Operation and
Certification of Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems, formalized the work in a framework that
outlines the requirements for the operation of UAS in the NAS. It is for sUAS that weigh under
55 pounds and remain in the VLOS of the visual observer to fly for non-hobby and nonrecreational operations (Operation and Certification of Small Aircraft Systems, 2016). Part 107
has over 50 major provisions and gives guidance to operational limitations, remote pilot in
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command certification and responsibilities, aircraft requirements, and model aircraft. Some of
the most concerning ones that may cause complications for incorporation include:
1. UAS VLOS only with the controller or visual observer
2. VLOS must not use anything other than corrective lenses
3. UAS may not operate over any person not directly participating in the operation
4. Daylight only operations or civil twilight if equipped with appropriate anti-collision
lights
5. First person view camera does not satisfy see-and-avoid
6. No person may operate more than one UAS at a time
7. Aircraft FAA airworthiness certificate is not required (Operation and Certification of
Small Aircraft Systems, 2016, p. 5). For further information, Part 107 may be read in
its entirety.
The analysis of drone operations beyond the visual line of sight (BVLOS) has received recent
examination, and a few items are in the process of being changed. Currently, many countries,
the U.S. included, have not allowed drones to fly BVLOS as they are concerned with the risk to
property and the public. Part 107.31 includes the guidelines that limit a pilot to operating in the
VLOS. One may apply for a waiver; however, most waivers have been denied. Currently Part
107.31 stated: §107.31 Visual line of sight aircraft operation
(a) With vision that is unaided by any device other than corrective lenses, the remote pilot
in command, the visual observer (if one is used), and the person manipulating the flight control
of the sUAS aircraft system must be able to see the UAS throughout the entire flight to:
(1) Know the unmanned aircraft's location.
(2) Determine the unmanned aircraft's attitude, altitude, and direction of flight.
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(3) Observe the airspace for other air traffic or hazards; and
(4) Determine that the unmanned aircraft does not endanger the life or property of
another.
(b) Throughout the entire flight of the small, unmanned aircraft, the ability described in
paragraph (a) of this section must be exercised by either:
(1) The remote pilot in command and the person manipulating the flight controls of
the small, unmanned aircraft system; or
(2) A visual observer. (“Visual Line of Sight Aircraft Operations,” 2016 p. 2).
The FAA continues to be active in the safe incorporation of the UAS. Recently published
information and final rules requiring remote identification of drones and some flights over
people, moving vehicles, and night flying in certain conditions went into effect April 21, 2021
(FAA, 2021). This is significant because to fly at night or over people operators no longer
requires a waiver. Regulations and policy implementation are moving forward to integrate UAS
in the NAS; however, they need to be ready for additional risk management with these added
permissions for drone operators. This area has been under intense review, and the five-year
outlook is promising with regulation changes for Remote ID, night operations, and operations
over people. Of significance to note is that in 2019 there were over 1200 applications sent in for
a waiver in the Part 107.31 the majority were denied (Choudhary, 2019; FAA, n.d.c).
One other area of research and possible changes are requirements in DAA. This is
important as it will enable support in BLVOS operations, and this will ensure ecommerce
movement of routine package delivery that will be discussed more in the civilian use of drones’
section. A consideration that must also be reviewed is the security, privacy, and noise issues
with more use in the NAS (FAA, 2020c).
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Government Accountability and Management of Safety Risks for sUAS
There was also a specific interest in past research or pilot studies of UAS incidents
similar to Cardosi and Lennertz (2017) research using data from NASA on UAS incidents. The
Government Accountability Office (GAO) also had done research around the same time as the
pilot study from Cardosi and Lennertz. The GAO investigation was done because there have
been many questions raised by Congress and other organizations about the extent of the safe
incorporation of drones in the NAS. Thus, there was also a review of GAO-18-110 report for
indicators in HF risks, specifically for ATC. Doing this review would help in understanding the
status of FAA data collection on drone incidents and interaction in the NAS. The GAO noted
that the FAA had been collecting data of safety events involving sUAS since about 2002.
However, it was noted by GAO that the validity and completeness of the data might be
questionable (Government Accountability Office, 2018). The intent was to use reports generated
by controllers and pilots that were analyzed by NASA and the FAA, knowing ahead of time how
accurate the reports were assisted in analysis and recommendations. An example the FAA gave
to the auditors was that even though the FAA sUAS sightings reports had grown to over 100 a
month, there was no way for the FAA to verify that there were UAS involved in most of the
sightings. This is because most of the sightings are relayed to ATC from manned aircraft, and it
may be difficult to properly identify the drone due to its size and the fact that small drones do not
display on radar (GAO, 2018).
The GAO found that the FAA did have some safety risk management policies that they
used, but they were not specific to HF and were not always able to analyze and assess the safety
risks. The situation was exasperated because they did not have enough data, and they often
estimated the risks based on their own expertise (GAO, 2018). The members on the GAO
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committee analyzed the information, and this current research started analysis at the point of data
that the GAO analysis stopped to see if there were any changes. The GAO items were
noteworthy and had some use in the current research. The GAO also had the ability to get
information from the Department of Defense, Department of Energy, the U.S. Forest service, and
the U.S. Park police. This is important because agencies have recorded sUAS flying over
property, and people and have affected procedures of these organizations. These other federal
reports may be more valid because the person reporting the sightings were on the ground and
could tell the UAS from a manned aircraft. In addition, the agency in some cases was able to
contact the operator of the sUAS. Officials noted that the FAA reporting was not able to 100%
determine the sightings were valid (GAO, 2018). This is significant as it is imperative that the
sightings and incidents are validated. It is difficult to learn from or mitigate HF situations
between the sUAS and the air traffic controller in the NAS if they are not able to be validated.
See Table 1 for GAO summary of selected federal departments.
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Table 1 Selected UAS Sightings from Government Agencies 2013-2017
Selected UAS Sightings from Government Agencies 2013-2017

(GAO 18-110, 2018)

Note. a. In more than half of the recorded incidents, the wildfire fighting operations were either managed by the
Forest Service or co-managed by it and one or more other state or federal agencies. A service official told us that in
the other incidents, the Forest Service may have provided resources in support of the operations.
b. The incidents included only sightings of UAS in areas of primary jurisdiction of the Park Police located within the
National Capital Region, the Park Police New York Field Office, and the Park Police San Francisco Field Office.

Additionally, the GAO report summarized the plan for regulations discussed above, and
this is depicted in Table 2. This is a significant snapshot that will aid not only in analysis and
findings but in making recommendations as each new regulation has the potential to create a
larger incorporation of sUAS in the NAS and possible HF errors for ATC.
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Table 2 FAA Incremental Approach for developing a regulatory Framework for sUAS
FAA Incremental Approach for developing a regulatory Framework for sUAS

Note. (GAO 18-110, 2018),

Civil Applications of Unmanned Aerial vehicles
Until recently, most of the uses for UAS were seen in combat or spying on people by
authority. With these types of operations often came a negative perception. Negative
perceptions put a burden on HFs too, as the negativity may lend to more stress in the controller
and lack of clear communication between the controller and the drone operator. The last couple
of years have brought forward some other applications for UAS use. However, this perception
still needs to be changed. UAS potential in civil applications has grown tremendously in the last
decade. The above literature review went over regulations and some of the current changes that
were implemented in Spring 2021. With these changes the public’s perception is even more
important. Measuring Public Utilization Perception Potential of Unmanned Aircraft Systems, a
report from the FAA states that the initial implementation is rife with argument and a major
concern is privacy invasion impacts on security, influence on international diplomacy, and drone
flights’ risks to property and people. At the same time operators have recognized the potential in
technological, economic, and social-political benefits and are working to change the perception.
One main reason that public perception needs to be updated is that perception often influences
rules, regulations, and policy. Keller et al. (2018) stressed the importance of more research and
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validation of a research instrument called Public Utilization Perception Potential. Their literature
review showed that there are mixed public perceptions for both support and opposition in
applications of use for UAS. Keller et al. (2018) stressed the importance of identifying the
factors that influence public perception as the relationships between these factors will assist all
UAS stakeholders in successful incorporation of UAS in the NAS. Investment in informational
resources, training, and support for sponsorship groups by government, commerce, and
university will enhance public knowledge and will also assist in safety programs and risk
mitigation. The next sections will discuss areas that UAS are being employed and some of the
problems associated with the use due to policy and perception.
Medical
Drones have started playing a role in assisting healthcare providers. With increased
demand for healthcare services there is potential for UAS to provide this service. Movement of
supplies and equipment in all types of environments could be augmented in a timely manner that
saves lives using drones. Thiels and Aho (2016) summarized potential applications for drones in
medicine. They showed that as early as 2015 drone flights carried prescriptions, blood samples,
and defibrillators and that there are other applications in the healthcare area that need to be
explored to save lives. One of the benefits is that many of the medical laboratory samples that
need to be transferred for analysis are lightweight, which is a perfect fit for the sUAS (Thiels &
Aho, 2016). The demand for quick analysis will continue to grow, and sUAS may well be a
perfect way to get highly perishable samples tested. Drones could also be used to deliver
medication in a timely and safe manner. This may be beneficial to all where controlled
substances are required. Prescriptions could be done for as short as daily or weekly delivery
which could prevent theft and addiction. These deliveries could open avenues for quick and
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efficient communication between emergency personnel, pharmacists, and doctors. In addition,
drones could be equipped with cameras for assistance in telemedicine and disaster response,
along with first responder supplies and organ transportation.
Due to COVID-19, countries were able to get permission to conduct trials to use drones
to carry samples and test kits up to 40 miles in Scotland. It was documented those remote
geographical locations were able to receive supplies in 15 minutes versus the normal 36 hours by
road (Morrison & Chadwick, 2020). This, in of itself, could be the difference between life and
death for some patients. This also shows that drone equipment and capability are available to
move goods. With better optimization of delivery of medical supplies by drones, home health
care could be improved. Euchi (2020) reviewed over a dozen applications of drones assisting in
the health care industry. Of special note is that the uses of drones may mitigate negative
environmental, social, and technical aspects of drones (Euchi, 2020).
Commercial Delivery
With COVID-19 and the large lockdown on economies, another aspect of drone use that
needs further understanding is commercial delivery of goods. The FAA issued new rules in 2020
overseeing commercial drone use for delivery of goods. This went into effect in February 2021
and has provisions for delivery of food, medical supplies, and other small items. In addition,
these rules that took effect in early 2021 have addressed some of the safety and security
concerns. The use will require remote ID and allow some drones to fly at night and over people
while delivering goods. Additionally, Amazon was one of the first companies granted approval
by the FAA to deliver packages by drones. As part of the procedure, operators must use the Part
135 certification process as outlined by the FAA (“Package Delivery by Drone,” 2020). The
FAA is supporting this program under the Unmanned Aircraft System (UAS) Integration Pilot
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program. This program was started in 2017 to build collaboration between the government and
private sectors to examine and assess the integration of UAS in the NAS, and it will assist the
DoT and the FAA in writing new rules that support the integration (“UAS Integration Pilot
Program,” 2020).
The application of use, along with the regulations that apply to those applications, was
touched upon lightly to show how complicated the integration into the NAS is for safe and
efficient use of the airspace. The next section will discuss some of the HFs to be considered for
integration of the UAS in the NAS. This will be done mainly from the air traffic controller
perspective. Literature is still sparse on the HFs associated as most of the drone use until
recently was at high altitudes and outside of controlled airspace. Now that many rules are
changing so that drones may be flown in controlled airspace, BLVOS, over populations and at
night it is imperative that there be better understanding of the possible HFs and ways to mitigate
incidents and mishaps.
There is little research available from the air traffic controller perspective on HF
considerations for UAS incorporation into the NAS. Cardosi and Lennertz (2017) did an
analysis of 220 drone-related reports submitted by controllers, pilots, and drone operators from
the ASRS database. The controllers’ primary concern was the difficulty of communications with
UAV pilots and the UAV pilots not understanding ATC clearance. It should be noted that of the
participants, only 17% represented air traffic controllers. The UAV pilots had concerns about
not receiving clear direction on operational restrictions and the possible irregularity of these
situation and the complications that irregular operations could cause in SA. The pilots of
manned aircraft also expressed the need to be protected from drone operations, and they had
difficulty seeing the drone in time to make avoidance decisions when needed (Cardosi &
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Lennertz, 2017). All these concerns can cause undue stress, lack of communication, and a large
amount of distraction, which, if not understood or corrected, could lead to incidents and
accidents. It is imperative that all stakeholders and especially air controllers understand the
implications of HFs so that drones may be safely incorporated into the NAS. Cardosi and
Lennertz (2017) review of the ARSR reports detail operational issues such as more training for
air controllers and drone pilots. Additionally, they pointed out that the missions reviewed were
under different rules as they applied mainly to military operations. However, some of those
situations and lessons need to be reviewed now that there are so many more small drones
registered and being used with more use on the horizon and with rule changes going into effect
in 2021. It is imperative that communication between air traffic control (ATC) and drones
become more standard and predictable so that confusion is not increased as workload increases.
Much of the workload increase will be in the proximity of airports, and it is imperative that
studies are done that focus on controllers’ experience identifying tools and mitigation strategies
to train both the controller and drone operator for fewer incidents (Cardosi, & Lennertz, 2017).
Cardosi and Lennertz recommended that continued monitoring of the ASRS be done for
understanding. The NASA ASRS 2019 report was also reviewed and compared to findings from
the Cardosi and Lennertz report later in the literature discussion.
Whenever a change in systems or operations comes to the air transportation industry
there are HF issues that come into play because change brings new procedures. Of note in the
Cardosi and Lennertz work is that even though drones have had HF situations since the
beginning, little was done to mitigate those situations. Cardosi and Lennertz stated that Neville
and Williams believe this was because the first use of drones was geared towards the military,
and HF issues were considered an unaffordable luxury to quick implementation of drone use. In
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addition, Cardosi and Lennertz also quoted research from Col. Dougherty who said, “Human
factors was not integrated into the original design of the Predator” (p. 200). This may have been
acceptable at the time; however. with the large amount of civilian drone registrations and the
forecasted increase in applicability, the time has come for understanding HF implications for safe
use in the NAS. The time for seamless and uncomplicated as possible integration is now.
Understanding current concerns requires identifying gaps in research that will enable safe and
well-organized drone operations in the NAS.
Some of Cardosi and Lennertz (2017) research focused on operational assessments with
feedback from air traffic controllers. They reviewed work done by Abrahamsen and Fulmer
(2013) that took views from over 100 ATC from four air route traffic control centers (ARTCC).
They included ATC in different positions and used open-ended questions. In this process
Cardosi and Lennertz were able to find common operational themes. Additionally, Thompson,
Won, Sollenberger, and Pastakia (2016) pursued responses from approximately 80 controllers
with drone experience that dealt with the effects of incident operations such as lost link, lost
communication, loss of the proficiency to DAA aircraft, and engine failure on ATC workload
and performance. The findings in both research results were similar and set some basic
interpretation to be discussed (Cardosi & Lenertz, 2017). The research identified the need for
additional expanded training as the main concern. It is important to note that at the time of
Cardosi and Lennertz research, there was no standard national curriculum for drones. This
current work should discover whether this has been remedied and whether it is improving the HF
implications to integration. Reviews were conducted to find some of the suggested initial and
recurrent training that is needed to incorporate sUAS. The reviewed research recommended that
initial and recurrent training be developed in both a computerized and in a face-to-face scenario
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(Abrahamsen & Fulmer, 2013; Thompson et al., 2016). In addition, other research noted that
training should also include scenario-based contingency operations (Pastakia et al., 2015). Of
note, is the significance in using the information to assess civilian integration of sUAS. Better
briefing information on drone flights that include drone mission, flight plans, contact information
and lost link procedures and overall communication procedures information needs to be
implemented. Additionally, communication between drone pilots and ATC for safe and efficient
operations with a special emphasis of standardization needs to be discussed and analysed.
Outside of the scope of this project, research needs to be completed that assesses the
available automation support with an emphasis on the benefits and complications with the
upcoming requirement of Remote ID of UAS. This would assist in addressing safety, national
security, and law enforcement concerns. In this vein, the FAA has mandated a Remote ID
process and procedure to begin in 2021; however, there will not be data available for a while to
see if this assists in safe integration.
Another area of research that needs consideration in HF is data for a better understanding
of issues that focus on HITL situations. It is hoped that the ASRS NASA 2019 report will
illustrate there is a need to incorporate procedures for improvement in this area. These studies
and reports focus on pilot and controller performance through workload, communication,
timeliness of response, and other factors. Cardosi and Lennertz (2017) reviewed studies that
were carried out by the FAA’s William Hughes Technical Center. Their data can be used to
examine information in the NASA 2019 report and the FAA sightings report to see whether there
are correlations.
A study by Buondonno, Gilson, Pastakia, and Sepulvado (2012) examined controller
performance with multiple UAV in Class D airspace for impact of drone operations through
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incrementally increasing a series of experimental scenarios. The idea behind the study was to
identify concerns pertaining to the integration of UAS into the NAS. Their report documented
the results of the Multi-UAS Operational Assessment: Class D Airspace, HITL simulation study
and was one of a series of research endeavors designed for promotion of UAS into the NAS.
The specialized purpose of the simulation was to identify and document events and their effects
on the NAS associated with mixing multiple simultaneous UAS operations with manned aircraft
operations within Class D airspace (Buondonno et al., 2012). The simulated airspace was in
California, and the UAS used were military as this was over a decade ago, and they did not have
enough data or types of civilian drones to have standard operation capabilities. The HITL
simulation purposely investigated the impact of multiple concurrent UAS and manned aircraft, in
both insignificant and off-nominal environments, to air traffic control communications, capacity,
situation awareness, proficiency, and safety of the operations. Interesting to note is that the study
showed “that the proposed operations were not feasible as simulated, and that several key
interoperability requirements must be identified and implemented before simultaneous Class D
operations with manned and multiple unmanned aircraft can be considered” (Buondonno et al.,
2012, p. 2). It is possible that now is the time to conduct studies that are more realistic to the
times with some of the standard drones in use for civilian operations. These studies or analyses
may give better comprehensive safety evaluations as there have been pockets of operations
approved throughout the NAS.
Another way to observe HF implications or reactions is to investigate contingency plans
or operations. Pastakia, Won, Sollenberger, Aubuchon, Entis et al. (2015) examined contingency
operations with controller performance by working with 24 TRACON controllers in both arrival
and departure and reviewed lost link, flight termination, lost communication emergency diverts,

55
and lost engine failure. Dealing with these situations and not having a standard contingency plan
may have a negative impact on the controller performance. This could also indicate that an
increased workload without an updated contingency plans or updated standardized training
program will also increase the mental demand and frustration for the controller. This could lead
to flight delays, which then may lead to a need for more communication between ATC and the
drone pilots. This type of scenario often leads to HF errors and possibly mishaps (Pastakia et al.,
2015). It is hoped that the FAA sighting and the ASRS from 2019 may shed some light on the
current situation and offer ideas for better solutions to controller workload pressures.
Additionally, word searches in reports analyzed will look for items that could be used to develop
contingency plans and/or scenarios for training.
One of the principal issues in integration has been the “see and avoid” FAA requirement,
which also requires being able to “see and avoid” without any assistance other than acceptable
corrective lenses. The see and avoid criteria has implications in the BLVOS and VLOS. New
technology that is being employed in sUAS operations in the DAA procedures uses equipment
on drones for safe BVLOS in controlled airspace. Truitt, Zingale, and Konkel (2016) were
understandably concerned with the “see and avoid” requirement and the impact it would have on
ATC performance for both workload and efficiency. They reviewed controllers in situations
during a missed approach and multiple low approaches and found that aircraft flew longer
distances and spent more time is a sector when a UAV was present. They also stated that
controllers believed that UAV operations had a negative impact on their workload (Truitt,
Zingale, & Konkel, 2016). This is comparable to Pastakia et al.’s (2015) work. They reinforced
some of the negative issues on controller workload and emphasized that more research needs to
be done to see what technology could mitigate the HF implications in this area. It may be
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possible to follow some of the procedures that the country of Poland is using with its focus on
VLOS and BVLOS operations by employing new technology (Konert & Kasprzyk, 2019).
Need for Current Analysis of Accidents and Incidents to Include FAA Sightings Reports
Analysis of accidents and incidents by Cardosi and Lennertz (2017) show that continued
analysis of ASRS reports is a productive means of finding HF issues in UAV operations. Their
research was conducted around 2015, and they also reviewed research from Williams (2004),
Tvaryanas, Thomson, and Constable (2006), and Wild, Murray, and Baxter (2016). At the time
of their study those operations were limited due to numbers on the civilian side and because
military operations are often classified. Data were available from the military which observed a
higher accident rate in UAVs with a focus on the HF in general.
Williams (2004) did a review and analysis of data collected from the military in a twostep process. The first step classified the data by categories, which included HFs, and the second
step looked at specific issues related to HFs, such as skill-based issues versus procedural errors
along with display design and alerts or alarms. The percentage of HFs varied from 20% to 68%
(Williams, 2004). Critical findings showed that there were many kinds of accidents and different
HFs and that most accidents could have been anticipated and possibly prevented. It was noted in
Williams’s research that there are different HF issues depending on the accidents, and it may be
beneficial to look for similarities in accident types along with HF match up.
Tvaryanas, Thompson, and Constable (2006) also reviewed the military between 1994
and 2003. They used the Department of Defense’s HFACS. Of the 221 mishaps reviewed, 60%
involved operations-related HFs. An example that Cardosi and Lennertz (2017) pointed out is
mechanical failures that are associated with HFs, such as an engine failure often accompanied by
a delayed response from the drone operator.
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Cardosi and Lennertz (2012) also reviewed Wild et al. (2016), who analyzed civilian data
from various aviation organizations. Wild et al. data were collected from a 10-year period and
covered over 150 events. There were a few differences in the analysis compared to data
collected previously. Wild et al. found that drone operations were more likely to experience,
“(1) loss of control in-flight, (2) events during takeoff and in cruise, and (3) equipment
problems” (p. 1). This shows that as more technology, operations and procedures are
implemented, human errors could increase. This also displays the significance of HFs, and that it
is imperative to do additional research and analysis that covers the last few years in sUAS
operations. This research needs to be done with stakeholder involvement and should include the
technologies, operators, and controllers for cross-over responsibilities. This will allow for the
best changes to procedures and regulations.
Cardosi and Lennertz (2017) stressed the importance of continued research, the research
staying responsive to operational needs, and the changes in operational needs. A productive way
this may be done is to analyze ASRS and mine the encounters of UAV pilots, commercial pilots,
and controllers who regularly interact with drones on a continuous cycle. This mining could
look for parameters or metrics found in the Swiss cheese and SHELL models. Their analysis of
ASRS reports could be adapted for the analysis on the NASA 2019 ASRS database report set and
the quarterly FAA UAS sightings to analyze for HFs in UAS incorporation in commercial
airspace. Their approach and adaptation to a current approach will be discussed in more detail in
Chapter 3.
Cyber Threat from Drones
There are security implications along with the rapid growth in drone usage. ALPA’s
Remotely piloted aircraft systems: Challenges for safe integration in civil airspace noted that
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there are challenges for current and future drone operation in complex airspace. Safety and
security are two different pieces to the operation; however, they need to complement each other
for safe and efficient operation. Communication capabilities with drones are a bit different in
that they have two parts. They exhibit the long-established style of ATC communication, but
this completely dependent on trustworthy, precise, two-way communication and not the
traditional controls and displays in a cockpit. This is called “command and control,” or C 2, and
is an integral part of incorporation and the second integral part of “detect and avoid” in the
airspace (ALPA 2015).
“Command and control” is completed with the pilot not present in the aircraft; instead,
this is done with a link in the wireless digital extension of the pilot. When this cannot be
completed, it is called “lost link”; the failure needs to be understood and evaluated as it is
susceptible for security threats. Mitigations must be established to prevent this from happening
as the “lost link” scenario is one that can lead to HF errors by both the Pilot and the controller
(ALPA, 2015; Best, Schmid, Tierney, Awan, Beyene, et al., 2020; Bora & Romny, 2020). While
many drones have preprogrammed commands for the aircraft in such an event, one must
remember that the pilot is no longer in control of the aircraft. This is concerning when the
aircraft is possibly near airspace occupied by other conventionally piloted aircraft and becomes
both a security and a safety concern. Though many operators, regulators, and controllers are
aware of this situation there is no clear set of procedures to report this situation to a government
agency (ALPA, 2015). When this broken link happens, it takes time, and this is where a breach
in security could take place. Incidents need to be reported for this type of situation, and
migration strategies need to be put in place.
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DAA is the second type of security and safety issue that technology needs to expand for
drones to operate safety. This could be looked at mainly as a safety issues but if the drone has
been hacked it becomes a security issue too. Since drones are very small, slow, and hard to see
by the human eye until they are very close mitigation methods need to be developed
electronically in conjunction with NextGen efforts in Automatic Dependent SurveillanceBroadcast (ADS-B) with GPS. Additionally, incidents need to be reviewed to see whether it is
possible to incorporate the new airborne collision avoidance system (ACAS) which is like
TCAS, only specific to drones (ALPA, 2015). Both ADS-B and ACAS could be the critical
improvements needed for the safety and security of drone integration in the NAS.
Analyzing current FAA sightings and ASRS reports could be done in a collaborative
manner and possibly using ALPA’s recommendations to mitigate challenges to UAS
incorporation. ALPA supports four essential elements to safely integrate UAS into the NAS,
which are education, registration, technology, and penalties and enforcements (ALPA, 2015).
Current analysis of incidents needs to be done to ensure these essential elements are in place and
safe integration will be maximized.
To further understand the possible cyber threats from drones, Best et al. (2020) work
also focused on current and future vulnerabilities. Their work highlighted some conceptual
approaches that assist in categorization of UAS cyber threats. It may be out of scope for this
research; however, it would assist in the analysis of ASRS reports and FAA sightings reports if
there were indicators that incidents were caused by vulnerabilities and security issues. Best et al.
also reviewed the use of UAS as both targets and trajectories of cyberattacks. They applied their
research to some real-world threat scenarios and looked at it from the perspective of the
Department of Homeland Security (DHS). Best et al. cited that the rapid growth in drone
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technology was over $12 billion and growing in 2021. Their research points to drones possibly
restructuring the cyber security world in two areas. First, drones could be a cybersecurity target.
Second, drones in the hands of adversaries could present more attacks as “cyber weapons.”
Their research looked at ways to categorize drone related cyber threats, which could assist
policymakers in writing legislation and could also assist in education and training for both
controllers and operators. Their research also highlighted industry developments and potential
implications of those developments (Best et al., 2020). Having this literature as a reference may
help find similarities in cyberattacks and other incidents in reporting.
Ly &Ly (2020) did a comprehensive literature review to identify which types of attacks
are the most common and what effects they cause in airspace. They found that spoofing and
denial of service attacks were the most common and concluded that there need to be
enhancements to drones and procedures to prevent the attacks (Ly & Ly, 2020). They also stated
that further studies are required for more details on how attacks are carried out and how to avoid
them.
Though Best et al. (2020), and Ly and Ly (2020) did not mention HFs there may well be
an HF element to cyber security. Reviewing and analyzing FAA sightings reports and ASRS
may reveal HITL situations that involve cognitive load, SA, and other HF elements that need
some safety risk management (SRM) for UAS operations. Cyber breaches and attacks have
elements that can impair ATC cognitive workload. This should encourage further research in HF
and cyber breaches in ATC and UAS operations. reports
Conclusion
Throughout the literature review areas outside of the scope of this research were found
that need additional exploration for the safe and secure integration of drones into commercial
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airspace and those areas were noted. Authors reviewed believe the growth of drone use will
continue to be a key part in connecting people and delivering goods to people. Authors such as
Vattapparambam et al. (2016) believe that there is a gap in research that needs to be eliminated
because this growth brings together several procedural and social matters and challenges in the
areas of cybersecurity, privacy, and public safety. The research in this paper identifies the gaps
and finds ways that drones may be used for the improvement of society without the fear of
malicious attacks or threats.
Additionally, the literature review identified research gaps in the HFs area of drone
integration in commercial airspace. Specifically, it was noted that there is a gap in the
knowledge in HITL with the relationship between the air traffic controller and the drone. This
means that more research needs to be conducted to understand the right level of workload for the
air controller that will optimize the drone and ATC interaction (Stark et al., 2012). There are
overall goals of HFs understanding in the FAA to support an attainment of high levels of humansystem operation across the industry. The FAA also has the goal to do continuous research to
ensure the “systems of systems” operations such as ATM, considers the multifaceted interactions
among people, technology, procedures, and organizations. The FAA also stated that this
research needs to have an approach that brings promotion, education, and partnership among HF
organizations within the FAA together to collaborate with industry, academia, and global
partners (FAA, n.d.b).
Cardosi and Lennertz (2017) also discussed gaps in research. Their research revealed that
most data available have focused on military drone use and that for safe incorporation of drones
in commercial airspace continuous research needs to be done due to the ever-increasing use of
drone application in the civilian world. They believe that continued research using data that are
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available on a regular basis from ASRS could fill the gaps in understanding HFs, thus being able
to mitigate risks associated with the HF issues currently known (Cardosi & Lennertz, 2017).
This could also identify areas of risk as they occur and grow the body of knowledge on human
errors in ATC and drone integration quickly, further mitigating risks.
Summary
In summary, Chapter 2 was a discussion of some of the pertinent literature that is
available about ATC and drone incorporation into a “system of systems” that operates the
commercial airspace. As the system is so complex, the literature review examined crucial
concepts as they applied to ATC and civilian drone integration from an HF perspective. It relied
on data from a military perspective and identified that there is a gap from the commercial
perspective in the research and mitigations that comes from the change brought in with sUAS in
the NAS. Neville and Williams may have been the first to identify this lack of knowledge and
research because the initial use of drones by the military. Both Neville and Williams and Cardosi
and Lennertz research showed that this may have been because HF were not studied in as much
detailed in civilian application as they wanted the drones use in military scenarios to be quickly
implemented. This has often been the case when a piece of equipment is being developed for the
military to use in a hostile situation (Cardosi & Lennertz, 2017).
The gap in literature and research may have also been increased because the rapid growth
in civilian application especially in controlled airspace may not have been adequately estimated.
Kamienski and Semanek, point out that UAS operators are at an increasing rate are requesting
access to controlled airspace (2015). The fast that their research again focused on large military
drones shows the lack of anticipation of sUAS involvement in the NAS. Additionally, the FAA
regulations require applications for waivers to fly in certain controlled airspace, at night, beyond
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the line of visual sight and over people. The number of applications for these types of operations
have increased with few given waivers. There is the strong possibility that not being able to
operate drones in an area that brings in more human error opportunity leaves research more at the
speculative level and may have not been attractive to the researchers. As these types of
operations are made permissible there is the probability of human error increase due to HF
elements. This in of itself should encourage more research and diminish the gap of understanding
the HF implications of sUAS us in the NAS.
It also showed that with the rapid growth in sUAS use, reviewing and analysis of the
latest ASRS report and FAA UAS sightings will give a current snapshot and possibly identify
risk mitigation and solutions for safe incorporation of sUAS. The literature stressed the
importance of growth in knowledge of HF, potential for human error, cyber threats and other
risks associated with the growth of the drone industry. The chapter also brought in some of the
history, policies, regulations, and current uses of drones. The chapter also had a focus on drone
integration challenges in the NAS in the last decade.
The review also looked at how risk is currently identified and analyzed to see the
possibilities to use some of those methodologies in a combined manner for further data gathering
and analysis. Chapter 2 did not cover every single HF or type of use of drones; however, it
discussed enough so that one can understand that there is need for research to mitigate the risk of
drones in commercial airspace from the controller machine interaction and HF. I explain the
method that will be used for data gathering and analysis in Chapter 3 to safely incorporate drones
in the commercial airspace from a controller HF perspective.
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CHAPTER 3: METHOD
This chapter includes the quantitative research design, methodology, the procedures used
to gather the data, data analysis strategy, reliability, and validity of the research. In this chapter
the problem and purpose are restated along with the research questions. It is important to note
that all levels of government seek to provide safe integration of sUAS in the NAS. However,
there are specific problems that must be examined to mitigate the risks, specifically in the safety
and security areas of HF and cybersecurity.
The purpose of this quantitative study was to determine, through statistical analysis of
reports involving UAS sightings and incidents, HF, safety, and security risks that need to be
mitigated for safe and secure incorporation of sUAS in the NAS. The data to be analyzed were
gathered from the NASA 2019 ASRS report, and the three most current FAA UAS sighting
reports. The first available FAA UAS sightings report was reviewed for general knowledge but is
not analyzed. and the three most current reports. This analysis will use some of the variables that
Cardosi and Lennertz (2017) used for comparison and possible risk mitigation.
Problem Statement
Though HFs associated with UAS operations come in an assortment of characteristics,
they are inadequately represented in literature. The inadequacies do not have a strong focus on
the integration of drones from the air controller or the operator of the drone from a HF
perspective (Cardosi & Lennertz, 2017). The next few years will include an increase in civilian
and commercial use of drones in the NAS and is expected to expand in the aerospace industry
(Stark et al., 2012). As the number of UAVs in controlled airspace increases, situations have
appeared where UAVs have clashed with air traffic and caused concern for air traffic safety,
efficiency, and workload in ATM (Vengal, 2011). Though HFs associated with UAV operations
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come in an assortment of characteristics, they are inadequately represented in literature, focusing
on the controller and air traffic management. Those who have been identified need to be
critiqued to ensure they are accurate. Additionally, they need a risk assessment and the
interconnections of the humans-in-the- loop identified. This analysis will identify protocols to be
tested to ensure air traffic controllers manage safe operations in the NAS of UAVs with other air
traffic.
Purpose of the Dissertation Study
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV)’s is a recent phenomenon in ATM. Truitt, Zingale,
and Konkel (2016) demonstrated the significance of mitigating risk so that UAVs’ access to the
NAS is completed safely and expeditiously. This dissertation assessed some of the current and
future challenges of incorporating UAVs in the NAS in a safe manner. Examination of UAV
accidents and incidents obtained from the ASRS, and the FAA quarterly sightings reports for risk
assessment and human-machine interface can provide protocols to test for safe incorporation of
UAVs into the NAS. The results will have a meaningful influence on the growth of UAVs’
positive contribution to the aerospace industry.
Research Questions
This study’s central research question was: How can negative consequences of
integration in commercial airspace between UAS and ATM systems be reduced, so that when
incidents happen SA and HF risks are negligeable?
Supporting sub questions were developed:
1. What protocols could be identified to ensure air traffic controllers develop metrics for
cognitive workload, SA and other HFs to ensure safe operations in the NAS of UAVs
with other air traffic?
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2. What needs to be done to mitigate HF issues using risk management and safety
management processes within the new operations of UAS in NAS?
3. What are the factors that influence the safe implementation of UAS integration in the
NAS?
4. In what ways could the perception with the public be improved to increase support of
integration of UAS in the NAS?
5. What technology investments can be made for communication and airspace
management for safe operations of UAS within the NAS?
6. What action can be taken on the regulatory challenges for safe and efficient UAS
operation in the NAS?
Research Design
Government organizations both in the U.S. and globally seek to provide safe use of the
NAS for all stakeholders. However, with the rapid rise in desire and use of sUAS it is imperative
that ATC and HF be researched to mitigate the risks associated with the incorporation. This
study employed the quantitative phenomenological research method to explore ways to mitigate
the risks from an air traffic controller perspective and HF perspective on how to incorporate
drones in commercial airspace. The research encompasses statistical analysis of the possible
threats and their mitigation for expanded use in the NAS.
To produce dependable assessments, quantitative research requires large numbers of
contributors, and the analysis is done through statistical tools to ensure better representation of
findings (Harkiolakis, 2020). Collecting data for quantitative studies is based on tools and
processes. This research involved using the ASRS reports and the FAA UAS sightings reports.
The ASRS reports are read and analyzed by members of ASRS aviation safety analysts who have
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experience as pilots, air traffic controllers, and mechanics. Each report must be reviewed by at
least two analysts to discover aviation hazards and to classify reports along with other duties
before the reports are incorporated into the ASRS’s database (NASA, n.d.a). The FAA UAS
sightings reports come from pilots, citizens, and law enforcement. The FAA uses the reports to
send messages to all stakeholders and to educate users on proper procedures. The FAA fines
people for unauthorized flights and encourages the public in general to report unauthorized drone
use (FAA 2021 d). These two types of reports are analyzed and compared to give past and
current situations and to offer risk mitigation.
Research Method and Design Appropriateness
With the methodology of quantitative research chosen and the research questions along
with the conceptual framework developed the next step was to devise a plan. Using the
secondary research data gathered from the ASRS reports and FAA UAS sightings to collect the
data made it easier for analysis. The idea of using these reports was that the reports focus on a
repeating occurrence so that the sample group experiences, or phenomenology could be studied
and analyzed. The ASRS reports from both NASA and the one analyzed by Cardosi and
Lennertz (2017) are analyzed by an aviation safety specialist, while the FAA UAS sightings are
submitted by anyone. Both styles of reporting (ASRS and NASA) are about a repeating
occurrence or a theme, which is drones in places that may cause incidents. This research design
had an underlying philosophy that guided in the quantitative methodology. Elements from the
Swiss cheese and SHELL models while analyzing the test of the incidents reports in the ASRS
and FAA UAS sightings were used. Data was mined from the reports and incorporated into
Excel spreadsheets to tally numbers by situation.
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Population, Sampling, and Data Collection Procedures and Rationale
Population Sampling
In this study the target population consisted of UAV reports from the ASRS database
during two periods of time and FAA UAS sightings reports from four different periods of time.
This sampling segment of the population was guided by the purpose, research questions, and
perspective of the design in the research. Harkiolakis (2020) noted that for accuracy and to
eliminate bias, the sample must be a miniature reflection of the population. Non-probabilistic
sampling in the form of purposive sampling was chosen. This sampling is based mainly on
demographics because it is very efficient. The qualified participants material is in the databases
and reports from the ASRS and the FAA UAS sightings reports. The research sampling is based
on the supposition that like-minded persons exposed to a certain circumstance form association
or closely tied social groups (Harkiolakis, 2020). These stakeholders, especially the controllers,
regulators, operators, and safety minded individuals, will report incidents for safety
consideration.
Data Collection and Instrumentation
The first ASRS report reviewed HF issues recognized in operational assessments,
experimental research, incidents, and accidents. These 200 reports came from air traffic
controllers, UAV pilots, and pilots of manned aircraft and were analyzed by subject matter
experts picked by the FAA. (Cardosi & Lennertz, 2017). These 200 reports that were analyzed
are considered the baseline report and focused mainly on military situations. Some of the same
variables from the reports Cardosi and Lennertz used to analyze their HF scenarios were used in
this analysis from the ASRS report batch of 50 incidents provided by NASA. This is called a
sampling report from NASA involving 50 UAV events which is raw data. The report is the 13th
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report, includes 50 records, and is dated February 2019. The current batch report was analyzed
as a follow-up or continuation of similar work done by the Cardosi and Lennertz 2017 research.
All ASRS reports generated and analyzed by NASA are not mandatory so they may reflect
reporting biases (NASA 2019). However, the report narrative is qualitative information that was
used to build quantitative information for analysis and to represent purposive sampling. The
samples size from ASRS is 200 older reports (Cardosi & Lennertz, 2017) and the 50 most
current reports (NASA 2019). The ASRS database online is considered the world’s largest
storehouse of information the is voluntary and confidentially submitted (NASA, 2019). The
reports are submitted by members that are in the aviation industry. One benefit of these reports is
that the narrative section is a good source for information on human factors as they apply to the
incidents. These reports may be reviewed after names have been removed to assist with policy
change, research, training, and education (NASA, 2019). The ASRS has 30 Database report Sets
on areas that are of interest in the aviation community. UAV is included as one of the standard
30 reports. The report batch or set has 50 records that are a sampling of reports or a ratio
involving UAV events. The reports are reviewed for relevance on the topic. The list of topics is
updated as the aviation community interest changes. The objective is to provide reliable data of
the 50 recent relevant records The reports are numbered, have a cover letter with explanations
and caveats regarding the use of the ASRS Data report sets (NASA, 2019). This gives more
reliability and validity to the material being relevant to the subject research. This also allows for
the research to be duplicated to observe changes in the subject matter, which, will allow
consistency in research models for analysis and the development of protocols to mitigate human
errors with sUAS in controlled and uncontrolled NAS. The February 2019 UAV report is
Appendix A and may reviewed in its entirety. The ASRS web page has a program briefing and
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other materials available for additional information on how to use the data for research,
education and training.
The FAA UAS sightings reports started with approximately 69 reports in 90 days from
November 1, 2014, through January 31, 2015, to approximately 350 reports in the last quarter of
2020 (FAA 2021). There are four FAA UAS sightings reports. The first one is from November
2014 to August 2015 and consists of about 600 sightings. Only the first 90 days of data for a
period to set the baseline were analyzed. The three most recent reports from the FAA are April
through June 2020, July through September 2020, and October through December 2020.
These six reports were mined for information to analyze and were modeled after the
ASRS data from Cardosi and Lennertz (2017). The instrumentation used is based on variables
that Cardosi and Lennertz used in their analysis which are listed below. The new variables may
change as the data are analyzed. However, this gives a base for all data reviewed. The data was
also gleaned to find specific HF verbiage.
1. Frequency of reported altitude of event
2. Frequency of reports by type of operation
3. Frequency of reports by airspace
4. Frequency or reports by phase of flight
5. Frequency of potential conflicts by type of operation, as reported by aircraft pilots
6. Proximity by altitude of potential conflicts (Cardosi & Lennertz, 2017).
Procedures
The procedure followed a four-step procedure. The proposed study utilized secondary
data, reported by numerous sources based on validated reporting procedures developed by the
FAA UAS sightings report and ASRS database. A copy of the Cardosi and Lennertz (2017)
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report is Appendix A. The standard ASRS forms is Appendix B and the ASRS 2019 report is
Appendix C.
The four-step procedure was explained in Chapter 1 and is expounded on more below in
a five-step process that still aligns with the procedures outlined in Chapter 1. Three of the steps
below became the data gathering and analysis process as outlined in Chapter 3. The fourth step
listed below will be discussed in Chapter 4 with the results. The fifth step listed below will be
discussed in Chapter 5 with the findings and recommendations.
1. Data mined from the ASRS database, and the FAA UAS sightings reports relevant to
UAV accidents and incidents.
2. Utilization of the SCM for risk identification and assessment. In this area I also
looked for risk indicators of a cyber event variable.
3. Employment of the principles of the SHELL model to look for HF variables. During
this analysis, I ensured data were reliable and validated with extensive review of the
credentials and requirements set forth in the forms for the ASRS reports and the
procedures that the FAA put forth to make a report to the FAA on a UAS sighting.
4. Discussion of the research findings and a summary of the data.
5. Presentation of findings and recommendations for protocols for further research for
possible implementation.
The data analyzed from the ASRS Data batch report was categorized in the following
areas to develop analysis using the Swiss Cheese and SHELL parameters. The keywords used
below are standard variables in analysis of ASRS and FAA data when reviewing HF and
possible mishap data. In addition, the flight synopsis was reviewed to look for keywords that
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pertain to HF. The ASRS was not analyzed for cybersecurity breaches as it is a non-punitive
report.
1. Altitude
2. Person reporting
3. Time of day
4. Mention of HFs
5. Conflict reported by reporter
6. Flight synopsis that included some details of the situation reported
To analyze the FAA UAS sightings reports, the two most recent FAA UAS sightings
were used data mining looked for patterns. It should be noted that the FAA UAS sightings report
per the FAA website is more geared towards policing the incidents and distributing fines to
people who breach security rules rather than finding safe ways to integrate drones. The list below
is a sample of the items that were used as variables to analyze the data. This information leads to
recommendations for safe sUAS integration into the NAS.
1. The US States that had the most sightings and where in those states were the sightings
located
2. Person/occupation giving the report to the FAA at the FSDO
3. Law enforcement involvement
4. Whether, in reviewing the summary, an HF indicator could be identified using HF
jargon found on ASRS reports
5. Whether, in reviewing the summary, a cyber threat was encountered
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Reliability and Validity
Reliability and validity are two criteria for good research as they are related to
measurement instruments in aviation. According to Mohajan (2017), validity is what and how
well an instrument measures something, and reliability is what one believes the data gathered
and the instrument used are trustworthy. It is a theoretical way to do analysis as it allows for
reporting to be used in a more practical manner. For example, technology is an important item to
use in ensuring continued safe operation in the NAS complexity. If there is a way to make
reporting more effective as more technology is developed it may be employed to assist in more
relevant data being obtained automatically through the new technology in reporting or gathering
data. The automated technology could assist in the data being uploaded to the reports in a more
accurate and timely manner. This information could be analysed quicker without taking away
from SA in the environment. The number of incidents is increasing so it is important to have data
that stays reliable and valid. Then this same information could be plugged into HFACS, SCM
and the SHELL concept to be analyzed in the PDCA manner that could mitigate human errors.
Having fewer human errors ensures there are fewer HF errors with the controller as the HITL.
This could also lead to better training scenarios and fewer incidents. Technology in reliability
and validity continues to improve and would assist in the four-step process for mitigation and
encourage continuous improvement. The technology allows for more current applicable results
that are better understood, thus being both more reliable and valid. Mohajan stressed that
according to Singh (2012), with good validity and reliability there is more transparency and with
more transparency there should be less ability for the researcher to insert bias (Mohajan, 2017).
As this research relied on secondary data from NASA and the FAA, a detailed assessment was
conducted to ensure the reliability of the data obtained from the two organizations. Without
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assessing the reliability and validity of the data obtained it is difficult to describe the
relationships, and it is hard to determine whether true information has been obtained (Mohajan,
2017). It is also important to note that reliability and validity are important tools to prevent
errors in research. Technology improvements will work with continuous reliable and valid data
being readily available for analysis.
As stated in Chapter 1, part of the conceptual framework included use of the SHELL
model. The SHELL was incorporated in the research for validation procedures. The SHELL
model aims to collect safety information during an investigation. Sharing safety information is
part of this research to ensure sUAS are incorporated into the NAS under the conceptual
framework. Part of the SHELL concept developed by Hawkins required the collection of
information from SHELL (Hawkins, 1987). This collection of information describes the
interaction between the software, hardware, environment, liveware and liveware elements and
delivers consistent data that provides safety indicators (Pouliquen, Ferrante, Jouniaux, Nicolas,
and BEA, 2005). The SHELL model depicts a system as the relationships of humans (a
Liveware and in this research the central liveware of point is the air traffic controller) with four
components: software, hardware, environment, and liveware. Each element of the model
includes items and their interactions (Hawkins, 1987). Pouliquen et al. discussed how the BEA
corporation developed a methodology validation protocol using the SHELL method, and this
process is taken in consideration in this research mining and analysis of data from NASA and the
FAA to identify risks and possible protocols for mitigation of integration of the sUAS in the
NAS.

75
Data Analysis
Harkiolakis (2020) proposed that the practical aspects of data need to be taken into
consideration so others can both follow and duplicate the research with similar results. This is
very beneficial in continuous study that desires continuous improvement. Processing and
analyzing the data go together, and the strategy needs to be clear to answer and test the research
questions. Creswell and Creswell (2018) asserted that it is important that data analysis consist of
variables that are understandable to form theories, findings, and recommendations. Data analysis
must also be assessed for truthfulness to support decision making (Creswell & Creswell, 2018).
The data analysis began by studying the variables from Cardosi and Lennertz (2017) as
previously stated. From there the second ASRS report was analyzed to find similar variables and
trends. The 2017 report covered 13 years and showed the number of reports growing from zero
to almost 90 in the 13 years. The most recent ASRS report included only 50 reports from 2019
so that variables may be validated or discounted for the ASRS 2019 report. Additionally, data
from FAA UAS sightings reports were analyzed to see whether similar variables could be
duplicated or whether additional information could be gleaned to give more relevance to the
study of HF indicators for ATC involvement with drones. The number of sightings went from
69 to as high as 485 in a three-month period (FAA 2021). The analysis of the data was used to
answer the primary and secondary research questions.
Summary
This chapter started with restating the problem and purpose of the research along with the
primary and secondary research questions. The research design section stressed the importance
of gathering or sorting data to populate the Swiss cheese or SHELL models for assessment. The
focus of the chapter was on the research design, methodology, data analysis plan, population,
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sampling procedures, reliability and validity, and ethics consideration. Additionally, details on
the processes, steps, and procedures used to be able to present the results, findings, and
recommendations in Chapters 4 and 5 was presented.
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CHAPTER 4: RESULTS
This quantitative research approach pursued research that could answer questions that
would ensure UAS could be safely integrated in the NAS. Its critical aim was to answer, how
can negative consequences of integration in commercial airspace between UAS and ATM
systems be reduced, so that when incidents happen SA, and HF risks are negligeable?
Supporting subquestions were also developed as listed:
1. What protocols could be identified to ensure air traffic controllers develop metrics for
cognitive workload, SA and other HFs to ensure safe operations in the NAS of UAVs
with other air traffic?
2. What needs to be done to mitigate HF issues using risk management and safety
management processes within the new operations of UAS in NAS?
3. What are the factors that influence the safe implementation of UAS integration in the
NAS?
4. In what ways could the perception with the public be improved to increase support of
integration of UAS in the NAS?
5. What technology investments can be made for communication and airspace
management for safe operations of UAS within the NAS?
6. What action can be taken on the regulatory challenges for safe and efficient UAS
operation in the NAS?
The research also targeted whether it is possible to find cybersecurity connections in data
available from NASA and the FAA. Current civilian use of sUAS that had the possibility of
large growth and use of the NAS were reviewed for applicability. There are so many market
opportunities for the use of drones for economic growth. Not all civilian applications were
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reviewed in detail in the literature review; however, data that could identify the civilian
applications to include search and rescue, firefighting, disaster relief, highway, rail and other
transportation modes, inspections, agriculture, recreation, and medical and package delivery
were studied. This enabled vigilance in finding reliable key pieces of data in the reports. The
primary finding was that sightings and incidents are increasing. However, almost all reports have
gaps in the information that would allow for the bigger picture to be presented and for risks to
HF to be mitigated. The results as they will be presented demonstrate that there are HFs present
applicable to air traffic controllers, and that they cause stressors to the air traffic controllers such
as, loss of SA, and work overload.
Another observation from reading the detailed summaries in reporting and follow-up
reporting data it that it takes time for air traffic controllers to receive and transfer that data. This
takes them away from their primary job of air traffic control and management. Additionally,
variables in the data show that many stakeholders participate in reporting sUAS in areas in which
they may not be authorized; however, there is little information to support follow-up data
collection or analysis that mitigate the risks to air traffic controllers and all stakeholders in
general. Much more analysis needs to be done to identify safety protocols that could be
developed and tested as a means of mitigating the risks to UAS incorporation in the NAS. This
chapter presents the findings, the emerging topics generated from the data analysis that
developed from the findings, and recommendations for safe UAS integration in the NAS from
the perspectives of air traffic controllers, which will make it safer for all stakeholders.
Pilot Study
The pilot study used to set up the current study was done by Cardosi and Lennertz
(2017). The pilot study done by Cardosi and Lennertz was broader in scope than this current
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research and analysis. Their research was a good base for variables to look for in analysis of the
current data. However, the focus of this research was to expand on the ATC perspective started
by Cardosi and Lennertz to see what new trends may be emerging with the growth in civilian
sUAS use, mainly in the aeras of safety and security. The pilot study that focused on military
drones showed there appeared to be many HF issues that could also be related to sUAS. Cardosi
and Lennertz report is lengthy, however, it is publicly available and is listed as a reference in this
research. Of note, the pilot study and current research analysis come from reports that were
voluntary in nature and may be only the tip of the iceberg of the current situation; however,
current data show a large increase in reporting. The pilot analysis showed that between 2003 to
2016 there was a significant increase in reporting. The pilot report also looked at the altitude of
events, reporter and aircraft type, time of day, conflicts, frequency of reports by airspace, and
frequency of potential conflicts by type of operation, as reported by aircraft pilots. The pilot
report also analyzed the HF issues faced with incorporation of drones at that time and included
recommendations from pilots and controllers, along with recommendations and next steps.
The recommendation for analysis of accidents and incidents becoming an ongoing
activity is what inspired this current research. Cardosi and Lennertz (2017) found there is
valuable information in the ASRS that may be analyzed for risk mitigation in UAS incorporation
in the NAS. Cardosi and Lennertz also proposed that the data described, gathered and analyzed
should be done on a continuous basis as data evolves. The continuous gathering may show
changes and provide information that updates contributing factors (Cardosi & Lennertz, 2017).
This current research aimed to do that by analyzing not only the current 2019 NASA ASRS but
also the ASRS forms to see what data are gathered to complete the analysis. Additionally, this
research added the step of data analysis of the FAA UAS sightings reports as those began about
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the same time as the analysis was completed by Cardosi and Lennertz in 2017. The forms are
available in Appendix A, and the NASA 2019 report is available in Appendix B. It was this pilot
or groundwork that set the stage for the evaluation of the information and offer the following
findings in this chapter.
Results of Analysis of Reports
Aviation Safety Reporting System
The Aviation Safety Reporting System is housed in a component of the government that
combines, business, and individuals both in and out of government agencies who continue to
advance aviation safety. The information collected is done on a voluntary basis and submitted
on aviation safety incident report forms, and no criminal information should be submitted
(NASA, 2020). There are four different forms that can be used to get information to NASA for
analysis, and three of the forms will be discussed in this research. The forms are called NASA
ARC 277A, B, and C, for ATC, general and cabin crew reporting forms. Once the report is
received it is analyzed and distributed to stakeholders to ensure the quality of human
performance in the NAS is maintained (NASA, 2009a, b, and c). These forms are in Appendix
A. The results of the analysis will focus on incident elements that include altitude, reporter, time
of the day, HFs, and conflict. The report set is a sampling of reports that have UAV events, and
the reports are screened to ensure they fit the topic. As the reviewers process the data, they
ensure all reports are de-identified permanently (NASA 2020).
Of significant note is the immunity concept of paragraph 9 c. of the FAA Advisory
Circular No 00-46 e that is adhered to. The forms also remind the reporter that aircraft accidents
and criminal activities are not to be reported on these forms. There are other cautions that NASA
advise the reader to keep in mind. They are aware that the data may reflect reporting biases, and
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that the report numbers exemplify the lower number of actual incidents (NASA, 2020). It is
important to keep in mind that the number of reports are just events that have been reports and
that there are many events that are never reported. The reports have strength in the narrative
section. This section NASA calls the “why it happened” section. This type of information is
qualitative and gives information that was used to find areas to improve safety. It also assisted in
answering the critical research question.
Cardosi and Lennertz (2017) recommended that the form be reviewed and updated if
needed. The current form available online is dated 2009 and still needs to have an update to
include sUAS information. The form expires in July 2022.
Both the Swiss cheese and SHELL concepts is used in the analysis of 50 incidents batch
report data mining to see whether the information requested could assist on the forms in
identifying HFs that impact safety in the use of drones in the NAS and whether
recommendations for improvement could supplied.
Reporters, time of day, and altitude. The first three items of the 50 reports analyzed
were the type of reporter, time of day, and the altitude because these three items set some of the
background for further analysis in the conflict and HF indicator. In the majority (20 or 40%) of
incidents the reporter was a crew member from a commercial air carrier. The other manned
aircraft reporters were 17 of the 50 (34%), a total of 74% of the reporters coming from manned
aircraft. It is proposed that they were on the frontline and the ones most adversely affected by a
sighting. sUAS pilots giving reports was 20%. The review of the narrative shows that sUAS
pilots report because they can gain knowledge from the experience of reporting and they know
that they cannot be identified in the final report. It is not known whether there were any
incidents that resulted in damage to people or property, whether the sUAS pilot may have had

82
some mitigation in culpability, or whether they had done an ASRS report prior. It is all part of
the confidentially process of ASRS reporting. The ATC reporters were only 6% and usually
reported loss of communication that a controller had with a drone. It is assumed that ATC’s low
number of ASRS reports is because they were not directly involved in the sighting unless they
had lost communication with the drone pilot. Figure 13 shows the data from reporters.
The time of day analysis broke out the time in six-hour blocks starting at midnight.
Current data reflect that sUAS are supposed to fly in daylight only so it was not noteworthy that
there were no sightings between midnight and 0600. This may change as regulations change. The
majority of the sightings took place between 1201 and 1800 followed by 0601 and -1200. From
1201to 1800, 48% of the incidents took place and from 0601 to 1200, 34% took place for a total
percent of 84% in daylight hours (Figure 14). Seeing sUAS during daylight is easier for aircrew.
The majority of the reporters were from manned aircraft so the larger takeaway for the
examination is that the drones flew as required mainly during daylight hours; however, they were
in close proximity to air carriers and may have been in airspace they were not authorized to be
in. Ther summary portion also gives the indiation there is also the possiblity that the drone pilot
may not have always had line of sight with the drone and may not have realized that they were in
the proximity of another aircraft, or they may not have been aware of the ASRS reporting.
The third factor is the altitude at which the reporter saw the drone. The majority (17 or
34%) were at 400 feet or below, which is the correct altitude where sUAS should be located. The
second largest group were at 14 of 50 events, and 34% were between 10,000 and 30,000 feet,
which are assumed to be miliatry drones (Figure 15). The data show that both sUAS and higher
level (possibly military) drones were in the right airspace; however, they may not have been
aware of their surroundings.

83
To summarize the background data, 74% of the reports came from manned aircraft with
40% of those being commecial aircrew. Addtionally, 84% of the incidents were during daylight,
which is when military drones usually fly, and the vast majority of sUAS are airborne. The
altitude of the incidents shows that most incidents were in the required 400 feet or below or in an
altitude that is usually reserved for military aircraft. However, these drones may have been in a
class of airspce they should not have been and that may cause a conflict with a manned aircraft,
which, in the majority of the time, has paying passengers aboard.

Figure 13. Person reporting.
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Figure 14. Person reporting.

Figure 15. Altitude of UAS.
Conflict and human factors. Evaluting the conflict situation and if it had a HF element
was improtant to this study. The conflict focused on reports that specified NMAC, which is
considered a safety concern and often has an HF involved. The NASA report also stated that
NMACs may exist in the highly-concentrated class “A” area rather than “B” due to the fact that
opeartors in class A may be more cognizant of the ASRS program and more disposed to report
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an incident when a NMAC occurs (NASA, 2020). This could be considered a bias or limitation
as it related to the quantitative statistical analysis performed. Of the 50 reports, 40% reported that
it was an NMAC situation and that 10% had to take evasive action. Even one evasive action
could prove to be a major diaster and cause loss of life (Figure 16). Of note was that the NMAC
often cited an HF situation.
The next area that was examined HF implications. This was done by looking for
keywords in the different sections of the report along with the narrative section that apply to
HFs. In addition, the SHELL technique was used when reading the narrative for identification of
HFs. The keywords looked for are listed below. FAA, in general, follows the Dupont 1993, 12
common human errors which are:
1. Lack of communication
2. Distraction
3. Lack of resources
4. Stress
5. Complacency
6. Lack of Teamwork
7. Pressure
8. Lack of Awareness
9. Lack of Knowledge
10. Fatigue
11. Lack of assertivness
12. Norms (FAA, n.d.-a)
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In addition, the DOT/FAA/AR/99-39 was reviewed and exemply Cardosi’s four HFs that apply
to ATC which could be considered under more than one of the above factors. The four HFs are:
1. Memory
2. Controller-pilot communication
3. Limitations to performance
4. Fatigue (Cardosi, 1999)
Overall, out of the 50 reports, 47 (94%) had an HF comment or phrase. Of the three ATC
reports 100% stated HF involvement. The top HF named as the primary cause was SA with 19
incidents (40%). Another 15 (32%) had SA and even broke it down into different parts of the
SHELL model. A total of 72% were related to HF, and each had a component of SA. The other
reports listed additonal HF implications. The reports were not clear on who had a lack of SA in
verbiage; however, in most cases the summary used a word to indicate it was the drone pilot who
probaly did not have good SA. Lack of good SA can lead to more SA in the other comments of
the SHELL model to include the air traffic controller.
The three ATC reports were detailed in the HF verbiage and should be noted; even
though there were only three reports out of 50, they were all HF related. The first report that
ATC did was a conflict in special use airspace between a piloted aircraft and two drones where
ATC had to issue an alert because there was a communication breakdown, and ATC felt
overworked. The second report from ATC involved an NMAC with a drone and a piloted aircraft
that had to take evasive action to prevent a midair the controller deemed as a loss of SA. The
third ATC related report was where a center controller had a loss of seperation between a sUAS
and a small transport aircraft and listed HF implications as human machine interface, situation
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awareness, training, and qualification and distraction, which all fit into analysis through the
SHELL and SCM.
It should be noted that when one piece of the SHELL has a situation that invovles SA, its
interaction with other parts of the SHELL which may cause additional SA for all pieces of the
model (FAA, 1999; FAA, n.d.-b; Miller et al., 2019). It is also possible that it brings in other
HFs for all memebers to include ATC. The HF brought in could cause performance to degrade
and the cognitive workload to become overwhelming for the parties invovled. Addtionally, the
increased workload could lead to fatigue, and this could cause more complications. One could
use the SCM and watch for HFs that align. When more HFs items align it is more likely an
incident could turn to an accident (Reason, 2000). Figure 17 shows the HFs invovled most often,
and Figure 18 is a list of all the HFs identified in the 50 reports.

Figure 16. Conflict report.
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Figure 17. Most often reported HF involved.

Figure 18. All human factors cited.
Through the analysis of the ASRS reports, a very strong HF connection in the ASRS
reports is shown. By combining the five varibles of reporter, time of day, altitude, conflict, and
HFs, the centeral and supporting subquestions of the research could possibly be answered.
Again, it should be stated that the main purpose of the ASRS reporting is safety and not
punative. However, the next step was to analyze the material from the FAA UAS sightings
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report, which may be used for punative purposes as stated before and to see corrolation or
immplication.
FAA UAS Sightings Reports
To analyze the FAA UAS sightings, report first the intent of the report on the FAA
website needed to be understood. As noted in the literature review, the GAO report noted that the
FAA could not verify whether the sightings were correct, and the public had to deal with an
incomplete web reporting process (GAO, 2018). Of special interest to me was the main purpose
of the FAA UAS report was to stop unauthorized use of sUAS. The FAA receives over 100
reports a month and want to see more compliance enforced through law enforcement and state on
the web page they will always contact the applicable law enforcement agency. The FAA wants
strong communication to all who operate drones where they are not legal that they may be
subject to large fines and criminal charges that could result in prison time (FAA, 2021). The
FAA is working with the aviation industry to educate drone users; however, they need to stress
that a lack of education is not an excuse for breaking the rules, and they are working closely with
the law enforcement to investigate unauthorized flights. The FAA with other authorities has
imposed civil punishments and have many cases in progress. The FAA also encourages citizens
to report to local law enforcement sightings of improper use of drones (FAA, 2021). One part of
the website also recommends a person calls the FSDO to report an unauthorized drone sighting.
It is not known whether the report is complete by using a form or whether the notifier talks and
the FSDO does the form as this information is not available on the web page or any of the related
documents.
In the study there was a search for items that could answer the main research question
and the subquestions. The two FAA UAS sightings reports analyzed were from FY2020Q4 and
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FY2021Q1. FY2020Q4 had 486 reports, and FY2021Q1 had 366 reports, showing that both are
well over 100 reports a month. The FAA UAS sightings report is different from the ASRS, and
there is no information available on the FAA website on how they are using the data for analysis
other than to punish people. The data consist of four items which are day of sighting, city and
state of sighting, and a summary. The first three categories give useful information to display on
maps; however, the summary has many components that would need to be broken out in other
spreadsheets for analysis. The intent in reviewing the research was to evaluate the following
items for safety and security concerns.
1. Which U.S. states had the most sightings and where in those states the sightings were
located
2. Person/occupation giving the report to the FAA at the FSDO
3. Law enforcement involvement
4. Whether, in reviewing the summary, an HF indicator could be identified using HF
jargon found on ASRS reports
5. Whether, in reviewing the summary, a cyber threat was encountered
Location of sightings by U.S. city and state. Time was spent reviewing the elements of
the FAA UAS sightings reports and it revealed that the first report in 2014 used a 10-month
period. Because of that it would be difficult to compare the 10-month periods to the current
quarterly reports, so no correlation was done to the initial report. However, there are two
important points from the first report: (a) the 10-month report showed about 750 sightings, which
is about 75 a month; and (b) California was in the lead with 171 reported sightings. These two
points are important as they show a place further research should be done possibly with a stateby-state perspective to find out why the numbers display as they do. This is because these
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numbers are significantly higher in certain states than locations. Having higher numbers may
indicate a place that a mishap would happen before other places. The research and analysis of
higher number sites gives a larger sample of data to investigate and prevent further infractions
that often lead to mishaps.
Similar to the Cardosi and Lennertz (2017) pilot study for the ASRS information, this
study also used the information from GAO report the GAO for this study was GAO 18-110 as a
pilot report. Also, as noted in the literature review, the FAA now requires all commercial,
public, and non-recreational UAS operators and pilots to register UAS. Figure 19 depicts the
registrations by state and helps put in context the FAA UAS sightings.
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Figure 19. The FAA registrations of recreational and commercial sUAS as of October 31, 2017.
(Retrieved from GAO 18-110 report, Small unmanned aircraft systems, 2018).
As the use, integration, rules, and regulations are changing rapidly, this research
examined data from the most current report and then work backwards. The most current report
was the data in FY2021Q1, which is from October 1, 2029, to December 31, 2020. There were
364 incidents listed in the report. This aligns with the FAA statement on the webpage that says
there are more than 100 reports in each quarter and the reported sighting are growing. The data
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showed that 42 (84%) states reported unauthorized use of drones. California had 74 reports
(20%). Figure 20 shows the complete numbers by state. The top ten states accounted for 265
sightings or a little over 71% of the sightings. Figure 21 shows complete numbers by the top 10
states. The top three states were border states and bordered on the water. They account for 158
sightings or a little over 43%. The top ten locations all have busy airports or are in densely
populated area. Seven of the 10 are border states, and six of the 10 border the water.

Figure 20. FAA UAS U.S. sightings.

Figure 21. FAA UAS USA top ten states.
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California is the state with the most sightings, and of the 74 sightings 21 (28%) are in and
around Los Angeles, which is a highly populated area with many airports. After Los Angeles the
numbers dropped drastically and were spread out over the entire state as depicted in Figures 22
and 23. Both a figure listing of all sightings is displayed as well as the top ten for better visual
effects.

Figure 22. UAS 2014 sightings by California cities.

Figure 23. UAS 2014 sightings, average number by California cities.
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The third largest state was Texas with 37 sightings, and the majority were in either
Houston or the Dallas/Fort Worth area, which are both densely populated. Texas had about 60%
less sightings than Califiornia, but it is 69% larger than California. This may bring in additional
ideas for further research on the density of the states population. Figure 24 and Figure 25 show
those results.

Figure 24. Texas UAS sightings FYQ1 2021.

Figure 25. Size comparison of Texas compared to California.
The next report reviewed was the FY2020Q4, which had 484 sightings for a three-month
period, again over 100 per month. California was in the top place again, and seven of the
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remaining top ten from FY2021Q1 were in the top ten. Figures 26 and 27 show the numbers, and
Figure 28 gives a chart with top ten state numbers for the 484 sightings. Again, it was observed
that the top three were California, Florida, and Texas.

Figure 26. FAA UAS U.S. sightings FY2020Q4.

Figure 27. FAA UAS U.S. top ten sightings FY2020Q4.
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Figure 28. Top ten UAS U.S. sightings FY2020Q4.
Texas had 36 sightings with Dallas/Fort Worth in the top place, while Florida is in fourth
place with 33 sightings. The most sightings for Florida were in Miami (Figures 29 and 30). The
data show that the last two quarters were about the same for sightings of drones in the wrong
place, maintaining over 100 a month with California, Texas, and Florida staying in the top five
states.
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Figure 29. UAS Texas Sightings FY2020Q4.

Figure 30. UAS Florida sighting FY2020Q4.
In summary, the data for two consecutive quarters show that the sightings remain at over
100 sightings a month. In addition, the sightings are in densely populated areas, and the report
showed that U.S. states are consistent from quarter to quarter. It should also be noted that of the
873,000 registered drones, fewer than 1/10 of one percent have been where they do not belong.
This may be a small number, but it could be catastrophic if improper use of a drone causes loss
of SA that results in an accident.
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Person/occupation giving the report to the FAA. For the two UAS sightings reports
evaluated, 95% of the information came from an FAA air traffic controller. The summary was
not clear as to the sequence of events for reporting. The information presented in the sightings
report displayed that almost all the incidents were given to air traffic control from pilots. Once
ATC received the material, they had to document the information in some type of format to relay
the data to the FSDO. The initial reporting and gathering of data took away the primary focus of
both the controller and the pilot of the manned aircraft reporting the situation throughout the
process. This shows additional tasking for the air traffic controllers in a work environment that
was already very busy. This will be discussed further in Chapter 5 in the findings and
recommendations section.
Law enforcement involvement. Next the summary of the UAS sightings report was
studied and the majority showed some type of law enforcement involvement. The summary area
of the report combined different items; however, having information on the number of sightings
reports that were referred to some type of law enforcement agency and whether there was
mention of a possible cyber threat could be significant. This was partially because the FAA
emphasizes penalties to the drone operator for being in the wrong place and the FAA also
encourages people to report sightings of drones doing illegal activities. Most of the reports state
that law enforcement had been notified however, they do not expand of what was done in most
reports. The first report covering November 2014 to August 2015 had over 750 reports or about
75 a month. Of those, the summary showed that about 50% involved law enforcement. Both the
FY2021Q1 and FY2020Q4 showed that almost 85% had been referred to law enforcement
agencies. As this is a summary of the sightings it does not include information about law
enforcement actions.
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However, the GAO 2018 did provide some valuable information on the range of actions
that can be used to tackle noncompliance and unsafe acts. The FAA has limited funding to
enforce these actions, but they are able to impose a fine of up to $20,000, which may be one way
to obtain more resources for enforcement and education. Table 3 depicts actions taken between
2007 and 2018.
Table 3 Number of Actions Taken by the FAA to Address Noncompliant or Unsafe Use of sUAS
Number of Actions Taken by the FAA to Address Noncompliant or Unsafe Use of sUAS

Note. (GAO, 2018, 18-110)
Human factors indicators. Of the approximately 1600 incidents reviewed for the initial
10-month period and the last two quarters, about 95% (1500) did not involve PDCA any evasive
actions. That does not mean there were not HF indicators; it just means none were brought up or
stated in the report. In Chapter 5 there is discussion about which HFs have been involved that
could lead to human error. Additionally, there is dialog on what could be done to assist the
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controller in ensuring safe and expeditious control of manned aircraft with unmanned aircraft in
the vicinity.
Cyber security indicators. The 1600 reports were scanned from a high level to observes
and look for indicators that a cyber incident took place along with an unauthorized location of
the sUAS. Though over 90% of the reports were forwarded to law enforcement of some type,
not a single summary indicated it was a cyber incident. This, coupled with the analysis from the
ASRS reports that stated lost communication between the controller was about 5%. Lost
communication could come from equipment failure and could be caused by a malicious attack. A
malicious attack on communication systems is a cyber threat, which will be examined in the
Chapter 5.
Summary
In summary, this chapter focused on data analysis to find answers for the research
questions. It began with a review of the pilot study conducted by Cardosi and Lennertz (2017)
that focused on HFs that should be considered for safe incorporation of drones in the NAS. Of
note is that controllers depicted incidents in that study that caused interference and could impact
SA, communication, and workload, which are all HFs in ATC (Cardosi & Lennertz, 2017). It
was also noted that most of the self-reported incidents in the 2017 report were military drones.
NASA’s ASRS reports were used from 2019 to see what had changed in two years.
Additionally, the NASA report forms were used to ensure that nothing had changed in the items
that were reported. It was found that most of the current reports that involved sUAS were still
mainly generated by manned aircraft crew. The analysis also showed that lost communication,
SA, and workload were impacted by the smaller drones too. The final data analyzed were from
FAA, UAS sightings reports from over 1600 incidents. There was a main difference noted
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between the two types of reporting and that is the ASRS is voluntary and non-punitive while the
FAA is mainly for punitive purposes. Through analysis of the incidents both voluntary and
punitive in nature, the research in previous chapters show that the research questions are
answered and that recommendations may be made for safe integration of sUAS in the NAS along
with recommendations for further research. The next chapter of the research will answer the
research questions, make recommendations, and outline future studies.
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CHAPTER 5: FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Concerns about a safe integration of sUAS in the NAS have been going on for over a
decade. With the rapid increase in use and waiver requests, the FAA has started to make
changes to procedures, and they are allowing more usage of drones in places and for purposes
that were different just three months ago. This requires more research and analysis to ensure the
changes do not have a negative impact on HF relationships for ATC.
Due to the anticipated rapid increase of drone usage in the NAS it is imperative to have a
way to mitigate HFs errors in drone use, especially for the air traffic controller as they are often
the front line for manned and unmanned aircraft from point A to point B. Human behavior in the
operation of sUAS has been challenging in the last decade. The literature review and data
analysis showed in earlier chapters that as more humans are flying drones with minimum
education of aviation and airspace, the more human errors have taken place. This was evident in
the review of ASRS reports, which are voluntary and non-punitive, along with the FAA UAS
sightings reports that are reported for punitive purposes. The reports used for analysis did not
reflect data that could be used to prevent cyber incidents, and this is an area for further research
that will be discussed in the recommendations.
The literature review also showed that there was a lack of research that emphasized the
air traffic controller’s role and the HFs as they applied to the controller. This may be because
many of the drone flights were not under ATC control. It may also be because there have not
been many reported accidents that involved drones. The review, research, and analysis also
showed that as more drones are flying and the more it jeopardizes air traffic controllers’ SA,
communications procedures, and workload cognitive abilities (Cardosi & Lennertz, 2017; FAA,
1993, 2016). Additional examination from the literature review showed that there are concerns
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about HFs in drone use, and it is possible that some of the challenges with these factors arise
because aircraft and operators are not located in the same place and because the air traffic
controller is often not involved until there is an incident (McCarley & Wickens, n.d.). The
specific HF problems researched pertain to the air traffic controller, but they appear evident in
the crew of both manned and unmanned aircraft.
This study’s central research question focused on how air traffic controllers could
minimize the impact of HFs while incorporating drones in the NAS. The primary research
question was: How can negative consequences of integration in commercial airspace between
UAS and ATM systems be reduced, so that when incidents happen SA, and HF risks are
negligeable?
The study’s objective was to investigate how air traffic controllers could positively
influence HFs as they pertain to drones in the NAS, thus minimizing negative results and
increasing safer use of airspace. The subsequent subquestions assisted in investigating the topic:
1. What protocols could be identified to ensure air traffic controllers develop metrics for
cognitive workload, SA, and HFs to ensure safe operations in the NAS of UAVs with
other air traffic?
2. What needs to be done to mitigate HF issues using risk management and safety
management processes within the new operations of UAS in NAS?
3. What are the factors that influence the implementation of UAS integration safely in
the NAS?
4. In what ways could the public’s perception be improved for increased support of
integration of UAS in the NAS?
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5. What technology investments can be taken for communication and airspace
management for safe operations of UAS within the NAS?
6. What actions can be taken on the regulatory challenges for safe and efficient UAS
operation in the NAS?
The quantitative research focused on finding ways to mitigate negative consequences of
integration of the sUAS in the NAS. This was done to answer all questions asked in Chapter 1
and to present findings and recommendations in Chapter 6. Chapter 6 will also discuss the
limitations while doing the research, recommendations for future research, and a chapter
summary.
Limitations
It can be assumed that all research faces some type of challenge. These challenges need
to be identified so they do not severely weaken the quality of the research. As stated in Chapter
1, “Limitations are usually areas over which you have no control. Some typical limitations are
sample size, methodology constraints, length of study and response rate” (Wargo, 2015, p. 15).
Also, stated in Chapter 1, were the concerns on the validity of the data as neither the
ASRS nor the FAA UAS sightings reports were mandatory. To compensate for the situation, the
background, and requirements of the two types of reports were reviewed. With the ASRS report
the NASA website was reviewed in the area and blocks on the forms that should be completed to
report an unsafe situation. This information on the ASRS forms that generate the reports were
very detailed with boxes to check and a place for the reporter to put a narrative (ASRS, 2009).
Additionally, those who evaluate the reports and make the information available to the public are
well versed in the reports, their purpose, and the industry (NASA 2021). Though the data may
have some limitations in the information, the information provided gives consideration that was
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further analyzed to come up with recommendations to answer the critical research question and
subquestions. On the other hand, the FAA sightings report did permit some limitations in certain
areas. The reports show an increasing trend of reporting drones in locations they are not
authorized to be in, but it was found that the summary did not do an analysis of the situation
which gave the opportunity to delve into the summary to find causes and effects that led to the
recommendations. This limitation is addressed further in the findings in this chapter.
The second limitation was that the reports may not show HF or indicate a cyber security
threat. The information that identifies HF situations, is better in the ASRS than in the FAA UAS
sightings report, and this too will be addressed in this chapter. The third limitation is that most
reports are about situations close to airports; however, it still gave the opportunity for findings,
recommendations, and further research. The fourth limitation was that the data gathered were for
snapshots of time and that was taken into consideration in the investigation of the statistics.
The investigation tried to get FAA involvement in the FAA sightings reports, but none of
the phone calls were returned. This was the fifth limitation to the work and that the full use of
the FAA sightings report was not available but led to further recommendations that will continue
to give answers to the research questions. These questions, though asked as a glimpse in time,
could be repeated for continued research.
It should also be noted that the researcher also attempted to explore the HFs from the
perspective of a past air traffic controller and aeronautical engineer with over 30 years’
experience with HFs and aeronautical science.
Findings and Interpretations
Findings and interpretations will be examined as they pertain to the four reports analyzed
and as they relate to the research questions. Those four reports are the NASA ASRS 2019 report
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and three FAA UAS sightings reports. The findings may also link back to the pilot study
completed by Cardosi and Lennertz (2017). In addition, the supporting subquestions were
examined to ensure the recommendation section reflected their intent. A finding may pertain to
more than one research question. The process will follow the order of the analysis in that the
NASA ASRS report will be deliberated first and then the FAA UAS sightings report. The
findings from the NASA ASRS report may, on occasion, link back to the Cardosi and Lennertz
analysis as that is the pilot study that set up for this current research. When possible, there is a
link between findings to established research. The following critical research question guided
the research examination.
Central Critical Research Question
How can negative consequences of integration in commercial airspace between UAS and
ATM systems be reduced, so that when incidents happen so that SA and HF risks are
negligeable?
This question explored how sUAS and manned aircraft could jointly operate in the NAS
with minimum HF impact to air traffic controllers and possibly ways to lower the incidents of
unsafe interaction between manned and unmanned aircraft. The primary finding from analysis of
all three reports indicate that there are ways through training, particularly of air traffic
controllers, to reduce human errors in the control of unmanned aircraft in the NAS. The findings
reveal that the FAA regulatory authority has overall responsibility to all stakeholders for the safe
and orderly integration of sUAS in the NAS. The finding places an emphasis on training and
technology among other items and will be further examined in the recommendation section of
this research. Regarding training for air traffic controllers however, general awareness and
training of the public, both for users and non-users of drones, would be beneficial to air traffic
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controllers. This general awareness and specific training of all stakeholders will minimize
negative consequences related to HFs. The ASRS NASA 2019 report will be examined first.
A finding in the analysis of the ASRS report shows that a way to mitigate negative
consequences is to use both the SHELL and SCM to find HF indicators in the narrative
summary. The phrase words, such as NMAC, SA, and altitude, could be lined up via the SCM to
show the increased possibility of an accident. In addition, the SHELL model was used to see the
interactions between the software, hardware, environment, liveware and liveware. The literature
review showed that identifying HF indicators is the first step in finding ways to mitigate negative
consequences (Cardosi & Lennertz, 2017). Using the SHELL and SCM showed that 94% of the
ASRS reports had an HF indicator. Being able to determine the line ups with the SCM and the
interconnections with the SHELL analysis is valid and reliable which supplied information that
led to the recommendations. The loss of SA was cited in over 50% of the reports (NASA, 2019
a).
This finding indicates that the drone pilot awareness of different elements of the SHELL
configuration took place whether the report was filed by manned aircrew, ATC, or the drone
pilot. It also shows that this increases the risk of an accident with further analysis using the SCM
(Reason, 2000). Most of these drones were not under ATC control, but because they lost their
SA some had strayed into airspace that was controlled by ATC. This becomes additional
workload and fatigue for the air controller. This could also lead to loss of SA for the controller if
they are overworked with unexpected or illegal air traffic (Cardosi & Lennertz, 2017).
Another finding is that 100% of the air traffic controllers’ reports conveyed negative
consequences that involved HFs. In all three reports the controller was able to mitigate the
situation because of their experience and training. In one incident the controller had a conflict
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between a manned aircraft and two drones in special use airspace and had to issue an alert. The
controller noted in one incident that there was a communication breakdown during a heavy
workload period (NASA, 2020). The second report from a controller involved an NMAC
between a manned aircraft and a drone. The controller stated that SA was lost by the controller
(NASA, 2020). The final report from a controller discussed human-machine interface and a loss
of SA that may have been due to a lack of training and distraction. The controller reported that
separation was lost between a small transport aircraft and a drone (NASA, 2020).
All incidents reported could have had severe negative consequences had the controllers
not reacted as they did. The reports also show that the information in the 2017 report by Cardosi
and Lennertz is still valid, and mitigation strategies to integrate drones safely in the NAS needs
to continue. These incidences also showed that negative consequences were mitigated when SA,
workload, fatigue, and distraction were present. In the recommendation section there will be
proposals to ensure mitigation of negative consequences are applied and that sUAS safely
integrates into the NAS.
Another finding in the analysis of the NASA ASRS report is that it is well organized, and
the form is detailed with check boxes and a place for a narrative statement. Even if it is vague on
UAS information the foundation is strong. These two ways of obtaining information are very
beneficial to the subject matter experts who analyzes the individual incidents. This report
information is also put together in a NASA report in a group of 50 incidents at a time. This was
beneficial in answering the main research question and the subquestions. This material could be
grouped for analysis for not just the air traffic controller HF area but for all stakeholders, thus
ensuring minimum negative consequences of incorporation of sUAS in the NAS. This is also
important as it allows each participant to be exposed to the same criteria, and it gives more
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validity to the data analyzed. The finding that most incidents took place during authorized time
slots is a good baseline indicator for tracking time zones as the rules and regulations change. It
was also found that the forms were detailed in HF indicators (NASA, 2009a, 2009b, and 2009c).
Again, this type of emphasis on the form allows for valid systematic analysis of data.
Other finding came from the FAA UAS sightings reports. Some of the information
brought forward to assist in the analysis of the current FAA UAS sightings reports came from the
analysis in the GAO (2018) report. The GAO discussed that the FAA may lack reliable
information about the degree of unsafe use of sUAS in the NAS. As stated in this research
literature review and in the GAO report, and confirmed with the analysis of 2020 reports, the
large number of reports are possible sightings, and the current analysis also found the reports
offer only limited information (FAA, 2020c, 2020d; GAO, 2018). Anyone can file a sightings
report, and all are encouraged to file reports so that unauthorized activity can be fully punished
(FAA, 2021). These findings show that negative consequences of integration of drones in the
NAS is possible. These findings also show that situation awareness and other HFs can be
minimized. The study also revealed that the critical research question is answered with
implementation of items from the subquestions; in other words, the subquestions should be
written as statements of recommendations followed with ways that they can be accomplished.
It could be stated that there are possibilities of negative HF consequences of integrating
unmanned aircraft into the NAS; however, they can be mitigated by the following, which will be
considered in detail in the recommendations.
1. Increased collaboration between NASA, FAA, and UAST with oversight is
imperative. Protocols such as official procedures are being developed to ensure air
traffic controllers are educated on HFs involved in sUAS in the NAS, thus enhancing
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SA and minimizing impact to the workload. Rules are changing that include the
following, and they must be monitored for continuous improvement.
a.

Remote identification procedures (Remote ID)

b.

Procedures for night flying

c. Procedures for operations over people
d. Protocols that focus on drone operations
2. Continued development in risk management and safety management processes for
integration of sUAS in the NAS that minimize HF implications for air traffic
controllers.
a. The UAST strongly supports an SMS in UAS operations.
b. I, along with Cardosi and Lennertz (2017), believe that procedures need to be
developed for controllers in training scenarios for practice in situations such
as lost communication.
c. The use of SHELL, SCM, and HFACS taxonomies through reporting, such as
NASA, ASRS, and the FAA UAS sightings reports, need to be done along
with continued research to improve these procedures and to see whether there
are new taxonomies for ensure better safety analysis.
3. Enhance positive public perceptions. To positively influence the implementation of
drone integration in the NAS, the relationship with the public must be improved by
using five key principles that are founded in regulatory framework and under the “We
are all one in the sky” concept by EASA. These principles include:
a. Enabling communal airspace SA through knowledge interchange.
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b. Continue the clarification of the responsibilities and liabilities for all
stakeholders.
c. Expand airspace capacity and value through integration, not separation.
d. Maintain and improve the highest held safety levels in aviation
e. Ensure a flexible framework is available for expanding and changing the UAS
industry (IATA, 2021)
4. Continued exploration of new technology options for sUAS.
a.

A TCAS system for sUAS. Technology that exists for TCAS on larger
drones needs to be mined for applicability on sUAS.

b. Maintained monitoring for improvements in Remote ID technology
5. Sustainable assessment on operations that focus on issues for safe and efficient use of
the NAS.
a. Operational assessments of controllers with UAS experience
b. Operational assessments by type of UAS operation
c. Operational assessment between ATC, manned, and unmanned aircraft.
6. Recurring analysis of data for mitigation of HF implications in the NAS
a. ASRS data reports
b. FAA UAS sightings reports
The data available to the public as it stands now does not indicate any cyber security
breaches or threats however, that does not mean they are not happening. This is another area for
research to ensure safe integration and will be incorporated in the recommendations.
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Study Taxonomy
Taxonomy is important as it assists in aligning terms and categorizing relationships. The
Merriam-Webster Dictionary stated that taxonomy is the “study of the general principles of
scientific classification” (“Taxonomy,” n.d.). This research used three articles (Rantanen,
Palmer, Wiegmann, & Musiorski, 2006; Stojic, Vittek, Plos, & Lalas, 2015; UNICEF, 2014) to
assist in the taxonomy, in the analysis of the research, and with recommendations for future
research.
According to UNICEF, their intent was to form an organization-wide identification of what
establishes research as there are benefits in ensuring all researchers and projects are aligned with
a common theme (UNICEF, 2014). For instance, this understanding could include all members
involved with ongoing research would have a better understanding of the situation, and it could
also ensure the efforts within UNICEF have outstanding quality assurance (UNICEF, 2014).
The systematic taxonomy process they used for the research did and evaluation of studies which
ed to an evaluation of taxonomy used in both HFs and air traffic control for strategies data
collection and quantitative analysis of material.
Rantanen et al. (2006) focused on the relevance of main factors in aviation accidents
being HFs. Rantanen et al. stressed the importance of the information that NASA provided in
their aviation safety programs. They also stressed that as new technologies (i.e., drones) were
brought into the NAS, new error prospects could be introduced and that understanding the
relationships was paramount for evaluation and intervention. They also put forward a framework
focused on a matrix with the human operator, the task, and the environment, with additional
taxonomy based on HFACS (Rantanen et al., 2006). HFACS was reviewed in the literature and
was a part of the analysis of the ASRS and FAA UAS sightings report. Having this background
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on taxonomy as it applied to aviation was paramount is charting out the HF implications
associated with drones in the NAS. It assisted in the proper linking of technologies employed in
the use of drones as they relate to air traffic control and the airspace. It allowed for scatter
diagrams that identified high risk areas and for mitigation to minimize the risks and to further
research ideas. The task of providing comprehensive mapping between technologies and HFs
has been available in aviation with manned aircraft, but it is relatively new for unmanned
aircraft. Rantanen et al. (2006) discussed it from the manned aircraft perspective, but I could not
find any indication that they had used it in unmanned situations. I believed these researchers
agree that the taxonomy in the use of drone ATC relationships needs to be robust and is essential
to the success of further research that mitigates HF risk of incorporation of the drones in the
NAS.
The third analysis employed in reviewing the data and giving the recommendations came
from understanding the taxonomies as they applied to aviation safety management systems
(SMS). Stojic, Vittek, Plos and Lalas (2015) focused on taxonomies that were broadly related in
the aviation industry though not specifically in drone usage. They reviewed taxonomies and
their application with identifying subjects that were applied in this research that included drones.
Stojic et al. also stressed that HFs are crucial parts in aviation safety. There are shared
taxonomies by organizations such as ICAO and the FAA that place importance of taxonomy
development as systems are put together (Stojic et al., 2015). This was beneficial to this research
as the unmanned systems are being placed with manned systems, air traffic controllers, and in
the NAS as this is a system of systems in a high-risk industry. A taxonomy in use that they gave
credit to was using HFACS, ASRS reports, are based on SHELL and Reason (2000). However,
Stojic et al. stressed that there may be some flaws in these taxonomies. They also stressed the
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importance of an efficient SMS program. Hence, their work was very beneficial in the analysis
of the data from the FAA and NASA and in the recommendations for next steps and research.
Of special interest to this research is how they reviewed ASRS anomaly code taxonomy and
HFACS as they apply to HFs. They found that some of the codes may have been a bit vague and
could be updated. They also found that HFACS, due to the structure, may not be the best use for
initial reporting (Stojic et al., 2015). This current research also noted that the forms could be
updated; the clarification could be better at assisting in ways to mitigate adverse situations. It is
possible there are better taxonomy procedures and that the possibility for further research exists
to find common universal taxonomies. Though there were some limitations in taxonomies used
in analyzing aviation safety, aviation is considered the safest mode of transportation. The below
recommendations are based on the study’s findings, analysis, and conclusions.
Recommendations
This study’s findings are focused on the current situation of mitigating HF implications
for the air traffic controller. The research and data analysis show that HF issues must be
addressed on a continuous basis for safe and secure integration of drones in the NAS. All
stakeholders are actively involved in mitigating negative HFs associated with air traffic
controllers, but the research also shows that there are opportunities for more collaboration
between the stakeholders. The research also highlighted the complexity of a system of systems
with the air traffic controller as the center focal point for safe operations of sUAS in the NAS.
This complex system of systems needs multi-faceted solutions to reach its full potential. The
current literature review gave the background for analysis of the ASRS 2018 NASA report and
the FAA UAS sightings reports. The analysis focused not only on the literature and the reports
but also brought in taxonomies from SHELL model and the SCM to look for HF indicators and
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areas for further research and development. Metrics for cognitive workload and SA need to be
an integral part as the integration moves forward. This can be accomplished by continued
research and development of processes that employ a strong SMS foundation. This will ensure
safe implementation and integration. The stakeholders must have continuous interaction with the
public to ensure a positive perception of drone use is part of the solution moving forward. As
technology and regulations are rapidly changing, there needs to be continued operational
assessments and analysis of mined data. This will minimize human errors made by air traffic
controllers and improve the understanding of all the opportunities that drones may bring to the
economy.
There is a solid foundation for safe integration with a focus on HFs. However, it is
imperative to continue the development of the FAA’s Concept of Operations. The Concept of
Operations has foundational principals in both safety and security (FAA, 2020e) and both,
through review of literature and data analysis employing SHELL and SCM and other
taxonomies, show the relationship to human error. Additionally, it is important for the
stakeholders, as they continue to develop the roles and responsibilities and include scenarios and
operational threads, to work closely with the recommendations from the GAO 2018 report with
an emphasis on improved technology. The analysis of the current data validates the GAO’s
findings and recommendations.
The next section will detail the recommendations and point out some of the practical and
economic benefits along with safety and security that should ensure the continued minimization
of ATC HF incidents as drone use grows in the NAS. As stated before, there are numerous
recommendations because with the complex challenges of new entrants in the NAS, multifaceted solutions employ a “best practices” philosophy. The highest priority for
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recommendations needs to be placed on collaboration between stakeholders with regulators and
users at the top of the list. One of the most promising areas is that regulators globally are
actively engaged in making the integration possible in a safe and secure manner. COVID and its
almost complete shutdown of commercial air traffic gave stakeholders time and opportunity to
focus on all the possibilities for integration of sUAS operations. The results were that rules and
regulations were changed during this time hence allowing for more operations in the industry
(FAA, 2020a, 2020c, & 2020f). This also allowed a focus on research and development that led
to some of the changes in the industry. It is hoped that as air traffic for commercial operations
starts to increase again that the research and development of sUAS traffic also continues.
Regulation Changes for sUAS Operations
In the GAO report and the literature reviewed it was found that regulations and
procedures changed in both the later part of 2020 and early 2021. The Remote ID, sUAS flight at
night and sUAS flight over people are being updated with new and operational dates for
compliance (GAO, 2018, FAA, 2020f & FAA, 2021b). This will be briefly summarized with
the recommendations that go with changing regulations. Whenever regulations change, they
must be monitored for impact to the industry. The recommendation in this section will examine
sUAS night flying and sUAS flights over people. This gives the reader insight on the changes
that may be needed to report procedures and the potential for further research. The research
shows that to integrate sUAS in the NAS these regulatory changes needed to take place. The
FAA Extension, Safety and Security Act of 2016 § 2202, FAA Modernization and Reform Act of
2012 § 232, and the FAA, Integration of Civil Unmanned aircraft Systems (UAS) in the National
Airspace System Roadmap could be reviewed for full details (GAO, 2018).
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sUAS night flying and flights over people. The literature review discussed operators
filing waivers to fly their sUAS at night and over people. The regulations did not allow for flight
over people however, they allowed an operator to file a waiver. These waivers were being filed
so that operators could complete missions and for new opportunities in the industry. This was a
time-consuming process, and many of the waivers were not granted. The operations over people
became effective April 21, 2021. This falls under Part 107 and allows drone operations at night,
over people, and over moving vehicles if the provisions in the rule are met. This change is only
for operations in uncontrolled airspace (FAA, 2020f). The executive summary came out in
December of 2020. The final rule covers four categories of eligibility for operations over people,
operations at night, and eligible aircraft. This also mean that the testing for remote pilot
knowledge will change (FAA, 2020f). As this is a new FAA rule it has many HF error
possibilities from both the operator and controller it needs to be monitored for obstacles. Doing
continuous monitoring in a PDCA manner will ensure safer operations (Britton, 2018). This
research lists five current recommendations. However, there may be more recommendations
made as the maturity of the operations presents best practices and lessons learned.
1. The FAA and other organizations need to encourage research and development in this
area to include new technology for continued safe operations in the industry.
2.

The FAA must ensure in the continued development of concepts of operations under
safety and security and other areas as applicable that there be provisions for roles and
responsibilities that reflect these changes.

3. The FAA and NASA in reporting procedures find ways to incorporate these changes
to monitor for safety and security violations.
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4. The FAA and NASA continue collaboration to educate the public on these changes to
ensure positive public perception in safety and security.
5. The FAA, as it changes the remote pilot testing, ensures that remote pilots also have
the knowledge base reflected in online recurrent training and that this knowledge is
free of charge.
The literature review and investigation of the literature that pressures an involvement
from stakeholders along with their detailed scientific investigation that included solutions led to
the recent regulatory changes is imperative. The changes to these regulations need to be
incorporated in reporting procedures. This will lead to further understanding and ideas for
education and training for all stakeholders. This will also lead to the next generation of
regulation changes that may be essential for growth in sUAS industry. However, if not properly
monitored and revised they could increase human errors and negative consequences.
Increased FAA oversight and collaboration with NASA and GAO. Increased FAA
oversight and collaboration between the FAA, NASA, and GAO are imperative. Continuous
collaboration assists in protocols being developed to ensure air traffic controllers are educated on
HFs involved in sUAS in the NAS. This will enhance SA and should minimize the impact to the
workload with increased and diversified operations. All these changes need to ensure that
NASA and the FAA are working together in the endeavors and that they are encouraging GAO
audits to identify areas of improvement.
The GAO noted in their 2018 report the need for a traffic management system for drones
that is similar to the ATC system of manned aircraft is needed. This collaboration was started in
2013 by NASA and is considered a concept of UTM. This concept would facilitate routine,
small commercial UAS operations operated below 400 feet and beyond the line of sight and
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allow for different operations and interactions. This would possibly allow delivery of small
packages, as proposed by Amazon and Google (GAO, 2018). The literature review illustrated
this concept, and the figure is presented again due to the significance of the research and
development that will minimize HF errors and allow for rapid growth of the utilization of sUAS
(Figure 31).

Figure 31. NASA concept of UTM (GAO 18-110, 2018)
This concept has developed, and in March 2020 the Concept of Operation published
version 2.0. It is recommended the continuation of the concepts for full integration of sUAS in
the NAS goes forward as it evolves. UTM is not considered a single full system for the
continental United States but, according to NASA officials, will likely be composed of small
local and regional systems. Additionally, review of the analysis and statistics back up not only
the GAO concept but also the speculative architecture from the FAA Version 2 concept as
depicted in Figure 32 and Figure 33. This architecture development will keep all stakeholders
involved and ensure positive commitment leading to continuous solutions in the research topic
area. The evolution and maturity must continue so that HF errors are mitigated and cyber threats
are minimized. Figure 33 illustrates how the stakeholders will be involved and how the roles and
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responsibilities of are divided. This is what is needed in the next evolution of integration from
the top down. It is also recommended that as reports are developed for analysis of incidents,
whether the reports come from NASA, ASRS, or the FAA, they take into consideration the UTM
architecture as it will mitigate HF errors and increase SA for all stakeholders.

Figure 32. National UTM architecture (FAA, 2020e).
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Figure 33. Operational context of UTM services (FAA, 2020e).

Development and collaboration through reporting. The current analysis of reports
from both the FAA and NASA confirmed that there is still room for improvement in reporting.
It is recommended that UAST, the FAA, and NASA collaborate on a standardized reporting
system that is included in the FAA concept of Operations. This recommendation should also
include more effective reporting using new technology. This also backed up the pilot report
from Cardosi and Lennertz (2017) that was used in the research. The analysis also showed that
current reporting is not as detailed or consistent as it needs to be to prevent human errors. The
GAO report proved reliable and valid in that current procedures do not give enough information
because the reports cannot be verified in numerous areas. The reporting is a good first
generation, but it is time for analysis and improvement of the reporting protocol. There are
numerous ways for improvements in the reporting that also cross over into technology,
regulation, policy, and procedures.
The UAST is a collaboration between industry and government for safe integration of
drones in the NAS. The UAST recommends a standard reporting format to analyze data in
standard logical reports. This data could then be used for legislation education and other
outreach programs, thus ensuring the public receives correct information (UAST, 2020).
Improving the format of the UAS sightings report used by pilots, aircrew, and controllers will
enhance safety. These reports, to reach their full potential to mitigate HF, controllers and
operators need to do the following because they have shown that many of the sightings happen
on final approach to airports. The aircraft in the landing and takeoff phases are in a crucial time
in flight which put a higher cognitive workload on the controllers, and a higher workload also
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can increase the controller’s distraction. If there is a standard in place for pilots to report the
information to the controller both the pilot and controller will understand the situation better.
This could be enhanced through technology that automatically reports information on sUAS.
This will decrease the cognitive workload and the distractions that can be caused by workload
(UAST, 2020). UAST members have been working on a list of reporting variables and
formatting. The analysis shows that the information collected and analysed between the different
reports is very important to the future safety of the NAS. Collaboration needs to be done on a
regular basis between the report writers.
Reports need to be verifiable and should consider:
a. Better sUAS detection with RADAR
i.

Remote ID continued development

b. Review of existing reporting tools such as the ASRS and laser sightings to ensure
safety data are collected on UAS accidents
c. Technology for pilots to assist with positive identification of:
i.

Distance from the observed position

ii.

Speeds of both manned and unmanned aircraft

iii.

Ways to minimize other factors competing with pilots’ and controllers’
attention

iv.

TCAS development for sUAS

d. Better ways to determine the validity of the report
i.

Review and revision of data to ensure correct and sufficient information is
available for analysis

ii.

An area for analysis that can determine whether the UAS was operating safely

124
iii.

Show security in addition to safety indicators

iv.

Further investigation (An example is that some reports state a UAS however,
there was no way to do follow up work. This may mean research needs to be
done that develops a completely different form of reporting.)

The FAA has worked well with NASA and other organizations to improve the data it
collects on sUAS operations; however, it must continue to seek new data for collaboration in
safety and security. It should also continue developing the web-based and FAA-based reporting
system the public uses to report UAS that may be a safety or security concern. Finally, in
reporting procedures, it is recommended that high stakeholders such as FAA, NASA, and UAST
develop surveys to determine the UAS anticipated growth and activities to meet the demand.
Risk Management through Safety Management Systems (SMS)
Another recommendation from the UAST for safe UAS operations is that risk
management can be accomplished using an SMS program (UAST, 2020). This is because
having a good safety management program has been proven to work in other parts of the aviation
industry it is a proven product. The program is a well-designed method to make knowledgeable
decisions, and it will assist with safe drone integration. This is applicable at both the individual
and organizational levels. The concept is recognized globally, and the literature review briefly
discussed ICAO’s safety management manual document 9859. A SMS is an approach that
manages safety through structures and accountabilities. SMS consists of safety policies, risk
management, safety assurance, and promotion (ICAO, 2017). SMS has been used in the aviation
industry and has proven that it can produce increased assurance in risk controls through its
structure. Risk management and safety management processes are being developed for
integration of sUAS in the NAS to minimize HFs for air traffic controllers. It consists of using an
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established risk mitigation strategy that involves regulators, auditors, operators, and controllers
that use a risk management strategy that most in the industry are familiar with and have used in
the past for commercial air operations. This new SMS program will be tailored to drones. There
are many benefits to a structured SMS UAS program including accountability to manage safety
before a failure or incident, increased assurance in risk controls with processes that include
safety assurance, and a way to create and advocate for a comprehensive safety culture. This has
been done in commercial aviation through four safety elements: policy, risk management,
assurance, and promotion (Figure 34).

Figure 34. FAA SMS components (UAST, 2020).
The framework UAST has proposed is valid and reliable as it bases it foundation on the
well-established program as it is being already being incorporated in the aviation industry. that
The framework for the UAST may be done on a voluntarily basis as successful SMS for
commercial aircraft started under this concept, and it allowed for a more robust program. The
framework of the procedures should understand UAS operations under CFR 14 Parts 91, 107,
and 135. The SMS structure should develop into a formal program of procedures and best
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practices in the use of commercial UAS. An ideal situation would be that this framework could
fill identified gaps in minimum operating regulations. This would lead to training and risk
management policies and procedures that could be done from the analysis of the level of the risk
involved in the operation. As the use of SMS developed in manned commercial flight became
widely accepted and trusted, it is believed that public trust and acceptance would grow in the use
of sUAS in the NAS.
Expanded Training to include UAS Human Factor/Air Traffic Situations for Controllers
Controllers need to have information and tools to minimize human errors, and drones
continue to be integrated in both controlled and uncontrolled airspace. Cardosi and Lennertz
(2017), and this research show that training scenarios need to be developed for controllers in to
practice in situations such as lost communication and loss of SA. Operational issues have been
identified from ASRS reports and other research conducted. This should be continued to be
identify human error situations. Experimental research through simulated scenarios will help
identify solutions. As knowledge and technology continue to expand in human-in-the-loop
interactions, simulation could be done with experienced pilots and controllers to find best
practices to mitigate human errors such as loss of SA and other work overload factors.
Understanding how these situations impact experienced operators would also assist in training
less experienced operators.
Expanded Taxonomy research with SHELL, SCM and Other Methodologies
The use of SHELL, SCM, HFACS, and SMS taxonomies analysis is important when
analyzing HFs to minimize errors. This should continue with the analysis of reports from
NASA, ASRS, and the FAA UAS sightings. Additionally, if there are new taxonomies to ensure
better safety analysis, those options should be explored. In addition to the safety analysis,
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security analysis needs to be expanded to minimize cyber threats as these also pose HF
implications. The current ASRS and FAA UAS sightings reports focus on safety, and there
needs to be a way to analyze security threats of drones in the NAS similar to safety issues for
consistency in effectiveness of reporting that could be analyzed. The research shows that it is
only a matter of time before a drone is used in some type of cyberattack and that the rapid
growth in the use drones may mean there is a growth in security implications. This research
could not find the links in the data analysis from NASA and the FAA that combine safety and
security. More research is needed in that area to analyze taxonomies that could be employed in
the security aspect. One such taxonomy that could assist in the security aspect of integration of
sUAS is the STRIDE threat model taxonomy developed by Adam Shostack to categorize
common types of cyber threats in six areas (Beyene et al., 2020). The taxonomy was originally
for software development, but the six areas could also be used for analysis of cyber security
threats related to UAS. Figure 35 illustrates the STRIDE threat taxonomy. Further research
needs to be done to see whether data gathered through STRIDE could then be worked into SMS
risk management or some type of ASRS or FAA database for an analysis that combines safety
and security. This could also work with the recommendation of creating possible attack
scenarios for air traffic controllers for training.

Figure 35. The STRIDE threat taxonomy.
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Public Positive Perception and We are all One Sky
To positively influence the implementation of drone integration in the NAS, the FAA
needs to improve the relationship with the public by using five key principles founded in the
regulatory framework and under the “We are all one in the sky” motto of the EASA. These
principles include:
1. Enabling communal airspace SA through knowledge interchange.
2. Continue the clarification of the responsibilities and liabilities for all stakeholders.
3. Expand airspace capacity and value through integration, not separation.
4. Maintain and improve the highest held safety levels in aviation
5. Ensure a flexible framework is available for the expanding and changing UAS
industry (IATA, 2021).
As the research showed, drones are changing many aspects of everyday life in the
aviation industry. The research also showed the importance of ensuring a secure, safe, and
sustainable integration of the sUAS. EASA’s support of these concepts of sUAS use within the
manned aviation framework is an example that could be used globally.
Emerging Technologies for sUAS
Technology advancements are the primary reason there is the possibility of sUAS
operations in the NAS. Due to the onboard mechanisms that can be commanded remotely and
the lightweight and small size of sUAS, they have the potential for the fastest growth of
opportunities in the air transportation industry. Advancements in technology often mean more
HF stressors for the human-in the-loop (i.e., the air traffic controller in this research). However,
the research shows that the HF/ATC negative implications for sUAS incorporation in the NAS
can be minimized through emerging technologies with continued collaboration between the FAA
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and other similar regulatory authorities such as EASA, ICAO and NAS. NASA and others have
collaborated since 2011 on technical opportunities and advancements. Exploration of new
technology options for sUAS using Remote ID have finally came together with regulations
taking effect in spring 2021, and recommendations are provided for implementation of the
regulation. Also, no literature reviewed revealed an FAA or Department of Transportation
endorsement of TCAS for sUAS, it will also be discussed as a recommendation from the
perspective of DAA work that is being conducted by NASA.
Remote identification of unmanned aircraft systems (Remote ID). Having remote ID
will help the FAA and other federal agencies in addition to law enforcement finding the control
station for a sUAS or any other drones. In addition, this is a foundation that combines both
safety and security in the integration of drones with manned aircraft in both controlled and
uncontrolled airspace. The recent regulation of Remote ID use for sUAS was approved and went
into effect on April 21, 2021 (FAA, 2021c). This new regulation forces most drones operating
the NAS to have Remote ID installed on the drone over a period. This requirement will provide
identification, location, altitude, and where the drone departed from to assist in public safety and
operations of drones (FAA, 2021b). Having the ability to locate and identify the UAS will
greatly assist in providing additional SA to controllers and manned and unmanned aircraft
operators. This is a significant step in mitigating HF errors in the integration of drones in the
NAS. It is also a crucial step that is needed for the continued unmanned traffic management
(UTM) procedures. There are three ways a drone pilot will be able to meet these FAA
requirements.
1. Operate a standard remote ID drone
2. Operate a drone with a remote ID broadcast
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3. Operate (without remote ID equipment (FAA, 2021c).
Figure 36 illustrates these concepts. The FAA has compliance dates for both the
manufacture and the operators. The effective date is March 16, 2021, and the manufacture will
have 18 months to comply, while the operator will have 30 months to comply with the
regulation. In addition, all drone pilots who are required to register their drones must comply
with the regulations.

Figure 36. FAA concept of three ways drone pilots will meet remote ID rule (FAA, 2021 c).
The FAA is being very proactive with this “digital licence plate” program for the UAS
and NAS community. The program is establised under a new Part 89 in the title of the Code of
Federal regulations. It provided operating rules, design, and production rules for manufactures,
as well as other provisions (FAA, 2021d). To assist in the implementation of the new rule, the
FAA also made a RemoteID Tool Kit. This should address some of the gaps found in being able
to properly identify drones so that HF errors could be minimized and properly address safety and
security issues with sUAS in the NAS. The changes open areas for continued research. Once the
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program is established there are many opportunities for research that could help in both ongoing
operational assessment and data analysis.
Ongoing operational assessments. As integration of drones is an ongoing process it is
imperative that there are opportunities for continuous action on operational assessments that
focus on issues for safe and efficient use of the NAS. These include:
1. Operational assessments of controllers with UAS experience
2. Operational assessments by type of UAS operation
3. Operational assessment between ATC and manned and unmanned aircraft
Data analysis improvement. While the new procedures are going into effect research
could be done that would expand the capabilities of use of the reports available through the FAA
and NASA, along with the possibility of developing new reports as this would assist with the
following:
1. Continued analysis of data for mitigation of HF implications in the NAS
2. ASRS data reports updated to have areas that are specific to UAS
3. FAA UAS sightings reports
4. Development of a security type of report
Detect and avoid (DAA) and Traffic Alert and Collision Avoidance Systems (TCAS).
To safely fly BVLOS, DAA has been emerging as a field of study for a means of risk mitigation
in collisions. Additionally, TCAS has also been researched for unmanned aircraft as it has
worked well in assisting manned aircraft avoid collision (Fern, Kenny, Shively, & Johnson,
2012; NASA, 2015; Zeitlin & McLaughlin, 2006). This research is being done to ensure sUAS
are granted full admittance to public airspace. In addition, collision avoidance procedures also
ensure less stress on air traffic controllers. However, it appears that NASA’s work with DAA is
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moving much faster than ideas with TCAS. It is recommended that NASA continue the work
they started in 2011 to support the development and validation of DAA technology that is needed
to integrate UAS in the NAS (NASA, 2019). NASA came to the forefront after research was
completed on the possibilities of developing TCAS in 2006 and 2010. This may have happened
because there was concern that TCAS was being considered as a primary source of collision
avoidance, and it was not designed for that; rather it was designed as a back up to a primary
means of avoidance (Fern et al., 2012). Though all TCAS systems provide some level of
collision threat alert, it has been discouraged by the FAA for use on the sUAS as noted by Fern
et al. Their research agreed with FAA research that asserted the use of TCAS for sUAS should
not be used to maintain self-separation or to provide better SA because the data could give
inaccurate and incomplete information on the TCAS display. Fern et al. research showed that
fluctuating concentration of traffic had anticipated effects on air traffic controllers’ workload to
include loss of separation and SA. This gives further verification of the significant role ATC
plays in maintaining separation in controlled airspace (Fern et al., 2012). Their simulation
experiment had encouraging results that controllers’ workloads were maintainable with the
introduction of UAS into the controllers’ sector; however, if the rapid growth of UAS operations
continue, ATC workload limits need further research to develop a tool that could assist in
collision avoidance.
Zeitlin and McLaughlin (2006) stressed the importance of modeling in developing a type
of UAS sense-and-avoid standards. They also concurred with Fern et al. (2012) and the FAA
that using the TCAS II, the world standard for manned aircraft, may be problematic due to safety
calculations. An interesting point they brought forward is the fact that because the UAS is
unmanned it would have to consider two-way communication link reliability (Zetlin &
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Mclaughlin, 2006). They still recommend that a collision avoidance system needs to be
developed.
Tabassum, Sabatini, and Gardi (2019) took the research a step further by discussing
safety assessment of DAA systems to identify the risk of collision of UAS with other flight
vehicles. They stressed the important fault tree analysis (FTA) being used to measure system
unavailability for each component. This and area that NASA should review as they have looked
at the interdependencies on the systems in the UAS. The acceptance of a unified framework in
UAS DAA is needed (Tabassum et al., 2019).
Cyber Security
In the literature review there is significant data available to show the possibility of a
cyber security breach using a drone to do malicious work however it may have been more
speculative. There is also current research on HFs in cybersecurity in the use of drones.
However, the data analyzed did not have details that pertain to cyber security HFs in the
integration of drones in the NAS. Based on this study it is recommended that HF specialists
familiar with air traffic control, UAS, and cybersecurity professionals need to be part of the team
that incorporates cyber security into tools that could be used to assess incidents and mitigate
cyberattacks in the NAS. There is research available that recommends the FAA fully implement
better security practices for better oversight in avionic cybersecurity risks (GAO, 2020).
Additionally, the FAA has an annual cybersecurity awareness symposium under the ATO that
pursues the advancement of cybersecurity awareness, collaboration, and partnership with all
stakeholders (FAA, 2020g). This partnership could implement more effective security training
and awareness that would implement continuous training that changes as the threats change
(Sebescen & Vitak, 2017). Lessons learned are often included in FAA ATC training so this
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would be a way to get all involved more in the HFs that lead to errors related to cybersecurity
issues in the use of drones in the NAS.
Recommendations for Future Research
As air traffic control is a part of a system of systems and often requires multi-faceted
solutions for advancement in safe and secure air traffic management, there are many
opportunities for additional areas of research. Continued HF research is needed in all areas of
recommendation for continued validation and mitigation of human errors. One reason is because
technology and growth of UAS types and operations will continue at a rapid rate. The first
recommendation is to conduct research that utilizes SMS principles and audits to continue safe
and secure operations. The research should look at both quantitative and qualitative research that
can employ the Plan-Do-Check-Act (PDCA) approach as it will render continuous improvement
and resolve problems (Britton, 2018). This loop of planning, doing, checking, and acting will
assist principles for continuous safe and secure operations of drones in the NAS. It will also
minimize air traffic control human errors. The second recommendation is to conduct qualitative
research that focuses on the HFs already identified that could also fall under cybersecurity to see
if air traffic controllers are aware of possible cyber incidents that impact HFs as they relate to the
controller. The third recommendation comes from the identified gap in the FAA UAS sightings
reports and that is to conduct research to develop reports like the ASRS that could assist in
identifying cyber threats. This is possibly one of the strongest areas that could employ some type
of technology to be more effective.
As collision avoidance is stressful to the controller and operators, is a primary cause of
loss of SA, and is a huge stressor for workload, another recommendation for future research is to
validate DAA equipment and procedures as this will ensure integration of drones in the NAS
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beyond visual sight. Collision avoidance may also benefit from more research as in Remote ID
for drones. There should be a way to monitor and develop case studies in the three required
ways to use Remote ID technology.
Original Contribution to Knowledge
This quantitative study contributes to the original body of knowledge in HFs by
investigating the human error possibilities in drone integration from the air traffic controller
perspective. Air traffic controllers are crucial to the safe integration of sUAS in the NAS, but
their role had been overlooked as the majority of sUAS were operated in uncontrolled airspace
and had little interaction with air traffic control. The majority of the research that had been done
on HFs and drones focused on the machine and/or the pilot of the drone. This study attempted to
rectify the scarcity of research from the controller’s perspective as the center human-in-the-loop
and the sUAS to reduce human errors while integrating sUAS in the NAS.
The study developed and employed a conceptual framework that used data from diverse
reports and combined different models in HF analysis from the SHELL, HFACS, and SCM.
This type of combination had recently been explored in ATC from the tower and radar, but this
study added in the sUAS integration. The conceptual framework contributes to the scholarly
models, work, and philosophies already in place to mitigate HF errors in air traffic management.
This study’s conceptual framework may be reused as new technology and procedures are put into
place and regulated for the use of sUAS incorporation in the NAS. This will continue to reduce
or mitigate HF errors from not only the ATC perspective, but all stakeholders involved in the
safe and secure incorporation of drones in the NAS.
Another contribution in this study is that it brought together diverse work from the
stakeholders to include the FAA, NASA, UAS, the latest changes in regulations and policy, and
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some of the latest ideas in technology such as Remote ID. Encapsulating and using the highlevel stakeholders with some of the newest technology through analysis of the SHELL and other
research models have led to ways to train stakeholders, inform the public, and employ mitigation
procedures. This process also contributes to a continuous improvement or mitigation of HF
errors by employing the plan-do-check-act integration with each generation of opportunities to
use UAS in the NAS. This is critical to the future of sUAS in the NAS and the aviation industry.
Summary
The purpose of this quantitative research was to explore the status of HFs as they apply to
air traffic controllers as they continue to incorporate drones in the NAS. By identifying
vulnerabilities and mitigating HF incidents and errors, it is possible for drones to assist in
economic growth in many industries. The research indicated that the stakeholders are aware of
HFs in aviation associated with drones in the NAS, but the focus was more on the pilots of the
manned aircraft. The research showed there is an understanding of HF in aviation and that the
knowledge available can be easily transferred to controllers to mitigate HF errors. This
knowledge will also mitigate HF errors for pilots of both the manned and unmanned aircraft.
The specific HFs that present a problem appear to focus on workload and SA. This study’s
critical research question was, how can negative consequences of integration in commercial
airspace between UAS and ATM systems be reduced, so that when incidents happen SA and HF
risks are negligeable? The critical subquestions were: What protocols could be identified to
ensure air traffic controllers develop metrics for cognitive workload, SA, and other HF to ensure
safe operations in the NAS of UAVs with other air traffic? What needs to be done to mitigate
HF issues using risk management and safety management processes within the new operations of
UAS in NAS? What are the factors that influence the implementation of UAS integration safely
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in the NAS? In what ways could public perception be improved for increased support of
integration of UAS in the NAS? What technology investments can made for communication and
airspace management for safe operations of UAS within the NAS? What action can be taken on
the regulatory challenges for safe and efficient UAS operation in the NAS?
A literature review was performed on the research on the topics associated with the
research questions. Research was also conducted via keyword searches from the critical research
question and the subquestions. Scholarly articles, dissertations, textbooks, and conference
journals were reviewed. The abstracts of the articles were reviewed for clarity and proper
application of the research area. The bibliographies and references were reviewed for other
keywords to search to enhance the objectives of the research. Additionally, regulations, laws,
and regulatory organizations for policies and procedures as they pertained to the research topic
were reviewed. Additionally, some of the some of the industry’s virtual roundtables and
conferences were attended to stay abreast of the fast-paced changes in UAS operations and HFs.
Assembling this material allowed the accomplishment of the study’s objectives with emphasis on
mitigation on HFs for air traffic controllers as they incorporate drones in the NAS. This makes
for safe and secure integration of drones in the NAS. As the integration of drones continues to
be dynamic in the air transportation industry for the unforeseeable future, it is imperative that all
stakeholders advocate for continuous research in HFs associated with air traffic controllers and
the incorporation of drones in the NAS from both a safety and security perspective. This will
benefit all and reduce HF errors and vulnerabilities as drones are fully integrated in the NAS.
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APPENDIX A: ASRS NASA REPORT FORMS
A
DO NOT REPORT AIRCRAFT ACCIDENTS AND CRIMINAL ACTIVITIES ON THIS FORM.
ACCIDENTS AND CRIMINAL ACTIVITIES ARE NOT INCLUDED IN THE ASRS PROGRAM AND SHOULD NOT BE SUBMITTED TO NASA.
ALL IDENTITIES CONTAINED IN THIS REPORT WILL BE REMOVED TO ASSURE COMPLETE REPORTER ANONYMITY.
(SPACE BELOW RESERVED FOR ASRS DATE/TIME STAMP)

IDENTIFICATION STRIP: Please fill in all blanks to ensure return of ID strip to you.
NO RECORD WILL BE KEPT OF YOUR IDENTITY. This section will be returned to you.
TELEPHONE NUMBERS where we may reach you for further details of this occurrence:

HOME

Area

No.

Hours

WORK

Area

No.

Hours
TYPE OF EVENT/SITUATION

NAME
ADDRESS/PO BOX
DATE OF OCCURRENCE
(MM/DD/YYYY)

CITY

STATE

ZIP

LOCAL TIME (24 hr. clock)
(HH:MM)

PLEASE FILL IN APPROPRIATE SPACES AND CHECK ALL ITEMS WHICH APPLY TO THIS EVENT OR SITUATION.

REPORTER
In what type of facility do you work?

 Tower

 TRACON

 Center

Describe your ATC qualifications.

 Fully Certified

 Developmental

Time certified on position/sector:

What is your ATC experience in years?

radar

non-radar

What was your control position or
activity during the occurrence?
(Check all that apply)

 approach
 coordinator
 departure

 enroute
 flight data/
clrnc delivery

Was instruction a factor?

 no

 yes

Do you have pilot experience?

 no

 yes

AIRSPACE

military

Reset

FSS

Facility ID
yrs

 flight service
 ground
 handoff/assist

 trainee
 local
 oceanic

 supervisor/CIC
 traffic management
 other

 I was instructing  I was receiving training
hours

Reset

 instrument rated

CONDITIONS / WEATHER ELEMENTS

 Class A

 Class E

 VMC

 Class B

 Class G

 IMC

 Class C

 Special Use

 Mixed

 Class D

 TFR

 Marginal

LIGHT / VISIBILITY

 fog

 snow

 hail

 thunderstorm

 dawn
 daylight

 haze/smoke

 turbulence

Ceiling

feet

 icing

 windshear

Visibility

miles

 rain

 other:

RVR

feet

AIRCRAFT 1
Your Aircraft Type (Make/Model)
(e.g. B737, Not "N #", Flt #", etc.):

mos

supervisor

 night
 dusk

AIRCRAFT 2
Operating
FAR Part:

Other
Aircraft:

Operating
FAR Part:

Operator

 air carrier
 air taxi
 corporate

 fractional
 FBO
 government

 military
 personal
 other:

 air carrier
 air taxi
 corporate

 fractional
 FBO
 government

 military
 personal
 other:

Mission

 passenger
 personal

 cargo/freight
 training

 ferry
 other:

 passenger
 personal

 cargo/freight
 training

 ferry
 other:

Flight Plan

 VFR
 IFR

 SVFR
 DVFR

 none

 VFR
 IFR

 SVFR
 DVFR

 none

Flight Phase

 taxi
 parked
 takeoff
 initial climb

 climb
 cruise
 descent
 initial approach

 final approach
 missed / GAR
 landing
 other:

 taxi
 parked
 takeoff
 initial climb

 climb
 final approach
 cruise
 missed / GAR
 descent
 landing
 initial approach  other:

Route
in Use

 airway (ID):
 direct
 SID (ID):

 visual approach
 none
 other:

 airway (ID):
 direct
 SID (ID):

 STAR (ID):
 oceanic
 vectors

 STAR (ID):
 oceanic
 vectors

 visual approach
 none
 other:

If more than two aircraft were involved, please describe the additional aircraft in the "Describe Event/Situation" section.

LOCATION
Altitude:
Distance:
 Airport

(single value)

CONFLICTS
 MSL  AGL

and/or Radial (bearing):

 ATC Fac

NASA ARC 277A (May 2009)

Estimated miss distance in feet:
from:

horiz

vert
 Yes  No

Was evasive action taken?
Was TCAS a factor?

ATC

 TA

O RA

 No

OMB No. 2700-0172 Exp 7/31/2022
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NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION

AVIATION SAFETY REPORTING SYSTEM

NASA has established an Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS)
to identify issues in the aviation system which need to be addressed.
The program of which this system is a part is described in detail in FAA
Advisory Circular 00-46E. Your assistance in informing us about such
issues is essential to the success of the program. Please fill out this form
as completely as possible, enclose in an sealed envelope, affix proper
postage, and and send it directly to us.

Section 91.25 of the Federal Aviation Regulations (14 CFR 91.25) prohibits
reports filed with NASA from being used for FAA enforcement purposes. This
report will not be made available to the FAA for civil penalty or certificate
actions for violations of the Federal Air Regulations. Your identity strip,
stamped by NASA, is proof that you have submitted a report to the Aviation
Safety Reporting System. We can only return the strip to you, however,
if you have provided a mailing address. Equally important, we can often
obtain additional useful information if our safety analysts can talk with
The information you provide on the identity strip will be used only if NASA you directly by telephone. For this reason, we have requested telephone
determines that it is necessary to contact you for further information. THIS numbers where we may reach you.
IDENTITY STRIP WILL BE RETURNED DIRECTLY TO YOU. The return
of the identity strip assures your anonymity.
Thank you for your contribution to aviation safety.
NOTE:

AIRCRAFT ACCIDENTS SHOULD NOT BE REPORTED ON THIS FORM. SUCH EVENTS SHOULD BE FILED WITH THE NATIONAL
TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD AS REQUIRED BY NTSB Regulation 830.5 (49CFR830.5).

Paperwork Reduction Act Statement - This information collection meets the requirements of 44 U.S.C. § 3507, as amended by section 2 of the Paperwork
Reduction Act of 1995. You do not need to answer these questions unless we display a valid Office of Management and Budget control number. The OMB
control number for this information collection is 2700-0172 and it expires on 7/31/2022. We estimate that it will take about 30 minutes to read the instructions,
gather the facts, and answer the questions. You may send comments on our time estimate above to: P.O. Box 189 Moffett Field, CA 94035-0189. Send only
comments relating to our time estimate to this address.

If you want to mail this form, please fold pages, enclose in a sealed, stamped envelope, and mail to:

NASA AVIATION SAFETY REPORTING SYSTEM
POST OFFICE BOX 189
MOFFETT FIELD, CA 94035-0189
DESCRIBE EVENT/SITUATION
Keeping in mind the topics shown below, discuss those which you feel are relevant and anything else you think is important. Include what you believe really caused the
problem, and what can be done to prevent a recurrence, or correct the situation. (USE ADDITIONAL PAPER IF NEEDED)

CHAIN OF EVENTS
- How the problem arose
- How it was discovered
- Contributing factors
- Corrective actions

Page 2 of 3

HUMAN PERFORMANCE CONSIDERATIONS
- Perceptions, judgments, decisions
- Actions or inactions
- Factors affecting the quality of human performance
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DESCRIBE EVENT/SITUATION (continued)

CHAIN OF EVENTS
- How the problem arose
- How it was discovered
- Contributing factors
- Corrective actions

Page 3 of 3

HUMAN PERFORMANCE CONSIDERATIONS
- Perceptions, judgments, decisions
- Actions or inactions
- Factors affecting the quality of human performance
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B
DO NOT REPORT AIRCRAFT ACCIDENTS AND CRIMINAL ACTIVITIES ON THIS FORM.
ACCIDENTS AND CRIMINAL ACTIVITIES ARE NOT INCLUDED IN THE ASRS PROGRAM AND SHOULD NOT BE SUBMITTED TO NASA.
ALL IDENTITIES CONTAINED IN THIS REPORT WILL BE REMOVED TO ASSURE COMPLETE REPORTER ANONYMITY.
(SPACE BELOW RESERVED FOR ASRS DATE/TIME STAMP)

IDENTIFICATION STRIP: Please fill in all blanks to ensure return of ID strip to you.
NO RECORD WILL BE KEPT OF YOUR IDENTITY. This section will be returned to you.
TELEPHONE NUMBERS where we may reach you for further details of this occurrence:

HOME

Area

No.

Hours

WORK

Area

No.

Hours
TYPE OF EVENT/SITUATION

NAME
ADDRESS/PO BOX
DATE OF OCCURRENCE
(MM/DD/YYYY)

CITY

STATE

LOCAL TIME (24 hr. clock)

ZIP

(HH:MM)

PLEASE FILL IN APPROPRIATE SPACES AND CHECK ALL ITEMS WHICH APPLY TO THIS EVENT OR SITUATION.

REPORTER
 Captain
 First Officer

FLYING TIME (in hours)

 Single Pilot

Total Time

hrs

 Instructor

 pilot flying
 pilot not flying
 relief pilot
 check airman

 Trainee

Last 90 Days

 Dispatcher:

hrs

yrs

Time in Type

 Other:

AIRSPACE

hrs

CERTIFICATES & RATINGS

ATC EXPERIENCE

 Student

 Flight Instructor

 FPL  Developmental

 Sport/Rec

 Multiengine

radar

 Private

 Instrument

non-radar

yrs

 Commercial

 Flight Engineer

supervisory

yrs

 ATP

 Other:

military

yrs

CONDITIONS / WEATHER ELEMENTS

LIGHT / VISIBILITY

 Class A

 Class E

 VMC

 fog

 snow

 Class B

 Class G

 IMC

 hail

 thunderstorm

 dawn

daylight

 night

dusk

 haze/smoke

 turbulence

 Class C

 Special Use

 Mixed

Ceiling

feet

 Class D

 TFR

 Marginal

 icing
 rain

 windshear
 other:

Visibility
RVR

miles
feet

yrs

ATC / ADVISORY SVC.
 Ramp

Ground

 Center

FSS

 Tower

TRACON

 UNICOM

CTAF

ATC Facility

Name:
AIRCRAFT 2

AIRCRAFT 1
Your Aircraft Type (Make/Model)

Operating

Other

Operating

(e.g. B737, Not "N #", Flt #", etc.):

FAR Part:

Aircraft:

FAR Part:

Operator

 air carrier
 air taxi
 corporate

 fractional
 FBO
 government

 military
 personal
 other:

 air carrier
 air taxi
 corporate


fractional

FBO

government


military
 personal
 other:

Mission

 passenger
 personal

 cargo/freight
 training

 ferry
 other:

 passenger
 personal

 cargo/freight
 training

 ferry
 other:

Flight Plan

 VFR
 IFR

 SVFR
 DVFR

 none

 VFR
 IFR

 SVFR
 DVFR

 none

Flight Phase

 taxi

 climb

 final approach

 final approach


cruise

descent

initial approach


missed / GAR

landing

other:

 taxi


parked

takeoff
initial climb

 climb


parked

takeoff

initial climb


cruise

descent

initial approach


missed / GAR

landing

other:

airway (ID):


STAR (ID):



visual approach




direct


Route

 airway (ID):

 STAR (ID):

 visual approach

in Use

NASA ARC 277B (May 2009)

GENERAL
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NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION

AVIATION SAFETY REPORTING SYSTEM

NASA has established an Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS)
to identify issues in the aviation system which need to be addressed.
The program of which this system is a part is described in detail in FAA
Advisory Circular 00-46E. Your assistance in informing us about such
issues is essential to the success of the program. Please fill out this form
as completely as possible, enclose in an sealed envelope, affix proper
postage, and and send it directly to us.

Section 91.25 of the Federal Aviation Regulations (14 CFR 91.25) prohibits
reports filed with NASA from being used for FAA enforcement purposes. This
report will not be made available to the FAA for civil penalty or certificate
actions for violations of the Federal Air Regulations. Your identity strip,
stamped by NASA, is proof that you have submitted a report to the Aviation
Safety Reporting System. We can only return the strip to you, however,
if you have provided a mailing address. Equally important, we can often
obtain additional useful information if our safety analysts can talk with
The information you provide on the identity strip will be used only if NASA you directly by telephone. For this reason, we have requested telephone
determines that it is necessary to contact you for further information. THIS numbers where we may reach you.
IDENTITY STRIP WILL BE RETURNED DIRECTLY TO YOU. The return
of the identity strip assures your anonymity.
Thank you for your contribution to aviation safety.
NOTE:

AIRCRAFT ACCIDENTS SHOULD NOT BE REPORTED ON THIS FORM. SUCH EVENTS SHOULD BE FILED WITH THE NATIONAL
TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD AS REQUIRED BY NTSB Regulation 830.5 (49CFR830.5).

Paperwork Reduction Act Statement - This information collection meets the requirements of 44 U.S.C. § 3507, as amended by section 2 of the Paperwork
Reduction Act of 1995. You do not need to answer these questions unless we display a valid Office of Management and Budget control number. The OMB
control number for this information collection is 2700-0172 and it expires on 7/31/2022. We estimate that it will take about 30 minutes to read the instructions,
gather the facts, and answer the questions. You may send comments on our time estimate above to: P.O. Box 189 Moffett Field, CA 94035-0189. Send only
comments relating to our time estimate to this address.

If you want to mail this form, please fold pages, enclose in a sealed, stamped envelope, and mail to:

NASA AVIATION SAFETY REPORTING SYSTEM
POST OFFICE BOX 189
MOFFETT FIELD, CA 94035-0189
DESCRIBE EVENT/SITUATION
Keeping in mind the topics shown below, discuss those which you feel are relevant and anything else you think is important. Include what you believe really caused the
problem, and what can be done to prevent a recurrence, or correct the situation. (USE ADDITIONAL PAPER IF NEEDED)

CHAIN OF EVENTS
- How the problem arose
- How it was discovered
- Contributing factors
- Corrective actions

Page 2 of 3

HUMAN PERFORMANCE CONSIDERATIONS
- Perceptions, judgments, decisions
- Actions or inactions
- Factors affecting the quality of human performance
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DESCRIBE EVENT/SITUATION (continued)

CHAIN OF EVENTS
- How the problem arose
- How it was discovered
- Contributing factors
- Corrective actions

Page 3 of 3

HUMAN PERFORMANCE CONSIDERATIONS
- Perceptions, judgments, decisions
- Actions or inactions
- Factors affecting the quality of human performance
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C
DO NOT REPORT AIRCRAFT ACCIDENTS AND CRIMINAL ACTIVITIES ON THIS FORM.
ACCIDENTS AND CRIMINAL ACTIVITIES ARE NOT INCLUDED IN THE ASRS PROGRAM AND SHOULD NOT BE SUBMITTED TO NASA.
ALL IDENTITIES CONTAINED IN THIS REPORT WILL BE REMOVED TO ASSURE COMPLETE REPORTER ANONYMITY.
(SPACE BELOW RESERVED FOR ASRS DATE/TIME STAMP)

IDENTIFICATION STRIP: Please fill in all blanks to ensure return of ID strip to you.
NO RECORD WILL BE KEPT OF YOUR IDENTITY. This section will be returned to you.
TELEPHONE NUMBERS where we may reach you for further details of this occurrence:

HOME

Area

No.

Hours

WORK

Area

No.

Hours
TYPE OF EVENT/SITUATION

NAME
ADDRESS/PO BOX
DATE OF OCCURRENCE
(MM/DD/YYYY)

CITY

STATE

ZIP

LOCAL TIME (24 hr. clock)
(HH:MM)

PLEASE FILL IN APPROPRIATE SPACES AND CHECK ALL ITEMS WHICH APPLY TO THIS EVENT OR SITUATION.

REPORTER

EXPERIENCE

 Flight Attendant (FA)
 FA in charge
 Off-Duty FA
 Other

Total years as Flight Attendant
Total years as FA with your current airline
Number of aircraft types currently qualified to work on
Percent of duty time in past year on aircraft type involved
FLIGHT INFORMATION

Type of Aircraft

(Make/Model)
number of seats

number of pax on board

number of exits:
Flight Segment

floor level

flight origin

(check all that
apply)

departure time

 air carrier
 air taxi
 corporate
 fractional
 other

(HH:MM)

hrs/mins nearest city/state (if known)

 boarding
 beverage service
 deplaning
 meal service
 safety related duties, specify

OPERATOR

tailcone

destination

time since takeoff
Cabin Activity

number in cabin crew

window

 cart service
 tray service

FLIGHT PHASE
 parked
 taxi
 takeoff
 climb
 cruise

 other

WEATHER

 descent
 approach
 landing
 gate arrival
 other

LIGHTING

 clear
 cloudy
 rain
 fog
 turbulence
 snow
 thunderstorms  ice
 unknown






CABIN
high
medium
low
off

OUTSIDE
 daylight
 night

EVENT CHARACTERISTICS

Reporter's location in aircraft at time of event
Reporter's activity at time of event
Was a passenger directly involved
in the event?

 Yes  No Reset

Did this event result in an injury?
to passenger?
to crew?

 Yes  No
 Yes  No
 Yes  No Reset

NASA ARC 277C (May 2009)

Was fire/smoke involved in the event?

 Yes  No Reset

Was there an evacuation during or
as a result of this event?

 Yes  No Reset

CABIN CREW

OMB No. 2700-0172 Exp 7/31/2022
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NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION

AVIATION SAFETY REPORTING SYSTEM

NASA has established an Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS)
to identify issues in the aviation system which need to be addressed.
The program of which this system is a part is described in detail in FAA
Advisory Circular 00-46E. Your assistance in informing us about such
issues is essential to the success of the program. Please fill out this form
as completely as possible, enclose in an sealed envelope, affix proper
postage, and and send it directly to us.

Section 91.25 of the Federal Aviation Regulations (14 CFR 91.25) prohibits
reports filed with NASA from being used for FAA enforcement purposes. This
report will not be made available to the FAA for civil penalty or certificate
actions for violations of the Federal Air Regulations. Your identity strip,
stamped by NASA, is proof that you have submitted a report to the Aviation
Safety Reporting System. We can only return the strip to you, however,
if you have provided a mailing address. Equally important, we can often
obtain additional useful information if our safety analysts can talk with
The information you provide on the identity strip will be used only if NASA you directly by telephone. For this reason, we have requested telephone
determines that it is necessary to contact you for further information. THIS numbers where we may reach you.
IDENTITY STRIP WILL BE RETURNED DIRECTLY TO YOU. The return
of the identity strip assures your anonymity.
Thank you for your contribution to aviation safety.
NOTE:

AIRCRAFT ACCIDENTS SHOULD NOT BE REPORTED ON THIS FORM. SUCH EVENTS SHOULD BE FILED WITH THE NATIONAL
TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD AS REQUIRED BY NTSB Regulation 830.5 (49CFR830.5).

Paperwork Reduction Act Statement - This information collection meets the requirements of 44 U.S.C. § 3507, as amended by section 2 of the Paperwork
Reduction Act of 1995. You do not need to answer these questions unless we display a valid Office of Management and Budget control number. The OMB
control number for this information collection is 2700-0172 and it expires on 7/31/2022. We estimate that it will take about 30 minutes to read the instructions,
gather the facts, and answer the questions. You may send comments on our time estimate above to: P.O. Box 189 Moffett Field, CA 94035-0189. Send only
comments relating to our time estimate to this address.

If you want to mail this form, please fold pages, enclose in a sealed, stamped envelope, and mail to:

NASA AVIATION SAFETY REPORTING SYSTEM
POST OFFICE BOX 189
MOFFETT FIELD, CA 94035-0189
DESCRIBE EVENT/SITUATION
Keeping in mind the topics shown below, discuss those which you feel are relevant and anything else you think is important. Include what you believe really caused the
problem, and what can be done to prevent a recurrence, or correct the situation. (USE ADDITIONAL PAPER IF NEEDED)

CHAIN OF EVENTS
- How the problem arose
- How it was discovered
- Contributing factors
- Corrective actions

Page 2 of 3

HUMAN PERFORMANCE CONSIDERATIONS
- Perceptions, judgments, decisions
- Actions or inactions
- Factors affecting the quality of human performance
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DESCRIBE EVENT/SITUATION (continued)

CHAIN OF EVENTS
- How the problem arose
- How it was discovered
- Contributing factors
- Corrective actions

NASA ARC 277C (May 2009)

Page 3 of 3

HUMAN PERFORMANCE CONSIDERATIONS
- Perceptions, judgments, decisions
- Actions or inactions
- Factors affecting the quality of human performance
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APPENDIX B: ASRS NASA REPORT FEBRUARY 2019
ASRS Database Report Set

Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) Reports

Report Set Description .......................................... A sampling of reports involving Unmanned
Aerial
Vehicle (UAV) events.
Update Number ..................................................... 13
Date of Update ...................................................... February 27, 2019
Number of Records in Report Set ......................... 50
Number of New Records in Report Set ................ 49
Type of Records in Report Set .............................. For each update, new records received at
ASRS will displace a like number of the oldest records in the Report Set, with the objective of
providing the fifty most recent relevant ASRS Database records. Records within this Report Set
have been screened to assure their relevance to the topic.

161
National Aeronautics
and Space
Administration

Ames Research Center
Moffett Field, CA 94035-1000

TH: 262-7

MEMORANDUM FOR: Recipients of Aviation Safety Reporting System
Data SUBJECT: Data Derived from ASRS Reports
The attached material is furnished pursuant to a request for data from the NASA Aviation
Safety Reporting System (ASRS). Recipients of this material are reminded when evaluating
these data of the following points.
ASRS reports are submitted voluntarily. The existence in the ASRS database of reports
concerning a specific topic cannot, therefore, be used to infer the prevalence of that
problem within the National Airspace System.
Information contained in reports submitted to ASRS may be amplified by further contact with
the individual who submitted them, but the information provided by the reporter is not
investigated further. Such information represents the perspective of the specific individual
who is describing their experience and perception of a safety related event.
After preliminary processing, all ASRS reports are de-identified and the identity of the
individual who submitted the report is permanently eliminated. All ASRS report processing
systems are designed to protect identifying information submitted by reporters; including
names, company affiliations, and specific times of incident occurrence. After a report has been
de-identified, any verification of information submitted to ASRS would be limited.
The National Aeronautics and Space Administration and its ASRS current contractor, Booz
Allen Hamilton, specifically disclaim any responsibility for any interpretation which may
be made by others of any material or data furnished by NASA in response to queries of the
ASRS database and related materials.

Becky L. Hooey, Director
NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System

162
CAVEAT REGARDING USE OF ASRS DATA
Certain caveats apply to the use of ASRS data. All ASRS reports are voluntarily submitted,
and thus cannot be considered a measured random sample of the full population of like events.
For example, we receive several thousand altitude deviation reports each year. This number
may comprise over half of all the altitude deviations that occur, or it may be just a small
fraction of total occurrences.
Moreover, not all pilots, controllers, mechanics, flight attendants, dispatchers or other
participants in the aviation system are equally aware of the ASRS or may be equally willing to
report. Thus, the data can reflect reporting biases. These biases, which are not fully known or
measurable, may influence ASRS information. A safety problem such as near midair
collisions (NMACs) may appear to be more highly concentrated in area “A” than area “B”
simply because the airmen who operate in area “A” are more aware of the ASRS program and
more inclined to report should an NMAC occur. Any type of subjective, voluntary reporting
will have these limitations related to quantitative statistical analysis.
One thing that can be known from ASRS data is that the number of reports received
concerning specific event types represents the lower measure of the true number of such
events that are occurring. For example, if ASRS receives 881 reports of track deviations in
2010 (this number is purely hypothetical), then it can be known with some certainty that at
least 881 such events have occurred in 2010. With these statistical limitations in mind, we
believe that the real power of ASRS data is the qualitative information contained in report
narratives. The pilots, controllers, and others who report tell us about aviation safety
incidents and situations in detail – explaining what happened, and more importantly, why it
happened. Using report narratives effectively requires an extra measure of study, but the
knowledge derived is well worth the added effort.

163

Report Synopses
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ACN: 1605225 (1 of 50)
Synopsis
C-172 pilot reported sighting a drone close by during cruise flight.

ACN: 1600739 (2 of 50)
Synopsis
737-800 captain reported a UAV at 2500 ft. (MSL).

ACN: 1600215 (3 of 50)
Synopsis
C172 Flight Instructor reported an airborne conflict with a UAV in the airport traffic
pattern.

ACN: 1600211 (4 of 50)
Synopsis
A UAS operator reported taking evasive action to avoid traffic at a non towered airport.

ACN: 1599969 (5 of 50)
Synopsis
An EMS Helicopter pilot reported many hospital heliports are not in the FAA Airport
database provided to drone operators to use to avoid the airspace.

ACN: 1599671 (6 of 50)
Synopsis
Remote pilot reported the UAV was flown to an altitude that was likely in excess of the
400 FT AGL limitation specified within FAR Part 107. Pilot states telemetry data on display
was set to metric.

ACN: 1598849 (7 of 50)
Synopsis
Military helicopter instructor reported a NMAC with a UAV in a military training area.

ACN: 1595651 (8 of 50)
Synopsis
First Officer reported sighting a drone while on initial approach to SAN, which caused a
distraction and possible track deviation.
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ACN: 1595573 (9 of 50)
Synopsis
Air Carrier flight crew reported an NMAC with a drone while on final approach to LAX.

ACN: 1593299 (10 of 50)
Synopsis
EMB-175 Captain reported a drone sighting after departure.

ACN: 1592641 (11 of 50)
Synopsis
Approach Controller reported airborne conflict between UAV and commercial aircraft being
vectored for approach.

ACN: 1592543 (12 of 50)
Synopsis
Air carrier Captain reported airborne conflict with a UAV on base leg into BOS.

ACN: 1591597 (13 of 50)
Synopsis
Drone operator reported penetrating Class D airspace.

ACN: 1591241 (14 of 50)
Synopsis
Departure Controller reported an airborne conflict between a manned aircraft and a flight
of two UAVs.

ACN: 1591153 (15 of 50)
Synopsis
Light Sport pilot encountered a UAV near a MOA.

ACN: 1591117 (16 of 50)
Synopsis
UAV operator reported that the UAV suffered a complete loss of power during flight
despite indications of sufficient battery time remaining.

ACN: 1590911 (17 of 50)
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Synopsis
Air carrier flight crew reported a conflict with a Drone on approach to DEN.

ACN: 1589922

(18 of 50)

Synopsis
UAS operator reported a conflict with a taxiing aircraft just prior to launch from an airport
taxiway. The operation was published informing all users of the airport of the planned UAS
operation.

ACN: 1589625

(19 of 50)

Synopsis
UAV pilot reported being unaware the flight conducted was in controlled airspace.

ACN: 1588688

(20 of 50)

Synopsis
UAV operator reported possible operation in Class C airspace.

ACN: 1588430

(21 of 50)

Synopsis
UAV operator reported being advised by local FSDO that an investigation of recent
operations of his UAV in the vicinity of an airport was being initiated.

ACN: 1588041

(22 of 50)

Synopsis
Air Carrier Captain reported a NMAC with a Drone on a four mile final to JFK.

ACN: 1587432

(23 of 50)

Synopsis
PA-38 pilot reported an encounter with a drone at 150 feet off the aircraft wing tip.

ACN: 1586244

(24 of 50)

Synopsis
UAV pilot reported he was contacted by the FAA for a possible violation of FAR 107.39.
Operating around a 0 AGL area.

ACN: 1584220
Synopsis

(25 of 50)
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Cessna 182 pilot reported airborne conflict with UAV.

ACN: 1583855

(26 of 50)

Synopsis
Cessna 172 pilot reported a NMAC with a drone at a distance of 0 feet vertical and 400
feet lateral.

ACN: 1583538

(27 of 50)

Synopsis
Air Carrier Captain reported an airborne conflict with UAV during approach.

ACN: 1582733

(28 of 50)

Synopsis
757 Captain reported the flight crew observed a UAV at their same altitude.

ACN: 1580222

(29 of 50)

Synopsis
Helicopter pilot reported a NMAC with drone.

ACN: 1578620

(30 of 50)

Synopsis
Indianapolis Center Controller reported an NMAC between a Piper and a drone, and also
failure on Controller's report to broadcast for 15 minutes afterward.

ACN: 1578002

(31 of 50)

Synopsis
A General Aviation pilot reported an NMAC with a drone at approximately 500 feet altitude.

ACN: 1577960

(32 of 50)

Synopsis
UAV pilot reported temporarily losing line-of-sight with drone.

ACN: 1577881

(33 of 50)

Synopsis
Gulfstream pilot reported, while on initial approach, sighting a drone 500 feet above
the aircraft.
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ACN: 1574558

(34 of 50)

Synopsis
A R44 Pilot reported an encounter with a UAV just before liftoff.

ACN: 1573395

(35 of 50)

Synopsis
Air carrier Captain reported a small white drone pass under his aircraft flying in the
opposite direction.

ACN: 1573186

(36 of 50)

Synopsis
Flight instructor reported sighting a drone while on an instructional flight at 4500 feet.

ACN: 1571254

(37 of 50)

Synopsis
Citation Captain reported a NMAC with a drone while on approach to Runway 24L at LAX.

ACN: 1570720

(38 of 50)

Synopsis
B737 Captain reported sighting a drone 400 feet below and just to the right of final
approach fix to Runway 12R at STL.

ACN: 1568419

(39 of 50)

Synopsis
B-777 flight crew reported passing over a drone by 1000 feet while at 4000 feet on the
HYPER 7 ARRIVIAL into IAD.

ACN: 1568336

(40 of 50)

Synopsis
B737 Captain reported sighting a drone while flying a visual approach to runway 27 at SAN
and then again hovering over a parked airplane upon landing.

ACN: 1566714

(41 of 50)

Synopsis
Air Carrier Captain reported sighting a quadcopter drone at approximately 4000 feet while
flying the STYCK6 departure out of IAH.
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ACN: 1562358

(42 of 50)

Synopsis
ZOA Center Controllers reported a loss of separation between a UAV and a Small
Transport.

ACN: 1562024

(43 of 50)

Synopsis
B737 First Officer reported an NMAC with a drone during approach to BOS.

ACN: 1561883

(44 of 50)

Synopsis
C172 pilot reported a NMAC with a drone while descending into SBP.

ACN: 1561479

(45 of 50)

Synopsis
A330 Captain reported they lost communication with ATC and did not realize it until they
observed unidentifiable traffic near their aircraft.

ACN: 1561264

(46 of 50)

Synopsis
An airport worker at CXP reported a midair collision between a helicopter and a drone.

ACN: 1561150

(47 of 50)

Synopsis
ERJ-190 flight crew reported a NMAC with a Drone during the descent phase of flight.

ACN: 1559150

(48 of 50)

Synopsis
CRJ-200 First Officer reported a UAV in close proximity to the aircraft.

ACN: 1558327

(49 of 50)

Synopsis
C-172 pilot reported a NMAC with a drone while on final approach to Ann Arbor Municipal
Airport.

ACN: 1549645

(50 of 50)
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Synopsis
Helicopter pilot reported a NMAC with a quadcopter drone at approximately 650 feet MSL
while inbound for landing.
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Report Narratives
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ACN: 1605225

(1 of 50)

Time / Day
Date : 201812
Local Time Of Day : 0601-1200

Place
Locale Reference.ATC Facility : ZJX.ARTCC
State Reference : FL
Altitude.MSL.Single Value : 4500

Environment
Flight Conditions : VMC
Weather Elements / Visibility.Visibility :
10 Light : Daylight

Aircraft : 1
Reference : X
Aircraft Operator : Personal
Make Model Name : Skyhawk 172/Cutlass
172 Operating Under FAR Part : Part 91
Flight Plan : None
Mission : Personal
Flight Phase : Cruise
Airspace.Class E :
ZJX

Aircraft : 2
Make Model Name : UAV - Unpiloted Aerial
Vehicle Crew Size.Number Of Crew : 0
Operating Under FAR
Part.Other Flight Phase : Cruise
Airspace.Class E : ZJX

Person
Reference : 1
Location Of Person.Aircraft : X
Location In Aircraft : Flight Deck
Reporter Organization : Personal
Function.Flight Crew : Pilot Flying
Function.Flight Crew : Single Pilot
Qualification.Flight Crew : Private
Experience.Flight Crew.Total : 153
Experience.Flight Crew.Last 90 Days : 19
Experience.Flight Crew.Type : 12
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number : 1605225
Human Factors : Situational Awareness

Events
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Anomaly.Conflict : NMAC
Detector.Person : Flight Crew
Miss Distance.Horizontal : 150
Miss Distance.Vertical : 25
When Detected : In-flight
Result.General : None Reported / Taken

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations : Airspace Structure
Contributing Factors / Situations : Procedure
Primary Problem : Ambiguous

Narrative: 1
We encountered a drone at our cruise altitude of 4500 feet. It was clearly identifiable
as an unmanned aerial vehicle with a white/red top and black bottom. No evasive
action taken because the time between seeing the drone and the drone passing about
150 feet from our left wing was too short (estimate between 0.5 and 1 second).

Synopsis
C-172 pilot reported sighting a drone close by during cruise flight.
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ACN: 1600739

(2 of 50)

Time / Day
Date : 201812
Local Time Of Day : 1201-1800

Place
Locale Reference.Airport : ZZZ.Airport
State Reference : US
Altitude.MSL.Single Value : 2500

Aircraft : 1
Reference : X
ATC / Advisory.TRACON : ZZZ
Aircraft Operator : Air Carrier
Make Model Name : B737-800
Crew Size.Number Of Crew : 2
Operating Under FAR Part : Part
121 Flight Plan : IFR
Mission : Passenger
Nav In Use : FMS Or
FMC Flight Phase :
Climb Airspace.Class B :
ZZZ

Aircraft : 2
Make Model Name : UAV - Unpiloted Aerial
Vehicle Airspace.Class B : ZZZ

Person
Reference : 1
Location Of Person.Aircraft : X
Location In Aircraft : Flight Deck
Reporter Organization : Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew : Pilot Flying
Function.Flight Crew : Captain
Qualification.Flight Crew : Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Qualification.Flight Crew : Instrument
Qualification.Flight Crew : Multiengine
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number : 1600739
Human Factors : Situational Awareness

Events
Anomaly.Conflict : Airborne
Conflict Detector.Person : Flight
Crew When Detected : In-flight
Result.General : None Reported / Taken

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations : Environment - Non Weather Related
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Primary Problem : Environment - Non Weather Related
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Narrative: 1
Flight encountered a drone passing 2500 ft (MSL). The drone was at our 9O'clock position. ATC notified.

Synopsis
737-800 captain reported a UAV at 2500 ft. (MSL).
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ACN: 1600215

(3 of 50)

Time / Day
Date : 201812
Local Time Of Day : 0601-1200

Place
Locale Reference.Airport : ZZZ.Airport
State Reference : US
Altitude.AGL.Single Value : 200

Environment
Flight Conditions :
VMC Light : Daylight

Aircraft
Reference : X
ATC / Advisory.CTAF :
ZZZ Aircraft Operator :
Personal
Make Model Name : Skyhawk 172/Cutlass
172 Crew Size.Number Of Crew : 1
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 91
Flight Plan : VFR
Mission : Training
Flight Phase : Final Approach
Route In Use : Visual Approach
Airspace.Class G : ZZZ

Person
Reference : 1
Location Of Person.Aircraft : X
Location In Aircraft : Flight Deck
Reporter Organization : Personal
Function.Flight Crew : Instructor
Qualification.Flight Crew :
Commercial
Qualification.Flight Crew : Flight Instructor
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number :
1600215 Human Factors : Situational Awareness

Events
Anomaly.Conflict : Airborne Conflict
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural : Published Material /
Policy Detector.Person : Flight Crew
Miss Distance.Vertical :
800 When Detected : Inflight
Result.General : None Reported / Taken

Assessments
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Contributing Factors / Situations : Environment - Non Weather Related
Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors
Primary Problem : Environment - Non Weather Related

Narrative: 1
My student and I were on short final for Runway 10 at ZZZ when we each observed an
unmanned aircraft operating directly above the airport at what appeared to be pattern
altitude or possibly lower. It was difficult to gauge the size of the drone from our
perspective but I would say at least 6 feet from wingtip to wingtip. We landed normally-we had been planning to fly the closed traffic pattern for a few circuits at ZZZ but
quickly decided after seeing the drone to depart the area for the day, which we did
without seeing the drone again. We had been monitoring the CTAF since 15 miles out
and had communicated our position and intentions for a straight-in approach several
times, starting at 8 miles away. No one else had made radio transmissions at ZZZ the
whole time. After landing back at [home airport] and concluding the flight, we spoke on
the phone to someone at an FBO listed at ZZZ. He said "the drone people had been
asking (him) earlier that morning if (he) could hear them on the frequency," and he said
he hadn't been able to hear them. Obviously we could not either. He suggested we file
[this] report.

Synopsis
C172 Flight Instructor reported an airborne conflict with a UAV in the airport traffic
pattern.
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ACN: 1600211

(4 of 50)

Time / Day
Date : 201812
Local Time Of Day : 0601-1200

Place
Locale Reference.Airport : ZZZ.Airport
State Reference : US
Altitude.AGL.Single Value : 400

Environment
Flight Conditions : VMC
Weather Elements / Visibility.Visibility :
10 Light : Daylight
Ceiling.Single Value : 3200

Aircraft
Reference : X
ATC / Advisory.CTAF :
ZZZ Aircraft Operator :
Personal
Make Model Name : UAV - Unpiloted Aerial
Vehicle Flight Plan : None
Mission : Test Flight
Flight Phase : Cruise
Route In Use : None
Airspace.Class G :
ZZZ

Person
Reference : 1
Location Of Person : Gate / Ramp /
Line Reporter Organization : Personal
Function.Flight Crew : Pilot Flying
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number : 1600211
Human Factors : Situational Awareness
Human Factors : Communication Breakdown
Communication Breakdown.Party1 : Flight
Crew Communication Breakdown.Party2 :
Flight Crew

Events
Anomaly.Conflict : Airborne Conflict
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural : Published Material /
Policy Detector.Person : Flight Crew
Miss Distance.Horizontal : 500
Miss Distance.Vertical : 400
When Detected : In-flight
Result.Flight Crew : Took Evasive Action
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Result.Flight Crew : Executed Go Around / Missed Approach

Assessments

181
Contributing Factors / Situations : Aircraft
Contributing Factors / Situations : Company
Policy Contributing Factors / Situations : Human
Factors Primary Problem : Human Factors

Narrative: 1
An unmanned aircraft was operating in the vicinity of ZZZ under a FAA 333 exemption
authority. The aircraft was positioned about 1000 feet north of the runway flying parallel
to the runway at 400 feet. At this time, a manned aircraft made a radio call that they
were on "short final for runway ..." No prior radio call was made by the manned aircraft
as they approached the area. The first radio call was made while the manned aircraft
was approximately one mile from the approach end of runway. The UAS operator
immediately commanded the aircraft to return to the south of the airfield where the
ground control station was located in order to avoid the landing traffic. A radio call was
also made by the UAS operator identifying the position of the unmanned aircraft but no
reply was heard from the manned aircraft. As the manned aircraft crossed the threshold
of the runway, the UAS was south of the runway by approximately 500 feet and
maintaining 400 feet. The manned aircraft did not take any evasive maneuvers to avoid
the unmanned aircraft and proceeded to do a touch and go. Several radio calls were
made by the UAS operator but no replies were heard. While the unmanned aircraft was
established in an orbit south of the runway, the manned aircraft made left traffic and
climbed above pattern altitude and departed the area to the west. The manned aircraft
made a final radio call indicating they had seen the UAS but did not acknowledge any
radio calls by the UAS operator.

Synopsis
A UAS operator reported taking evasive action to avoid traffic at a non towered airport.
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ACN: 1599969

(5 of 50)

Time / Day
Date : 201812
Local Time Of Day : 1801-2400

Aircraft
Reference : X
Make Model Name :
Helicopter Flight Phase :
Cruise
Flight Phase : Takeoff
Flight Phase :
Descent Flight Phase
: Landing Flight
Phase : Climb

Person
Reference : 1
Location Of Person.Aircraft : X
Reporter Organization :
Personal
Function.Flight Crew : Other / Unknown
Qualification.Flight Crew : Instrument
Qualification.Flight Crew : Commercial
Experience.Flight Crew.Total : 5210
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number : 1599969
Analyst Callback : Completed

Events
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural : Published Material /
Policy Detector.Person : Other Person
When Detected : Routine Inspection

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations : Aircraft
Contributing Factors / Situations : Procedure
Contributing Factors / Situations : Company
Policy Primary Problem : Company Policy

Narrative: 1
In conducting research in regard to the accuracy of the FAA's Airport Master Record
(5010) database system significant discrepancies have been discovered. While auditing
four different states for hospital heliports; Ohio, Indiana, Wisconsin and Tennessee,
numerous hospital heliports were found to be unaccounted for. Ohio-44, Indiana-36,
Wisconsin-42 and Tennessee-38. Given these numbers it is estimated upwards of 2,000
hospital heliports may be unaccounted for in the U.S. The criticality of this is based on
the fact that the FAA has provided UAS and Drone operators with the B4UFLY application
to alert them when they are in proximity of any airports. Since the B4UFLY application,
as does every other aviation database and GPS, pulls its information directly from the
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FAA Airport Master Record Database, any facility not identified in that system will not
appear in the B4UFLY, hence the UAS or Drone pilot would never know these facilities
existed and would not know to avoid the area or to alert the hospitals of their operation
as required by Part-107. The primary reasons identified for this lack of information are
the fact that hospital
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heliports are qualified as "private" facilities, even though commercial operations are
performed at these locations, and the FAA has never been given any legal jurisdiction or
authority over private facilities and cannot enforce compliance. With the continually
increasing number of UAS and Drone operations being conducted in the U.S., the risk
exposure for a potential incident continues to climb every day.

Synopsis
An EMS Helicopter pilot reported many hospital heliports are not in the FAA Airport
database provided to drone operators to use to avoid the airspace.
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ACN: 1599671

(6 of 50)

Time / Day
Date : 201812
Local Time Of Day : 0601-1200

Place
Altitude.AGL.Single Value : 490

Environment
Flight Conditions : VMC
Weather Elements / Visibility.Visibility :
10 Light : Daylight
Ceiling.Single Value : 2000

Aircraft
Reference : X
Aircraft Operator : Government
Make Model Name : UAV - Unpiloted Aerial
Vehicle Crew Size.Number Of Crew : 1
Flight Plan : None
Mission : Photo Shoot
Flight Phase : Climb

Person
Reference : 1
Location Of Person : Hangar / Base
Reporter Organization : Government
Function.Flight Crew : Single Pilot
Qualification.Flight Crew : Private
Experience.Flight Crew.Total : 1100
Experience.Flight Crew.Last 90 Days : 10
Experience.Flight Crew.Type : 75
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number : 1599671
Human Factors : Human-Machine Interface

Events
Anomaly.Airspace Violation : All Types
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural : Published Material /
Policy Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural : FAR
Detector.Person : Flight Crew
When Detected : In-flight
Result.Flight Crew : Exited Penetrated Airspace

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations : Human
Factors Primary Problem : Human Factors

Narrative: 1

186
While collecting photo/video data, the UAS was flown to an altitude that was likely in
excess of the 400 FT AGL limitation specified within FAR Part 107. Remote Pilot in
Command (RPIC) holds both Part 61 (manned) certificate and Part 107 (remote)
certificate. A Visual Observer (VO), also a Part 61 & Part 107 pilot, was also scanning for
traffic and other potential hazards in and around the planned operating environment. The
crew had an aviation-band transceiver available to monitor the local airport's CTAF
frequency, a small untowered/uncontrolled GA airport located approximately 1 nm away.
No manned aircraft were heard (over the radio or via engine noise) or visually observed
during the entirety of the day's flights and the UAS was not within the airport's
approach/departure paths. The RPIC had eyes on the UAS while maneuvering to ensure
UAS did not fly close to obstacles (primarily trees & power lines when closer to ground)
or over areas that may have contained nonparticipants (yards, roads). The planned route
was chosen to be free from most factors, with the few road crossings performed safely
when there was no vehicular traffic in the vicinity (RPIC and Visual Observer both
verbally verify prior to crossing). After all obstacles were well cleared and the UAS was
maneuvered into position and had begun data collection, the RPIC checked the display
and noticed the flight display software's telemetry data had been reset to display metric
and was indicating approximately 150 meters. Knowing the metric equivalent of 400 FT is
approximately 122m, the RPIC initiated an immediate descent. Contributing Factors:
RPIC's focus on ensuring the UAS was not flown near obstacles or over people, coupled
with the delayed awareness of the software displaying telemetry information in metric
units. Corrective Actions (real-time): Upon noticing an indicated altitude in excess of 400
FT AGL, the RPIC immediately descended the UAS below 400 FT (122m) AGL indicated.
Corrective Actions (future procedures): In the future, pre-flight checklist will include
verification that software units are displayed in feet (not metric) and the software-based
altitude limit is enabled and properly set (when able). RPIC will also refer to flight display
more frequently as the aircraft is climbing (assuming safe to do so) and call out altitudes
passing through during major ascents/descents. Additionally, when the flight profile
allows, RPIC will de-couple climbs/descents from horizontal maneuvering, particularly if
the UAS is approaching the altitude limit or may be operating in the vicinity of other
considerations (obstacles, roads, nonparticipants, etc.) which may take attention away
from altitude awareness.

Synopsis
Remote pilot reported the UAV was flown to an altitude that was likely in excess of the
400 FT AGL limitation specified within FAR Part 107. Pilot states telemetry data on display
was set to metric.
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ACN: 1598849

(7 of 50)

Time / Day
Date : 201811
Local Time Of Day : 1201-1800

Place
Locale Reference.Airport : ZZZ.Airport
State Reference : US
Altitude.AGL.Single Value : 200

Environment
Flight Conditions : VMC
Weather Elements / Visibility.Visibility :
10 Ceiling.Single Value : 10000

Aircraft : 1
Reference : X
ATC / Advisory.Military Facility :
ZZZ Aircraft Operator : Military
Make Model Name : Jet/Long Ranger/206
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 91
Flight Plan : VFR
Mission :
Training Flight
Phase : Taxi
Airspace.Special Use : MILITARY AIRSPACE

Aircraft : 2
Reference : Y
ATC / Advisory.Military Facility : ZZZ
Make Model Name : UAV - Unpiloted Aerial
Vehicle Operating Under FAR Part : Part 91
Flight Phase : Cruise

Person
Reference : 1
Location Of Person.Aircraft : X
Location In Aircraft : Flight Deck
Reporter Organization : Military
Function.Flight Crew : Instructor
Function.Flight Crew : Pilot Not
Flying Qualification.Flight Crew :
Instrument
Qualification.Flight Crew : Air Transport Pilot
(ATP) Qualification.Flight Crew : Flight Instructor
Qualification.Flight Crew : Multiengine
Experience.Flight Crew.Total : 3000
Experience.Flight Crew.Last 90 Days : 120
Experience.Flight Crew.Type : 2300

188
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number : 1598849
Human Factors : Situational Awareness

189
Events
Anomaly.Conflict : NMAC
Detector.Person : Flight Crew
When Detected : Taxi
Result.General : None Reported / Taken

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations : Environment - Non Weather Related
Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors
Primary Problem : Human Factors

Narrative: 1
While hover taxiing at a [military] training field a quadcopter drone (app. 2ft by 2ft) flew
overhead of my helicopter at roughly 200 ft AGL. The training field is 1 square mile. My
aircraft was in the southeast corner of the field. The drone flew over my aircraft then to
the northwest until it eventually exited the training environment. There were 9 other
helicopters at the field during this time. The drone flew overhead at least 3 other aircraft
that were doing hover training during its transit across the field. [Military] operating
altitude at this outlying field is 650 ft AGL and below. I made a call over our common
training frequency to alert the other aircraft and also had the field duty officer file a
report with local law enforcement.

Synopsis
Military helicopter instructor reported a NMAC with a UAV in a military training area.
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ACN: 1595651

(8 of 50)

Time / Day
Date : 201811

Place
Locale Reference.ATC Facility : SCT.TRACON
State Reference : CA
Altitude.MSL.Single Value : 7000

Aircraft : 1
Reference : X
ATC / Advisory.TRACON :
SCT Aircraft Operator : Air
Carrier
Make Model Name : B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Crew Size.Number Of Crew : 2
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 121
Mission : Passenger
Flight Phase : Initial
Approach Route In
Use.STAR : LUCKI 4
Airspace.Class B : SCT

Aircraft : 2
Reference : Y
ATC / Advisory.TRACON : SCT
Make Model Name : UAV - Unpiloted Aerial
Vehicle Operating Under FAR Part : Part 91
Airspace.Class B : SCT

Person
Reference : 1
Location Of Person.Aircraft : X
Location In Aircraft : Flight Deck
Reporter Organization : Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew : First Officer
Function.Flight Crew : Pilot Not
Flying
Qualification.Flight Crew : Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number : 1595651
Human Factors : Distraction

Events
Anomaly.Deviation - Track / Heading : All Types
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural : Clearance
Anomaly.Inflight Event / Encounter : Other /
Unknown Detector.Person : Flight Crew
When Detected : In-flight
Result.Air Traffic Control : Issued New Clearance

191
Assessments

192
Contributing Factors / Situations : Airspace Structure
Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors
Contributing Factors / Situations : Procedure
Primary Problem : Ambiguous

Narrative: 1
While on LUCKI 4 Arrival to SAN, we were distracted by an odd aircraft close to our
track. It looked like a large drone. We were distracted discussing this aircraft and
possibly missed something. Soon after ATC made an odd query as to our position as if
we were tracking incorrectly, asked if we had the field in sight. I replied that we did and
ATC cleared us for a visual approach. After landing they gave a phone number to call for
possible deviation. SoCal implied we were off course/asked if field in sight/cleared us for
a visual approach. I am unsure what was wrong. Need better communication with ATC.

Synopsis
First Officer reported sighting a drone while on initial approach to SAN, which caused a
distraction and possible track deviation.
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ACN: 1595573

(9 of 50)

Time / Day
Date : 201811
Local Time Of Day : 1201-1800

Place
Locale Reference.Airport : LAX.Airport
State Reference : CA
Altitude.MSL.Single Value : 2500

Environment
Weather Elements / Visibility.Visibility :
2 Light : Daylight

Aircraft : 1
Reference : X
ATC / Advisory.TRACON :
ZZZ Aircraft Operator : Air
Carrier
Make Model Name : B787 Dreamliner Undifferentiated or Other Model
Crew Size.Number Of Crew : 2
Operating Under FAR Part : Part
121 Flight Plan : IFR
Mission : Passenger
Flight Phase : Final
Approach Route In
Use.Other Airspace.Class B
: ZZZ

Aircraft : 2
Reference : Y
ATC / Advisory.TRACON : ZZZ
Make Model Name : UAV - Unpiloted Aerial
Vehicle Airspace.Class B : ZZZ

Person : 1
Reference : 1
Location Of Person.Aircraft : X
Location In Aircraft : Flight Deck
Reporter Organization : Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew : Pilot Not
Flying Function.Flight Crew : First
Officer
Qualification.Flight Crew : Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Qualification.Flight Crew : Multiengine
Qualification.Flight Crew : Instrument
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number : 1595573

Person : 2

194
Reference : 2
Location Of Person.Aircraft : X
Location In Aircraft : Flight
Deck

195
Reporter Organization : Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew : Pilot Flying
Function.Flight Crew : Captain
Qualification.Flight Crew : Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Qualification.Flight Crew : Multiengine
Qualification.Flight Crew : Instrument
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number : 1595575

Events
Anomaly.Conflict : NMAC
Detector.Person : Flight Crew
Miss Distance.Horizontal : 300
When Detected : In-flight
Result.General : None Reported / Taken

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations : Airspace Structure
Contributing Factors / Situations : Procedure
Primary Problem : Ambiguous

Narrative: 1
A large drone (approximately 2 feet high) passed the right wing during approach to LAX at
glideslope intercept. Distance estimated to be about 100 meters. Reported to ATC.

Narrative: 2
A large drone passed the right wing during approach at glideslope intercept. Reported
to ATC. The drone was a barrel shape, cylinder-looking type, black cylinder 2 to 3 ft
height. Red light and some rotors at the top. It appeared to be as close as 100 meters
from the wing of the aircraft. Seemed stationary and did not appear to react to the
aircraft approaching. It appeared to be hovering.

Synopsis
Air Carrier flight crew reported an NMAC with a drone while on final approach to LAX.
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ACN: 1593299

(10 of 50)

Time / Day
Date : 201811
Local Time Of Day : 1201-1800

Place
Locale Reference.ATC Facility : ZZZ.TRACON
State Reference : US
Altitude.MSL.Single Value : 8000

Environment
Flight Conditions : VMC

Aircraft : 1
Reference : X
ATC / Advisory.TRACON :
ZZZ Aircraft Operator : Air
Carrier
Make Model Name : EMB ERJ 170/175
ER/LR Crew Size.Number Of Crew : 2
Operating Under FAR Part : Part
121 Flight Plan : IFR
Mission : Passenger
Flight Phase : Climb
Airspace.Class B :
ZZZ

Aircraft : 2
Reference : Y
ATC / Advisory.TRACON : ZZZ
Make Model Name : UAV - Unpiloted Aerial
Vehicle Airspace.Class B : ZZZ

Person
Reference : 1
Location Of Person.Aircraft : X
Location In Aircraft : Flight Deck
Function.Flight Crew : Pilot Not
Flying Function.Flight Crew :
Captain
Qualification.Flight Crew : Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Qualification.Flight Crew : Instrument
Qualification.Flight Crew : Multiengine
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number : 1593299

Events
Anomaly.Inflight Event / Encounter : Other /
Unknown Detector.Person : Flight Crew
When Detected : In-flight

197
Result.General : None Reported /
Taken

Assessments

198
Contributing Factors / Situations : Airspace Structure
Contributing Factors / Situations : Procedure
Primary Problem : Ambiguous

Narrative: 1
On departure while level at 8000 feet I saw what appeared to be a drone at
approximately 8500 feet about a mile to our left. It appeared to be somewhat large, dark
in color and looked to have two propellers. The First Officer (FO) did not see it. I notified
ATC and we continued the flight with no issues.

Synopsis
EMB-175 Captain reported a drone sighting after departure.
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ACN: 1592641

(11 of 50)

Time / Day
Date : 201811
Local Time Of Day : 1201-1800

Place
Locale Reference.ATC Facility : ZZZ.TRACON
State Reference : US
Altitude.MSL.Single Value : 8000

Aircraft : 1
Reference : X
ATC / Advisory.TRACON : ZZZ
Make Model Name : UAV - Unpiloted Aerial
Vehicle Flight Plan : IFR
Flight
Phase
:
Descent Route In
Use
:
Vectors
Airspace.Class E :
ZZZ

Aircraft : 2
Reference : Y
ATC / Advisory.TRACON : ZZZ
Make Model Name : Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer
Flight Plan : IFR
Flight Phase : Final
Approach Route In Use :
Vectors Airspace.Class E :
ZZZ

Aircraft : 3
Reference : Z
ATC / Advisory.TRACON : ZZZ
Make Model Name : Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft
Manufacturer Operating Under FAR Part : Part 121
Flight Plan : IFR
Route In Use : Vectors
Airspace.Class E : ZZZ

Aircraft : 4
Reference : A
ATC / Advisory.TRACON : ZZZ
Make Model Name : Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 121
Flight Plan : IFR
Route In Use : Vectors
Airspace.Class E : ZZZ

Person

200
Reference : 1
Function.Air Traffic Control : Approach

201
Qualification.Air Traffic Control : Fully Certified
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number :
1592641 Human Factors : Communication
Breakdown Communication Breakdown.Party1 :
ATC
Communication Breakdown.Party2 : Ground Personnel

Events
Anomaly.ATC Issue : All Types
Anomaly.Conflict : Airborne
Conflict
Anomaly.Inflight Event / Encounter : VFR In
IMC Detector.Person : Air Traffic Control
When Detected : In-flight
Result.Air Traffic Control : Separated Traffic

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations : Company
Policy Contributing Factors / Situations :
Procedure Primary Problem : Ambiguous

Narrative: 1
Unmanned MQ9s file IFR and depart to the resticted area, and then return, cancel IFR
and land. Today low ceilings moved in after they departed, and they had to come back
early. They had NO plan on what to do if they cannot cancel IFR, and they were flying
around looking for a hole in the clouds to get down. They conflicted with the three IFR
inbounds that I was vectoring. They also stated if they couldn't get below the clouds,
that they would land. Ultimately they did find a hole in the clouds after getting 45
degrees left and right of course, causing a conflict with a northbound aircraft on the
localizer at 4000. I then had to vector the MQ9s at this point to follow one of the aircraft.
Something needs to be done to alleviate a situation from happening in the future. I have
heard that this has happened multiple times. This is adding inherent risk to the NAS that
doesn't need to. It just seems that the [drone operators] says we will fly, and if bad
weather happens, then we can do whatever we want.

Synopsis
Approach Controller reported airborne conflict between UAV and commercial aircraft being
vectored for approach.
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ACN: 1592543

(12 of 50)

Time / Day
Date : 201811
Local Time Of Day : 0601-1200

Place
Locale Reference.Airport : BOS.Airport
State Reference : MA
Altitude.MSL.Single Value : 3000

Environment
Flight Conditions :
VMC Light : Daylight

Aircraft : 1
Reference : X
Aircraft Operator : Air Carrier
Make Model Name : Commercial Fixed
Wing Crew Size.Number Of Crew : 2
Operating Under FAR Part : Part
121 Flight Plan : IFR
Mission : Passenger
Nav In Use : FMS Or FMC
Flight Phase : Initial
Approach

Aircraft : 2
Reference : Y
Make Model Name : UAV - Unpiloted Aerial
Vehicle Operating Under FAR Part : Part 91
Flight Phase : Cruise

Person
Reference : 1
Location Of Person.Aircraft : X
Location In Aircraft : Flight Deck
Reporter Organization : Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew : Pilot Flying
Function.Flight Crew : Captain
Qualification.Flight Crew :
Multiengine
Qualification.Flight Crew : Air Transport Pilot
(ATP) Qualification.Flight Crew : Instrument
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number : 1592543

Events
Anomaly.Conflict : NMAC
Anomaly.Inflight Event / Encounter : Object
Detector.Person : Flight Crew

203
When Detected : In-flight

Assessments

204
Contributing Factors / Situations : Environment - Non Weather Related
Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors
Contributing Factors / Situations : Procedure
Primary Problem : Ambiguous

Narrative: 1
On arrival into BOS, on what was effectively base leg prior to turning final for Runway
22L, just as we were beginning a descent out of 3000 feet, I saw a blue and white UAV
pass directly under the nose of the aircraft. I would estimate the distance below us to
have been 300 feet. The encounter lasted less than 2-3 seconds from initial sighting to
the UAV passing out of sight beneath our aircraft. Blue and white and 4-rotor, I think,
though I only caught the brief glimpse of it. No action was taken on our part as the
device was gone before we could do anything. I notified ATC of the encounter. I
transferred control of the aircraft briefly to the First Officer so I could concentrate on the
communication as any danger was past. The First Officer had been "heads down" for that
brief moment "sequencing the approach", so she never saw anything. Her first knowledge
of the event was when I started talking to ATC. The controller asked the usual questions,
and then cleared us for the approach. Normal approach and landing. Taxied to the gate.
No further action was taken. Neither the First Officer nor I had any contact with anyone
other than company people about the incident. An idiot with a drone. Nothing we could
have done. No way for the ATC people to know about it. Ban all drone use within 50
miles of any airport. Arrest and jail anyone caught violating this rule.

Synopsis
Air carrier Captain reported airborne conflict with a UAV on base leg into BOS.
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ACN: 1591597

(13 of 50)

Time / Day
Date : 201809
Local Time Of Day : 0601-1200

Place
Locale Reference.Airport : ZZZ.Airport
State Reference : US
Altitude.AGL.Single Value : 75

Environment
Flight Conditions :
VMC Light : Daylight

Aircraft
Reference : X
Make Model Name : UAV - Unpiloted Aerial
Vehicle Operating Under FAR Part.Other
Flight Plan : VFR
Mission : Photo Shoot
Airspace.Class D :
ZZZ

Person
Reference : 1
Location Of Person : Company
Function.Flight Crew : Pilot Flying
Qualification.Flight Crew : Commercial
Experience.Flight Crew.Total : 30
Experience.Flight Crew.Last 90 Days : 2
Experience.Flight Crew.Type : 30
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number : 1591597
Human Factors : Confusion

Events
Anomaly.Airspace Violation : All Types
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural : Published Material /
Policy Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural : FAR
Detector.Person : Other Person
When Detected.Other
Result.General : None Reported / Taken

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations : Human
Factors Primary Problem : Human Factors

Narrative: 1
Looked at airspace on the morning and saw Temporary flight restrictions and was
notified the temporary restriction was removed early that morning. Later when flights
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were reviewed it appears I penetrated controlled airspace in my inspection without prior
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authorization. In review with drone coordinator, it appears I confused the TFR with the
Class D Controlled Airspace for ZZZ. I have updated my airspace software to prevent
from future incursions.

Synopsis
Drone operator reported penetrating Class D airspace.
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ACN: 1591241

(14 of 50)

Time / Day
Date : 201811
Local Time Of Day : 1201-1800

Place
Altitude.MSL.Single Value : 15000

Aircraft : 1
Reference : X
ATC / Advisory.Center : ZZZ
Make Model Name : UAV - Unpiloted Aerial
Vehicle Flight Plan : IFR
Flight Phase : Cruise
Airspace.Special Use :
ZZZ

Aircraft : 2
Reference : Y
ATC / Advisory.Center : ZZZ
Make Model Name : Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer
Flight Phase : Cruise
Airspace.Special Use : ZZZ

Person
Reference : 1
Function.Air Traffic Control : Departure
Qualification.Air Traffic Control : Fully Certified
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number :
1591241 Human Factors : Confusion
Human Factors : Communication Breakdown
Communication Breakdown.Party1 : ATC
Communication Breakdown.Party2 : Ground Personnel

Events
Anomaly.ATC Issue : All Types
Anomaly.Conflict : Airborne Conflict
Detector.Person : Air Traffic
Control When Detected : In-flight
Result.Air Traffic Control : Issued Advisory / Alert

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations : Human
Factors Contributing Factors / Situations :
Procedure Primary Problem : Ambiguous

Narrative: 1
I climbed a flight of 2 Hawks to 150 southbound and handed the flight off to [another
sector]. An aircraft was southwest bound at 135/VFR. I performed an automated pointout
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of this aircraft to [the other sector controller] and handed the flight off. After attempting
to
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hand off the aircraft to [the other sector], I performed other duties while my D-side
attempted to establish communication. I shipped the aircraft and after he left my
frequency, the flight of Hawks squawked 1200 and descended just in front of the aircraft.
We informed [the next controller] of the flight of Hawks descending in front of the
aircraft, so that a traffic alert could be provided. My mains/standby frequency was
released and I was on a back-up frequency. This may have attributed to me not being
able to hear the flight of Hawks read back the frequency change or the multiple attempts
to cancel IFR.

Synopsis
Departure Controller reported an airborne conflict between a manned aircraft and a flight
of two UAVs.
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ACN: 1591153

(15 of 50)

Time / Day
Date : 201810
Local Time Of Day : 1201-1800

Place
Locale Reference.Airport : LHW.Airport
State Reference : GA
Relative Position.Angle.Radial : 180
Relative Position.Distance.Nautical Miles : 15
Altitude.MSL.Single Value : 4500

Environment
Weather Elements / Visibility.Visibility :
10 Light : Daylight
Ceiling.Single Value : 10000

Aircraft : 1
Reference : X
Aircraft Operator : Personal
Make Model Name : Light Sport
Aircraft Crew Size.Number Of Crew : 1
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 91
Flight Plan : VFR
Mission : Personal
Flight Phase :
Cruise

Aircraft : 2
Reference : Y
Aircraft Operator : Military
Make Model Name : UAV - Unpiloted Aerial
Vehicle Operating Under FAR Part : Part 91
Flight Phase : Cruise

Person
Reference : 1
Location Of Person.Aircraft : X
Location In Aircraft : Flight Deck
Reporter Organization :
Personal Function.Flight Crew :
Single Pilot
Qualification.Flight Crew : Sport /
Recreational Experience.Flight Crew.Total :
510 Experience.Flight Crew.Last 90 Days : 30
Experience.Flight Crew.Type : 510
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number : 1591153

Events

212
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural : Published Material /
Policy Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural : FAR

213
Anomaly.Inflight Event / Encounter : Object
Detector.Person : Flight Crew
When Detected : Routine Inspection
Result.Flight Crew : Became Reoriented

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations : Airspace Structure
Primary Problem : Airspace Structure

Narrative: 1
Flying south of Midcoast Regional airport, [I] saw a drone believed military less than 1
mile from my heading, it then turned north and was gone. On my part better monitoring
of MOA space was needed.

Synopsis
Light Sport pilot encountered a UAV near a MOA.
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ACN: 1591117

(16 of 50)

Time / Day
Date : 201811
Local Time Of Day : 1201-1800

Place
Altitude.AGL.Single Value : 100

Environment
Flight Conditions : VMC
Weather Elements / Visibility.Visibility :
10 Light : Daylight
Ceiling.Single Value : 3900

Aircraft
Reference : X
Aircraft Operator.Other
Make Model Name : UAV - Unpiloted Aerial
Vehicle Flight Plan : VFR
Flight Phase.Other

Component
Aircraft Component : Electrical/Electronic Panel &
Parts Aircraft Reference : X
Problem : Failed

Person
Reference : 1
Location Of Person : Company
Reporter Organization :
Corporate
Function.Flight Crew : Other / Unknown
Qualification.Flight Crew : Private
Experience.Flight Crew.Total : 15
Experience.Flight Crew.Last 90 Days : 8
Experience.Flight Crew.Type : 15
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number : 1591117

Events
Anomaly.Aircraft Equipment Problem :
Critical Detector.Person : Other Person
When Detected : In-flight
Result.Aircraft : Aircraft Damaged

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations : Aircraft
Primary Problem : Aircraft

Narrative: 1

215
While performing an inspection of a building, a brand new DJI M-210 aircraft suffered a
complete loss of power during flight, despite indications that there was sufficient battery
time still remaining. The resulting aircraft fell directly to the ground due to the
immediate loss of lift with the remote pilot unable to control its subsequent flight path.
The small unmanned aircraft was damaged upon impact, with insignificant damage done
to the property. The aircraft firmware was updated prior to the flight and new batteries
were being used at the time of the incident.

Synopsis
UAV operator reported that the UAV suffered a complete loss of power during flight despite
indications of sufficient battery time remaining.
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ACN: 1590911

(17 of 50)

Time / Day
Date : 201811
Local Time Of Day : 0601-1200

Place
Locale Reference.Airport : DEN.Airport
State Reference : CO
Altitude.MSL.Single Value : 10000

Environment
Flight Conditions : VMC

Aircraft : 1
Reference : X
ATC / Advisory.TRACON :
D01 Aircraft Operator : Air
Carrier Make Model Name :
A320 Crew Size.Number Of
Crew : 2
Operating Under FAR Part : Part
121 Flight Plan : IFR
Mission : Passenger
Flight Phase : Final Approach
Route In Use : Visual Approach
Airspace.Class B : DEN

Aircraft : 2
Reference : Y
Make Model Name : UAV - Unpiloted Aerial
Vehicle Flight Phase : Cruise

Person : 1
Reference : 1
Location Of Person.Aircraft : X
Location In Aircraft : Flight Deck
Reporter Organization : Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew : Pilot Not
Flying Function.Flight Crew : First
Officer
Qualification.Flight Crew : Air Transport Pilot
(ATP) Qualification.Flight Crew : Multiengine
Qualification.Flight Crew : Instrument
Experience.Flight Crew.Type : 548
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number : 1590911

Person : 2
Reference : 2
Location Of Person.Aircraft : X
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Location In Aircraft : Flight Deck
Reporter Organization : Air Carrier

218
Function.Flight Crew : Pilot
Flying Function.Flight Crew :
Captain
Qualification.Flight Crew : Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Qualification.Flight Crew : Instrument
Qualification.Flight Crew : Multiengine
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number : 1590917

Events
Anomaly.Conflict : Airborne
Conflict Detector.Person : Flight
Crew
Miss Distance.Horizontal : 1000
Miss Distance.Vertical : 500
When Detected : In-flight
Result.General : None Reported / Taken

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations : Procedure
Contributing Factors / Situations : Human
Factors Primary Problem : Ambiguous

Narrative: 1
A drone passed us about 500-700 feet below us and about 1000 feet to the aircraft's
right as we were doing a visual approach.

Narrative: 2
While approaching DEN from the SE, on a right base for Runway 35L, we saw what
appeared to be a drone approximately 500 feet below and to our right. We were level at
11,000 feet. The drone appeared to be in the shape of an octahedron, approximately two
feet by two feet in size, and was heading east. We reported it to ATC.

Synopsis
Air carrier flight crew reported a conflict with a Drone on approach to DEN.

219

ACN: 1589922

(18 of 50)

Time / Day
Date : 201810
Local Time Of Day : 0601-1200

Place
Locale Reference.Airport : ZZZ.Airport
State Reference : US
Altitude.AGL.Single Value : 0

Environment
Flight Conditions : VMC
Weather Elements / Visibility.Visibility :
10 Light : Daylight
Ceiling.Single Value : 10000

Aircraft : 1
Reference : X
ATC / Advisory.UNICOM : ZZZ
Aircraft Operator : Government
Make Model Name : UAV - Unpiloted Aerial
Vehicle Operating Under FAR Part : Part 91
Flight Plan : None
Mission : Training
Flight Phase : Parked
Route In Use.Other

Aircraft : 2
ATC / Advisory.UNICOM : ZZZ
Make Model Name : SR22
Operating Under FAR Part : Part
91 Flight Phase : Taxi

Person
Reference : 1
Location Of Person : Company
Reporter Organization : Government
Function.Flight Crew : Pilot Flying
Qualification.Flight Crew :
Multiengine Qualification.Flight Crew
: Commercial
Qualification.Flight Crew : Flight Instructor
Qualification.Flight Crew : Instrument
Experience.Flight Crew.Total : 6200
Experience.Flight Crew.Last 90 Days : 40
Experience.Flight Crew.Type : 2
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number : 1589922
Human Factors : Communication Breakdown
Communication Breakdown.Party1 : Flight Crew
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Communication Breakdown.Party2 : Flight Crew
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Events
Anomaly.Conflict : Ground Conflict, Less Severe
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural : Published Material /
Policy Detector.Person : Flight Crew
Miss Distance.Horizontal :
200 Miss Distance.Vertical :
0 When Detected : Taxi
Result.General : None Reported / Taken

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations : Human
Factors Contributing Factors / Situations :
Procedure Primary Problem : Procedure

Narrative: 1
This report pertains to a situation involving an hq-90b UAS and a Cirrus SR22. We
operated a transponder and ADS-B equipped hq-90b UAS. This aircraft is certified for
operation under a certificate of waiver or authorization. A NOTAM was filed and was
accessible by normal means. TRACON was informed of UAS operation prior to launching
operation. We have VHF communications and we were close to launching the VTOL fixed
wing aircraft from taxiway Bravo. The Cirrus approached from the ramp toward the
taxiway. For safety reasons for all involved, one of my air vehicle operator ground team
members, wearing a fluorescent shirt, gave a stop hand signal to the approaching Cirrus
pilot to make him aware of the UAS that was sitting on the taxiway and which was ready
to launch. The Cirrus pilot stopped and got on the radio (UNICOM) to inquire about why a
lineman was stopping him. I politely told him my n-number and explained that we are a
UAS that was about to depart for a local flight. The Cirrus pilot used unprofessional
phraseology to assert his dissatisfaction. I explained that we will be in the air in less than
1 minute and out of his way. He then went on a lecture about the lack of a NOTAM. I
politely explained that a NOTAM was filed. I made my call for our aircraft to launch and
we got it into a stable orbit at 400 ft AGL away from all runways and well inside and
below the normal traffic pattern. As the Cirrus was taxiing to the runway, I made a call
on UNICOM, indicating that we are in a stable left hand orbit, clear and south of both
runways at 400 AGL (1100 MSL). The Cirrus pilot kept making a number of additional,
very unprofessional calls indicating his dissatisfaction. In one call, he asked if he was
going to hit the UAV. I am not sure if I replied but I think I simply stated that we were
orbiting south of both runways. This pilot clearly did not read the pertinent NOTAMS as
required by 91.103 because he should have found it without problem under the UAS
section. As both a manned and unmanned operator and as a researcher who is focused
on developing means to integrate UAS safely into US airspace, I can understand that
some people who are unfamiliar with UAS may have questions or concerns. Our UAS is
not a small UAS, it is a 100-lb aircraft with sophisticated capabilities such as VTOL, long
endurance, transponder, dual data link, etc. The operation is performed under the
umbrella of a coa (Certificate of Authorization) with significant oversight from the FAA.
The learning point from this encounter with an unprofessional pilot is that we cannot
assume that NOTAMs for UAS operations are being found or read. It would be good to
have a way to put a short audible into the ASOS voice loop about this. At the same time,
we should be able to rely on other pilots to refrain from unprofessional phraseology
which has no place in aircraft radio transmissions and that safety should be the
overriding concern at all times. Road rage like behavior and bullying is not a suitable
mental state for operators of any aircraft.
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Synopsis

223
UAS operator reported a conflict with a taxiing aircraft just prior to launch from an
airport taxiway. The operation was published informing all users of the airport of the
planned UAS operation.
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ACN: 1589625

(19 of 50)

Time / Day
Date : 201808
Local Time Of Day : 0601-1200

Place
Locale Reference.Airport : FNL.Airport
State Reference : CO
Relative Position.Angle.Radial : 062
Relative Position.Distance.Nautical Miles :
5.4 Altitude.AGL.Single Value : 75

Environment
Flight Conditions : VMC
Weather Elements / Visibility.Visibility :
10 Light : Daylight

Aircraft
Reference : X
ATC / Advisory.CTAF : FNL
Aircraft Operator :
Corporate
Make Model Name : UAV - Unpiloted Aerial
Vehicle Crew Size.Number Of Crew : 1
Operating Under FAR
Part.Other Flight Plan : None
Mission.Other
Flight
Phase.Other
Route In Use : None
Airspace.Class E :
D01

Person
Reference : 1
Location Of Person.Aircraft : X
Location In Aircraft.Other
Reporter Organization :
Corporate Function.Flight Crew :
Single Pilot
Qualification.Flight Crew : Commercial
Experience.Flight Crew.Total : 8
Experience.Flight Crew.Last 90 Days : 1
Experience.Flight Crew.Type : 8
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number : 1589625
Human Factors : Training / Qualification
Human Factors : Situational Awareness

Events

225
Anomaly.Airspace Violation : All Types
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural : FAR
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural : Published Material /
Policy Detector.Person : Other Person
Detector.Person : Flight Crew

226
When Detected.Other
Result.General : None Reported / Taken

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations : Human
Factors Primary Problem : Human Factors

Narrative: 1
I thought I was in uncontrolled airspace. I later found out that I was 3 blocks into it.
Now that LANC [Low Altitude Authorization and Notification Capability] is fully
functional, I will get familiar with it and be sure to use it when doing inspections.

Synopsis
UAV pilot reported being unaware the flight conducted was in controlled airspace.

227

ACN: 1588688

(20 of 50)

Time / Day
Date : 201810
Local Time Of Day : 1201-1800

Place
Locale Reference.Airport : ZZZ.Airport
State Reference : US
Altitude.AGL.Single Value : 100

Environment
Flight Conditions : VMC
Weather Elements / Visibility.Other
Light : Daylight
Ceiling : CLR

Aircraft
Reference : X
Aircraft Operator : Personal
Make Model Name : UAV - Unpiloted Aerial
Vehicle Flight Plan : VFR
Mission : Personal
Route In Use : Visual Approach
Airspace.Class C : ZZZ

Person
Reference : 1
Location Of Person : Hangar / Base
Reporter Organization : Personal
Function.Flight Crew : Pilot Not
Flying
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number : 1588688
Human Factors : Situational Awareness

Events
Anomaly.Airspace Violation : All Types
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural : Published Material /
Policy Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural : FAR
Detector.Person : Other Person
When Detected : Routine
Inspection
Result.General : None Reported / Taken

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations : Human
Factors Primary Problem : Human Factors

Narrative: 1
This pertains to a small UAV flight near [the] State University. We took all usual
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protocols & procedures to check airspace and confirm we are clear to safely fly. For this
particular flight, we checked to confirm we were outside of the Class C airspace of ZZZ
Airport and
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checked for TFR's in the area - all came back clear. However, we may have flown in or
near the Class C airspace during this brief flight and it was discovered after flight was
over. Moving forward, we will use https://skyvector.com/ and https://uasfaa.opendata.arcgis.com/ to check instead of B4UFly app.

Synopsis
UAV operator reported possible operation in Class C airspace.
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ACN: 1588430

(21 of 50)

Time / Day
Date : 201810
Local Time Of Day : 1201-1800

Place
Locale Reference.Airport : ZZZ.Airport
State Reference : US
Altitude.AGL.Single Value : 20

Aircraft
Reference : X
Aircraft Operator : Personal
Make Model Name : UAV - Unpiloted Aerial
Vehicle Operating Under FAR Part.Other
Flight Plan : None
Mission : Personal
Flight Phase : Cruise
Airspace.Class G :
ZZZ

Person
Reference : 1
Location Of Person : Hangar / Base
Reporter Organization : Personal
Function.Flight Crew : Single Pilot
Qualification.Flight Crew : Air Transport Pilot
(ATP) Qualification.Flight Crew : Flight Instructor
Qualification.Flight Crew : Instrument
Qualification.Flight Crew : Multiengine
Experience.Flight Crew.Type : 50
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number : 1588430

Events
Anomaly.ATC Issue : All Types
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural : Published Material /
Policy Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural : FAR
Detector.Person : Air Traffic
Control When Detected : In-flight
Result.Air Traffic Control : Issued Advisory / Alert

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations : Procedure
Primary Problem : Procedure

Narrative: 1
I was operating a DJI Mavic 2 in Class G airspace in the vicinity of ZZZ airport. All
operations were conducted in coordination with the pilot of a manned aircraft on the
taxiway and the runway. All operations were conducted in accordance with 14CFR107

231
and no regulations were broken, nor any safety risk or interference created by the
operation of
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the UAS in Class G airspace to the best of my knowledge. The local airport manager did
approach me and asked me to land the UAS as he stated it was illegal to operate near an
airport, and I did land and attempted to contact the local FSDO by phone. Later the
airport manager made contact with the local [FAAST Program Manager] at the FSDO who
stated by phone it was "illegal to operate a drone within 5nm of an airport". Despite that
not being true under 14CFR107, we did not operate the UAS further, and left the airport.
[Local] FSDO emailed me stating "I am attempting to contact you regarding UAS (drone)
operation at the ZZZ airport yesterday. I have some questions I need to ask of you."
FSDO requested the registration for the UAS I regularly fly and inquired if I had ever
operated over people. I replied I had not ever operated over people and have always
conducted operations in accordance with 14CFR107. FSDO responded: "I have been
assigned by the office to conduct an investigation into the operation of your drone at the
ZZZ Airport." At no point was any part of 14CFR107 violated, however, it is clear that
local FSDO offices have inconsistencies in knowledge of 14CFR, and inspectors do not
appear to be complying with FAA Order 8900.1.

Synopsis
UAV operator reported being advised by local FSDO that an investigation of recent
operations of his UAV in the vicinity of an airport was being initiated.
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ACN: 1588041

(22 of 50)

Time / Day
Date : 201810
Local Time Of Day : 0601-1200

Place
Locale Reference.Airport : JFK.Airport
State Reference : NY
Altitude.MSL.Single Value : 1600

Environment
Flight Conditions :
VMC Light : Daylight

Aircraft : 1
Reference : X
ATC / Advisory.Tower : JFK
Aircraft Operator : Air
Carrier
Make Model Name : Commercial Fixed
Wing Crew Size.Number Of Crew : 2
Operating Under FAR Part : Part
121 Flight Plan : IFR
Nav In Use.Localizer/Glideslope/ILS : Runway 22R
Flight Phase : Initial Approach
Airspace.Class B : JFK

Aircraft : 2
Reference : Y
Make Model Name : UAV - Unpiloted Aerial
Vehicle Airspace.Class B : JFK

Person
Reference : 1
Location Of Person.Aircraft : X
Location In Aircraft : Flight Deck
Reporter Organization : Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew : Captain
Function.Flight Crew : Pilot Flying
Qualification.Flight Crew : Air Transport Pilot
(ATP) ASRS Report Number.Accession Number :
1588041 Human Factors : Situational Awareness

Events
Anomaly.Conflict : NMAC
Detector.Person : Flight Crew
Miss Distance.Vertical : 200
When Detected : In-flight
Result.General : None Reported / Taken

234
Assessments

235
Contributing Factors / Situations : Human
Factors Primary Problem : Human Factors

Narrative: 1
On approach in JFK for ILS 22R (may have been 22L), just past the Outer Marker
(probably MATTR) I saw something small that didn't appear to be moving up ahead in
the windscreen. We were descending on the glideslope. Once I determined the object
appeared mostly stationary, while staying at the same altitude, I didn't feel that a course
change or attitude change was necessary. I also only had several seconds to identify the
object, determine its size, and even consider evasive action. The object appeared to be a
small, quad-copter drone. It was grey in color with the rectangular body that seems
ubiquitous to many designs. It appeared to fly 100 to 200 feet above our altitude of
1600 feet MSL. We were on about a 4-mile final. I don't think the First Officer (Pilot
Monitoring) ever saw it. We immediately reported it to ATC. We gave JFK Ground a more
exact description than Tower received. If I had been scanning the flight instruments
rather than looking outside, then I may have never seen the drone. There was nothing
we could have done differently. Perhaps drone sightings and suggested procedures could
be mentioned in one of the manuals.

Synopsis
Air Carrier Captain reported a NMAC with a Drone on a four mile final to JFK.
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ACN: 1587432

(23 of 50)

Time / Day
Date : 201810
Local Time Of Day : 0601-1200

Place
Locale Reference.Airport : ZZZ.Airport
State Reference : US
Altitude.AGL.Single Value : 3500

Environment
Flight Conditions : VMC
Weather Elements / Visibility.Visibility :
10 Light : Daylight

Aircraft
Reference : X
ATC / Advisory.Tower :
ZZZ Aircraft Operator :
Personal
Make Model Name : PA-38
Tomahawk Crew Size.Number Of
Crew : 1 Operating Under FAR Part :
Part 91 Flight Plan : VFR
Mission : Personal
Flight Phase : Cruise
Route In Use : Direct
Airspace.Class C :
ZZZ

Person
Reference : 1
Location Of Person.Aircraft : X
Location In Aircraft : Flight Deck
Reporter Organization : Personal
Function.Flight Crew : Pilot
Flying Function.Flight Crew :
Single Pilot Qualification.Flight
Crew : Private Experience.Flight
Crew.Total : 375
Experience.Flight Crew.Last 90 Days :
1 Experience.Flight Crew.Type : 252
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number : 1587432
Human Factors : Situational Awareness
Human Factors : Distraction

Events
Anomaly.Conflict : NMAC
Detector.Person : Passenger
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Detector.Person : Flight Crew
Miss Distance.Horizontal : 150
Miss Distance.Vertical : 0

238
When Detected : In-flight
Result.General : None Reported /
Taken

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations : Human
Factors Primary Problem : Human Factors

Narrative: 1
Before entering ZZZ Class C airspace, I was instructed by ZZZ ATC to remain at or
above 2500 feet. During level cruise at 3500 ft., flying from north to south on
approximate heading of 150 degrees, a four rotor drone with amber lights was sighted
flying south to north off the right wing at the same altitude. The drone was sighted by
the pilot and then witnessed by the passenger. The drone was flying to the north of but
near the intersection of [two freeways]. I immediately reported the sighting to ZZZ ATC
who commented that nothing showed on radar. Upon arrival at ZZZ1 I was asked by
ZZZ1 Tower to call ZZZ ATC to discuss the situation further.

Synopsis
PA-38 pilot reported an encounter with a drone at 150 feet off the aircraft wing tip.
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ACN: 1586244

(24 of 50)

Time / Day
Date : 201810

Place
Altitude.AGL.Single Value : 0

Environment
Light : Daylight

Aircraft
Reference : X
Aircraft Operator : Personal
Make Model Name : UAV - Unpiloted Aerial
Vehicle Operating Under FAR Part.Other
Mission : Photo Shoot
Flight Phase : Cruise

Person
Reference : 1
Location Of Person.Aircraft : X
Reporter Organization : Personal
Qualification.Flight Crew :
Commercial
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number : 1586244
Human Factors : Situational Awareness
Human Factors : Communication Breakdown
Communication Breakdown.Party1 : Flight Crew
Communication Breakdown.Party2 : Other

Events
Anomaly.Airspace Violation : All Types
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural : Published Material /
Policy Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural : FAR
Detector.Person : Other Person
When Detected : Routine
Inspection
Result.General : None Reported / Taken

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations : Human
Factors Primary Problem : Human Factors

Narrative: 1
I was contacted by [an] FAA Aviation Safety Technician that he received a report of my
UAS possibly involved in 107 violations from an anonymous report. Upon [the
technician's] review of my videos on my [social media] account and website, he informed
me of violations of section 107.39 being displayed in my [social media] account for
operation over human beings and for operations within a 0 AGL area around [a National

240
Park]. Over the phone I stated that my interpretation of the rule is you must get an FAA
waiver for those operations unless you had consent of the parties you flew over. I
thought

241
participating in the operation of the UAS was meaning the individuals were will
participants in the event or filming. I have violated this for non-paid work I do to
promote veterans causes and initiatives being a veteran myself and still active member
of the Army Reserve. Specifically, at the request of the [local] Fire Department and Police
Department I operated my UAS above them in a standing formation. I also operated my
UAS above [military] Recruiters working with local high school students at a leadership
camp where they pushed a Humvee underneath a hovering UAS about 50-75 feet above
them. I did not maliciously intend to violate the rule. [The technician] also mentioned my
flight over a moving vehicle violated this rule as well. Additionally, I knew you could not
operate a UAS on National Park Lands or boundaries from my study for my 107 license in
2016. After talking with [the technician] informing me of a 0 AGL ban at the [National
Park] grounds and my since research, I understand I cannot fly at all above the area. I
operated a drone with line of sight from outside the NPS boundaries but crossed over
them to film a shot of the [monument] from a side profile. I have since removed the
video from my feed on Instagram after initially being contacted by [the FAA] in reference
to it. My 107 certificate expired within the last month. I plan to retake and certify the
107 test once I return from military duty. I have also enrolled with [pilot organization]
for UAS resources and training since being full time military I fly so infrequently to
ensure I stay abreast of changes to airspace rules concerning UAS safety and operation.
In my reading of FAA literature, it seems there is a new safety training program called
SMS I can also take, but I am unable to locate how to do so online. Any information for
this training would be appreciated.

Synopsis
UAV pilot reported he was contacted by the FAA for a possible violation of FAR 107.39.
Operating around a 0 AGL area.
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ACN: 1584220

(25 of 50)

Time / Day
Date : 201810
Local Time Of Day : 1201-1800

Place
Locale Reference.ATC Facility : N90.TRACON
State Reference : NY
Altitude.MSL.Single Value : 6500

Environment
Flight Conditions : VMC
Weather Elements / Visibility.Visibility :
30 Light : Daylight

Aircraft
Reference : X
ATC / Advisory.TRACON :
N90 Aircraft Operator :
Personal
Make Model Name : Skylane 182/RG Turbo Skylane/RG
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 91
Flight Plan : VFR
Mission : Personal
Flight Phase : Cruise
Route In Use : Direct

Person
Reference : 1
Location Of Person.Aircraft : X
Location In Aircraft : Flight Deck
Reporter Organization : Personal
Function.Flight Crew : Pilot Flying
Function.Flight Crew : Single Pilot
Qualification.Flight Crew :
Instrument
Qualification.Flight Crew : Air Transport Pilot
(ATP) Qualification.Flight Crew : Multiengine
Experience.Flight Crew.Total : 2400
Experience.Flight Crew.Last 90 Days : 30
Experience.Flight Crew.Type : 400
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number : 1584220
Human Factors : Situational Awareness

Events
Anomaly.Conflict : Airborne
Conflict Detector.Person : Flight
Crew
Miss Distance.Horizontal : 200

243
Miss Distance.Vertical : 100

Assessments

244
Contributing Factors / Situations : Airspace Structure
Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors
Primary Problem : Human Factors

Narrative: 1
Flight conducted VFR GPS Direct to [destination] with VFR Advisories along entire
route. Drone sighted on right side side of aircraft at designated location and seen by
both passenger and pilot. Drone was a black quadcopter. Sighting reported to NY
approach. Flight condition was VFR on top above a solid overcast at 3500 FT.

Synopsis
Cessna 182 pilot reported airborne conflict with UAV.
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ACN: 1583855

(26 of 50)

Time / Day
Date : 201810
Local Time Of Day : 1801-2400

Place
Locale Reference.Airport : ZZZ.Airport
State Reference : US
Altitude.MSL.Single Value : 2500

Environment
Flight Conditions : VMC
Weather Elements / Visibility.Visibility :
10 Light : Daylight
Ceiling.Single Value : 6000

Aircraft
Reference : X
ATC / Advisory.Tower :
ZZZ Aircraft Operator :
Personal
Make Model Name : Skyhawk 172/Cutlass
172 Crew Size.Number Of Crew : 1
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 91
Flight Plan : None
Mission : Personal
Flight Phase : Cruise
Route In Use : Direct
Airspace.Class G :
ZZZ

Person
Reference : 1
Location Of Person.Aircraft : X
Location In Aircraft : Flight Deck
Reporter Organization : Personal
Function.Flight Crew : Pilot Flying
Function.Flight Crew : Single Pilot
Qualification.Flight Crew : Private
Experience.Flight Crew.Total :
1500
Experience.Flight Crew.Last 90 Days :
4 Experience.Flight Crew.Type : 1200
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number : 1583855
Human Factors : Situational Awareness
Human Factors : Distraction

Events
Anomaly.Conflict : NMAC
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Detector.Person : Flight Crew
Miss Distance.Horizontal : 400
Miss Distance.Vertical : 0

247
When Detected : In-flight
Result.General : None Reported /
Taken

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations : Airspace Structure
Contributing Factors / Situations : Environment - Non Weather Related
Primary Problem : Ambiguous

Narrative: 1
Approximately 7 miles east of ZZZ under control of tower, I was approaching ZZZ at
2500 MSL cruise. Directly into hazy sunset. I noticed traffic at 2 o'clock at my altitude. I
couldn't immediately make out the type aircraft or distance because of unfamiliar shape
of craft. I then noticed that it appeared to be not moving (hovering) as I passed it. Then
I realized it appeared to have LED NAV lights visible. Then I also realized that it was
likely a drone because it didn't look like an airplane or a rotor craft. Then I realized that it
was very close because I began to perceive its relative size. I immediately reported it to
Tower and asked if he saw a drone at my 5 o'clock position. He said no. I wrongly
reported it was about 400 yards off my wing. It was more like 400 feet off my wing. I
lost track of it as I passed it but I think it was rather large, most likely a commercial size
drone. I verified my reporting time by reviewing the transmission recording on ATC-Live
on the internet and recorded the time and estimated the distance by the fact that I
checked on at about 10 miles out and reported 2 minutes later. I would like to know the
results of this investigation should there be one. I believe that if this object had been at
12 o'clock instead of 2... I might not have seen it in the glare of the sun until it was too
late and that would likely have been catastrophic based on my estimate of its size.

Synopsis
Cessna 172 pilot reported a NMAC with a drone at a distance of 0 feet vertical and 400
feet lateral.
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ACN: 1583538

(27 of 50)

Time / Day
Date : 201810
Local Time Of Day : 1801-2400

Place
Locale Reference.Airport : MMU.Airport
State Reference : NJ
Relative Position.Distance.Nautical Miles : 10
Altitude.MSL.Single Value : 6000

Environment
Flight Conditions :
VMC Light : Night

Aircraft
Reference : X
ATC / Advisory.TRACON :
N90 Aircraft Operator : Air
Carrier
Make Model Name : Widebody
Transport Crew Size.Number Of Crew :
2 Operating Under FAR Part : Part 121
Flight Plan : IFR
Flight Phase : Final
Approach Airspace.Class B
: EWR

Person
Reference : 1
Location Of Person.Aircraft : X
Location In Aircraft : Flight Deck
Reporter Organization : Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew : Captain
Function.Flight Crew : Pilot Flying
Qualification.Flight Crew : Air Transport Pilot
(ATP) Experience.Flight Crew.Total : 12711
Experience.Flight Crew.Last 90 Days : 240
Experience.Flight Crew.Type : 7401
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number : 1583538
Human Factors : Situational Awareness

Events
Anomaly.Conflict : Airborne Conflict
Anomaly.Inflight Event / Encounter : Object
Detector.Person : Flight Crew
When Detected : In-flight
Result.General : None Reported /
Taken

249
Assessments

250
Contributing Factors / Situations : Human
Factors Primary Problem : Human Factors

Narrative: 1
At 6,000 feet night VMC. About 10NM South of Morristown Airport. I noticed a possible
drone about 500 to 750 feet above us moving in the opposite direction. It was very fast
and I just noticed this off the corner of my left peripheral vision. There was no TCAS
identification. We reported to NY Approach a possible drone sighting.

Synopsis
Air Carrier Captain reported an airborne conflict with UAV during approach.
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ACN: 1582733

(28 of 50)

Time / Day
Date : 201810
Local Time Of Day : 1201-1800

Place
Locale Reference.ATC Facility : NCT.TRACON
State Reference : CA
Altitude.MSL.Single Value : 12200

Environment
Flight Conditions : VMC

Aircraft
Reference : X
ATC / Advisory.TRACON :
NCT Aircraft Operator : Air
Carrier
Make Model Name : B757 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Crew Size.Number Of Crew : 2
Operating Under FAR Part : Part
121 Flight Plan : IFR
Mission : Passenger
Nav In Use : FMS Or
FMC Flight Phase :
Climb Route In Use :
Vectors
Route In Use.SID :
TRUKN2 Airspace.Class E
: NCT

Person
Reference : 1
Location Of Person.Aircraft : X
Location In Aircraft : Flight Deck
Reporter Organization : Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew : Captain
Function.Flight Crew : Pilot Not
Flying
Qualification.Flight Crew : Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Experience.Flight Crew.Last 90 Days : 140
Experience.Flight Crew.Type : 1485
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number : 1582733
Human Factors : Situational Awareness

Events
Anomaly.Conflict : Airborne
Conflict Detector.Person : Flight
Crew When Detected : In-flight

252
Result.General : None Reported / Taken

Assessments

253
Contributing Factors / Situations : Airspace Structure
Contributing Factors / Situations : Environment - Non Weather Related
Primary Problem : Ambiguous

Narrative: 1
On a vector on TRUKN2 [SID] just north of fix COSMC passing 12,000 FT, I noticed target
off nose and about a mile, small but big enough to spot, of unusual shape. It passed to
our right at approximately 12,200 FT co-altitude, 2-3,000 feet laterally. Copilot had better
look and had high confidence it was a drone due to odd flat shape and distinguishable
protrusions downward. ATC notified of details. We were on a 040-degree vector north of
SID, estimating 2-4 NM north of COSMC.

Synopsis
757 Captain reported the flight crew observed a UAV at their same altitude.
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ACN: 1580222

(29 of 50)

Time / Day
Date : 201809
Local Time Of Day : 1201-1800

Place
Locale Reference.Airport : FSD.Airport
State Reference : SD
Relative Position.Angle.Radial : 015
Relative Position.Distance.Nautical Miles :
5 Altitude.MSL.Single Value : 2500

Environment
Flight Conditions : VMC
Weather Elements / Visibility.Visibility :
20 Light : Daylight
Ceiling.Single Value : 12000

Aircraft : 1
Reference : X
ATC / Advisory.TRACON : FSD
Aircraft Operator : Air Taxi
Make Model Name :
Helicopter Crew Size.Number
Of Crew : 1
Operating Under FAR Part : Part
135 Flight Plan : VFR
Mission : Ambulance
Flight Phase : Cruise
Route In Use :
Direct
Airspace.Class E :
FSD

Aircraft : 2
Reference : Y
Make Model Name : UAV - Unpiloted Aerial
Vehicle Airspace.Class E : FSD

Person
Reference : 1
Location Of Person.Aircraft : X
Location In Aircraft : Flight Deck
Reporter Organization : Air Taxi
Function.Flight Crew : Single Pilot
Qualification.Flight Crew :
Instrument
Qualification.Flight Crew : Air Transport Pilot
(ATP) Qualification.Flight Crew : Flight Instructor
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Qualification.Flight Crew : Multiengine
Experience.Flight Crew.Total : 7150
Experience.Flight Crew.Last 90 Days : 80
Experience.Flight Crew.Type : 3000

256
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number :
1580222 Human Factors : Situational Awareness

Events
Anomaly.Conflict : NMAC
Detector.Person : Flight
Crew Miss
Distance.Horizontal : 200
Miss Distance.Vertical : 0
When Detected : In-flight
Result.General : None Reported / Taken

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations : Airspace Structure
Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors
Primary Problem : Ambiguous

Narrative: 1
While in cruise profile approximately 5NM N-NE of FSD, crew identified a blue & red
drone passing by the right side of the aircraft. Aircraft Radar Altimeter was indicating
1100 [AGL]. Drone passed within [estimated] 200 feet of the aircraft at the same
altitude. No previous recognition of the drone and no evasive action was initiated. Event
reported to FSD TRACON and subsequent followup with FSD ATCT personnel. No further
information available to the crew.

Synopsis
Helicopter pilot reported a NMAC with drone.
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ACN: 1578620

(30 of 50)

Time / Day
Date : 201809
Local Time Of Day : 0601-1200

Place
Locale Reference.ATC Facility :
ZID.ARTCC State Reference : IN
Altitude.MSL.Single Value : 21000

Aircraft : 1
Reference : X
ATC / Advisory.Center : ZID
Make Model Name : PA-46 Malibu/Malibu Mirage/Malibu
Matrix Operating Under FAR Part : Part 91
Flight Plan : IFR
Flight Phase :
Cruise
Airspace.Class A : ZID

Aircraft : 2
Reference : Y
Make Model Name : UAV - Unpiloted Aerial
Vehicle Crew Size.Number Of Crew : 0
Airspace.Class A : ZID

Person
Reference : 1
Location Of Person.Facility : ZID.ARTCC
Reporter Organization : Government
Function.Air Traffic Control : Enroute
Qualification.Air Traffic Control : Fully
Certified
Experience.Air Traffic Control.Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) : 13
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number : 1578620
Human Factors : Training /
Qualification Human Factors :
Situational Awareness

Events
Anomaly.ATC Issue : All Types
Anomaly.Conflict : NMAC
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural : Published Material /
Policy Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural : FAR
Detector.Person : Flight Crew
When Detected : In-flight
Result.General : None Reported / Taken

Assessments

258
Contributing Factors / Situations : Human
Factors Contributing Factors / Situations :
Procedure Primary Problem : Human Factors

259
Narrative: 1
Aircraft X was level at FL210 and asked me if there was any known drone activity in the
area. I responded, "Negative, why?" His response was, "We just went right by one. It
was big and black". I asked the pilot if it was the type with 4 rotors to which he
responded affirmative. I had an aircraft climbing in that same general area so I reported
it to him two times. Upon leaving my sector the climbing aircraft said he never saw it. I
immediately reported it to the FLM [Front Line Manager] and he proceeded to do his
checklist and paperwork. Approximately 5 min after the incident the FLM had me ask the
pilot if he could tell what direction the UAV was traveling and if he considered it to be a
near miss.
The pilot said it appeared to be hovering in one spot and that he came within
approximately 50 feet of it, and he definitely considered it a near miss. I looked the
situation up in the 7110.65 later and discover that advisories are supposed to be
broadcast every 4 min after the last report, similar to a laser event. We have not
had proper training on UAV activity so I was unaware of this requirement.
[Recommend] proper training on unauthorized UAV activity.

Synopsis
Indianapolis Center Controller reported an NMAC between a Piper and a drone, and also
failure on Controller's report to broadcast for 15 minutes afterward.
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ACN: 1578002

(31 of 50)

Time / Day
Date : 201809
Local Time Of Day : 1201-1800

Place
Locale Reference.Airport : ZZZ.Airport
State Reference : US
Altitude.AGL.Single Value : 500

Environment
Flight Conditions :
VMC Light : Daylight
Ceiling : CLR

Aircraft : 1
Reference : X
ATC / Advisory.CTAF :
ZZZ Aircraft Operator :
FBO
Make Model Name : Single Engine Turboprop
Undifferentiated Crew Size.Number Of Crew : 1
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 137
Mission : Agriculture
Flight Phase : Cruise
Airspace.Class G :
ZZZ

Aircraft : 2
Reference : Y
Make Model Name : UAV - Unpiloted Aerial
Vehicle Operating Under FAR Part.Other
Flight Phase : Cruise
Airspace.Class G :
ZZZ

Person
Reference : 1
Location Of Person.Aircraft : X
Location In Aircraft : Flight Deck
Reporter Organization : FBO
Function.Flight Crew : Pilot Flying
Function.Flight Crew : Single Pilot
Qualification.Flight Crew :
Instrument Qualification.Flight Crew
: Commercial Experience.Flight
Crew.Total : 10000
Experience.Flight Crew.Last 90 Days :
350 Experience.Flight Crew.Type : 4000

261
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number : 1578002

Events

262
Anomaly.Conflict : NMAC
Detector.Person : Flight Crew
When Detected : In-flight
Result.Flight Crew : Took Evasive Action

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations : Airspace Structure
Contributing Factors / Situations : Procedure
Primary Problem : Ambiguous

Narrative: 1
On an 8 mile ferry back to my airstrip I suddenly had a windshield full of a drone. I
immediately banked 90 to the right and then instantly back hard left to try to reacquire
the drone. It was at that point I saw a van parked in the S.E. corner of a potato field. As
I circled the van I noticed the shadow of the drone again as it landed. I noted my
altimeter at 550 ft. When I asked the drone company about this I was told the drone
operator climbed to avoid me. I don't believe this is true because I didn't notice anyone
standing outside the van and I'm certain no one observed me approaching. This incident
was 1.7 nm from my airstrip. This is the 3rd close call with a drone belonging to this
company. This summer with either my airplane or the other airplane we operate we had
had 3 close calls. My competitor has had 2 in the 300 ft - 400 ft range.

Synopsis
A General Aviation pilot reported an NMAC with a drone at approximately 500 feet altitude.
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ACN: 1577960

(32 of 50)

Time / Day
Date : 201809
Local Time Of Day : 1201-1800

Place
Locale Reference.Airport : ZZZ.Airport
State Reference : US
Altitude.AGL.Single Value : 130

Environment
Weather Elements / Visibility.Visibility :
10 Light : Daylight
Ceiling.Single Value : 10000
RVR.Single Value : 10000

Aircraft
Reference : X
Aircraft Operator : Personal
Make Model Name : UAV - Unpiloted Aerial
Vehicle Operating Under FAR Part.Other
Flight Plan : VFR
Mission : Personal
Flight Phase :
Cruise
Route In Use : Visual Approach
Airspace.Class G : ZZZ

Person
Reference : 1
Location Of Person : Hangar / Base
Reporter Organization : Personal
Function.Flight Crew : Pilot Flying
Function.Flight Crew : Single Pilot
Qualification.Flight Crew : Private
Experience.Flight Crew.Total : 410
Experience.Flight Crew.Last 90 Days : 10
Experience.Flight Crew.Type : 380
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number : 1577960
Human Factors : Situational Awareness

Events
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural : Published Material /
Policy Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural : FAR
Detector.Person : Flight Crew
When Detected : In-flight
Result.General : None Reported / Taken

Assessments

264
Contributing Factors / Situations : Human
Factors Primary Problem : Human Factors

Narrative: 1
Temporary loss of line-of-sight with drone. Shooting a video of skydiver. Although drone
pilot and skydiver determined safest position for drone to hover, in GPS lock, was just
above the tree that I (the pilot) was positioned underneath, I did not have line of sight
of the drone while the skydiver landed in the open area.

Synopsis
UAV pilot reported temporarily losing line-of-sight with drone.
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ACN: 1577881

(33 of 50)

Time / Day
Date : 201809
Local Time Of Day : 1801-2400

Place
Locale Reference.Airport : HPN.Airport
State Reference : NY
Altitude.MSL.Single Value : 4000

Environment
Flight Conditions : VMC
Weather Elements / Visibility.Visibility :
10 Light : Dusk
Ceiling.Single Value : 1000

Aircraft
Reference : X
ATC / Advisory.TRACON :
N90 Aircraft Operator :
Corporate
Make Model Name : Gulfstream Jet Undifferentiated or Other Model
Crew Size.Number Of Crew : 2
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 91
Flight Plan : IFR
Mission : Passenger
Flight
Phase
:
Initial
Approach
Route
In
Use.STAR
:
BOUNO4
Airspace.Class B : LGA

Person
Reference : 1
Location Of Person.Aircraft : X
Location In Aircraft : Flight Deck
Reporter Organization : Corporate
Function.Flight Crew : Captain
Function.Flight Crew : Pilot Not
Flying
Qualification.Flight Crew : Air Transport Pilot
(ATP) Qualification.Flight Crew : Multiengine
Qualification.Flight Crew : Instrument
Experience.Flight Crew.Total : 9000
Experience.Flight Crew.Last 90 Days : 60
Experience.Flight Crew.Type : 300
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number : 1577881
Human Factors : Distraction
Human Factors : Situational Awareness

Events

266
Anomaly.Conflict : Airborne Conflict
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural : Published Material /
Policy Detector.Person : Flight Crew

267
Miss Distance.Horizontal :
0 Miss Distance.Vertical :
500 When Detected : Inflight
Result.General : None Reported / Taken

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations : Airspace Structure
Contributing Factors / Situations : Environment - Non Weather
Related Primary Problem : Ambiguous

Narrative: 1
On BOUNO4 arrival traveling westbound on track Bridgeport (BDR) to ALIXX intersection,
I spotted a small black drone roughly 500 ft directly above us roughly 2 miles east of
ALIXX intersection. It appeared to moving slowly eastbound. I reported it to the New
York Tracon. They notified the aircraft behind us who was also on the BOUNO4 arrival.

Synopsis
Gulfstream pilot reported, while on initial approach, sighting a drone 500 feet above the
aircraft.
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ACN: 1574558

(34 of 50)

Time / Day
Date : 201809
Local Time Of Day : 1201-1800

Place
Locale Reference.Airport : BWI.Airport
State Reference : MD
Altitude.AGL.Single Value : 0

Environment
Flight Conditions : VMC
Weather Elements / Visibility.Visibility :
10 Light : Daylight
Ceiling.Single Value : 3600

Aircraft : 1
Reference : X
ATC / Advisory.Tower :
BWI Aircraft Operator : Air
Taxi
Make Model Name : Robinson R44
Crew Size.Number Of Crew : 1
Operating Under FAR Part : Part
135 Flight Plan : SVFR
Mission : Passenger
Flight Phase :
Landing Route In Use
: None Airspace.Class
B : BWI

Aircraft : 2
Reference : Y
Aircraft Operator : Personal
Make Model Name : UAV - Unpiloted Aerial
Vehicle Mission : Photo Shoot
Flight Phase : Climb
Airspace.Class B :
BWI

Person
Reference : 1
Location Of Person.Aircraft : X
Location In Aircraft : Flight Deck
Reporter Organization : Air Taxi
Function.Flight Crew : Pilot
Flying Function.Flight Crew :
Single Pilot
Qualification.Flight Crew : Flight Instructor

269
Qualification.Flight Crew : Commercial
Qualification.Flight Crew : Instrument
Experience.Flight Crew.Total : 2039
Experience.Flight Crew.Last 90 Days : 178
Experience.Flight Crew.Type : 538

270
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number : 1574558
Human Factors : Communication Breakdown
Communication Breakdown.Party1 : Flight Crew
Communication Breakdown.Party2 : Other

Events
Anomaly.Conflict : NMAC
Detector.Person : Flight
Crew Miss
Distance.Horizontal : 10
Miss Distance.Vertical : 0
When Detected : In-flight
Result.Flight Crew : Took Evasive Action

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations : Human
Factors Primary Problem : Human Factors

Narrative: 1
I was dropping off a groom and his best man for a wedding at a venue with a tight
landing area. It was a short flight, and after communicating with Tower I began my high
recon of the landing area. I had done both a satellite imagery review and a site visit prior
to the landing, but there was a new obstacle I had not expected to encounter. One of the
groom's friends had a drone that he was hovering in the parking lot. Not 100% sure of
the type but it was a small four rotor system similar to DJI Phantom with a camera
underneath. I had not thought to communicate to the groom ahead of time of the need
to keep any small UAS on the ground during the landing. I did say to the groom during
the flight, "He needs to keep the drone on the ground." As I shifted my focus back down
to the ground I saw the UAS was in his hand and it looked like he was walking it back to
his trunk. At the same time the groom was on the phone and I heard him say "the pilot
said to keep it on the ground." I decided at that time to continue the approach, and
conducted a steep approach into the landing area to remain clear of the trees and
obstacles in the area. After landing, I rolled down the throttle to bring rotor RPM to idle
and had the groom and his best man exit out of the helicopter walking forward of the
helicopter. When I shifted my attention back forward I saw the drone back in the air,
about 10 feet in front of me at or slightly above my rotor system. I leaned my head out
of the aircraft and made eye contact with the operator while pointing at him, then the
drone. I made a hand signal to back away from the aircraft, and the drone moved away
from the helicopter and back down to a one foot hover before setting back down on the
ground. At that point I contacted tower for takeoff clearance, brought my RPM back up to
flight and exited the landing area using a max performance takeoff.
It is possible communication with the groom prior to the event to keep any aerial
videographers on the ground during the landing and takeoff would have prevented the
occurrence, but it is possible the drone operator never communicated his intent to film
the landing to the groom. What would have been far more effective would have been to
have ground personnel there for the landing to directly communicate with the operator
and stress the importance of keeping the drone on the ground to prevent either a mid-air
collision or the drone being thrown by the rotor wash into people or objects. However, we
had limited staffing due to the holiday weekend and all available company personnel
were tasked. I have no way of determining if the operator was licensed, I consider it a
high probability the individual was a friend who flew for hobby. A factor in my

271
assessment of

272
this probability is the hope that a licensed UAS operator would know better than flying a
UAS two miles from a class B Airport off the departure end of the runway.

Synopsis
A R44 Pilot reported an encounter with a UAV just before liftoff.
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ACN: 1573395

(35 of 50)

Time / Day
Date : 201808
Local Time Of Day : 0601-1200

Place
Locale Reference.Airport :
DFW.Airport State Reference : TX
Altitude.AGL.Single Value : 200

Environment
Flight Conditions : VMC

Aircraft
Reference : X
ATC / Advisory.Tower :
DFW Aircraft Operator : Air
Carrier
Make Model Name : Commercial Fixed
Wing Crew Size.Number Of Crew : 2
Operating Under FAR Part : Part
121 Flight Plan : IFR
Flight Phase : Initial
Approach Airspace.Class B :
DFW

Person
Reference : 1
Location Of Person.Aircraft : X
Location In Aircraft : Flight Deck
Reporter Organization : Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew : Pilot Not
Flying Function.Flight Crew :
Captain
Qualification.Flight Crew : Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Experience.Flight Crew.Total : 25000
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number : 1573395
Human Factors : Situational Awareness

Events
Anomaly.Conflict : NMAC
Detector.Person : Flight Crew
Miss Distance.Vertical : 125
When Detected : In-flight
Result.General : None Reported / Taken

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations : Airspace Structure
Contributing Factors / Situations : Procedure

274
Primary Problem : Ambiguous

Narrative: 1

275
On short final to RWY 18R at DFW at 200 ft AGL I saw a small white drone pass under
our nose flying in the opposite direction. We took no action since it didn't pose as a
threat. It was maybe 100-150 ft below us. It appeared to be flying over the construction
area near the approach end of RWY 18R. I advised ATC and they had the next few
aircraft land on RWY 18L.

Synopsis
Air carrier Captain reported a small white drone pass under his aircraft flying in the
opposite direction.
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ACN: 1573186

(36 of 50)

Time / Day
Date : 201808
Local Time Of Day : 1201-1800

Place
Altitude.MSL.Single Value : 4500

Environment
Flight Conditions : VMC
Weather Elements / Visibility : Haze / Smoke
Weather Elements / Visibility.Visibility : 30
Light : Daylight
Ceiling.Single Value : 25000

Aircraft
Reference : X
Aircraft Operator : Personal
Make Model Name : Skyhawk 172/Cutlass
172 Crew Size.Number Of Crew : 1
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 91
Flight Plan : None
Mission : Training
Flight Phase :
Cruise

Person
Reference : 1
Location Of Person.Aircraft : X
Location In Aircraft : Flight Deck
Reporter Organization : Personal
Function.Flight Crew : Pilot Not
Flying Function.Flight Crew :
Instructor Qualification.Flight Crew :
Commercial
Qualification.Flight Crew : Flight Instructor
Qualification.Flight Crew : Instrument
Qualification.Flight Crew : Multiengine
Experience.Flight Crew.Total : 8000
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number : 1573186
Human Factors : Situational Awareness

Events
Anomaly.Inflight Event / Encounter : Other /
Unknown Detector.Person : Flight Crew
Miss Distance.Horizontal : 2000
Miss Distance.Vertical : 200
When Detected : In-flight
Result.General : None Reported / Taken

277
Assessments

278
Contributing Factors / Situations : Airspace Structure
Contributing Factors / Situations : Procedure
Primary Problem : Ambiguous

Narrative: 1
We saw a medium sized object perhaps 100-300 feet below us; we were at 4,500 feet
MSL too small to be a plane. At first we thought balloons, but that didn't make sense
with its track over the ground. It was headed into the wind fairly quickly. My student and
I believed it was a drone of some type. There are no current [UAV] NOTAMS in the area
we were operating. It was green, black, and silver in color. It had the appearance of a
quad copter.

Synopsis
Flight instructor reported sighting a drone while on an instructional flight at 4500 feet.
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ACN: 1571254

(37 of 50)

Time / Day
Date : 201808
Local Time Of Day : 1801-2400

Place
Locale Reference.Airport : LAX.Airport
State Reference : CA
Altitude.MSL.Single Value : 2500

Environment
Flight Conditions : Marginal
Light : Dusk

Aircraft : 1
Reference : X
ATC / Advisory.TRACON :
SCT Aircraft Operator : Air
Taxi
Make Model Name : Cessna Citation Undifferentiated or Other Model
Crew Size.Number Of Crew : 2
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 135
Mission : Passenger
Flight Phase : Initial
Approach Airspace.Class B :
LAX

Aircraft : 2
Reference : Y
Make Model Name : UAV - Unpiloted Aerial
Vehicle Flight Plan : None
Airspace.Class B : LAX

Person
Reference : 1
Location Of Person.Aircraft : X
Location In Aircraft : Flight Deck
Reporter Organization : Air Taxi
Function.Flight Crew : Pilot Not
Flying Function.Flight Crew :
Captain
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number : 1571254
Human Factors : Situational Awareness

Events
Anomaly.Conflict : NMAC
Detector.Person : Flight Crew
Miss Distance.Horizontal : 25
When Detected : In-flight

280
Result.General : None Reported / Taken

Assessments

281
Contributing Factors / Situations : Airspace Structure
Contributing Factors / Situations : Procedure
Primary Problem : Ambiguous

Narrative: 1
On approach to Runway 24R at LAX, approximately 2.9 miles from JETSA at 2500 ft we
encountered a drone at our altitude. The drone passed approximately 25ft on the right
wing of the aircraft, slightly above the wing but at our altitude. We immediately notified
ATC and provided a description of the drone and the approximate location and altitude.
We did not have time to deviate and only saw the drone at the last second. Passengers
were unaware and the flight landed normally.

Synopsis
Citation Captain reported a NMAC with a drone while on approach to Runway 24L at LAX.
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ACN: 1570720

(38 of 50)

Time / Day
Date : 201808
Local Time Of Day : 0601-1200

Place
Locale Reference.Airport : STL.Airport
State Reference : MO
Altitude.MSL.Single Value : 2400

Environment
Flight Conditions : Mixed
Weather Elements / Visibility.Visibility :
10 Light : Daylight
Ceiling.Single Value : 3000

Aircraft : 1
Reference : X
ATC / Advisory.Tower : STL
Aircraft Operator : Air
Carrier
Make Model Name : B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Crew Size.Number Of Crew : 2
Operating Under FAR Part : Part
121 Flight Plan : IFR
Mission : Passenger
Flight Phase : Final
Approach Airspace.Class B
: STL

Aircraft : 2
Reference : Y
Make Model Name : UAV - Unpiloted Aerial
Vehicle Flight Plan : None
Flight Phase : Cruise
Airspace.Class B :
STL

Person
Reference : 1
Location Of Person.Aircraft : X
Location In Aircraft : Flight Deck
Reporter Organization : Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew : Captain
Function.Flight Crew : Pilot Flying
Qualification.Flight Crew : Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number : 1570720

Events

283
Anomaly.Conflict : NMAC
Detector.Person : Flight Crew
Miss Distance.Vertical : 400

284
When Detected : In-flight
Result.General : None Reported /
Taken

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations : Procedure
Contributing Factors / Situations : Airspace Structure
Primary Problem : Ambiguous

Narrative: 1
When crossing the final approach fix to Runway 12R at 2400 ft on a visual approach, we
spotted a black colored drone hovering approximately 400 ft below us and just to the
right of our approach path. We then reported it to the STL Tower Controller upon landing.

Synopsis
B737 Captain reported sighting a drone 400 feet below and just to the right of final
approach fix to Runway 12R at STL.
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ACN: 1568419

(39 of 50)

Time / Day
Date : 201808
Local Time Of Day : 0601-1200

Place
Locale Reference.ATC Facility : PCT.TRACON
State Reference : VA
Altitude.MSL.Single Value : 4000

Environment
Flight Conditions :
VMC Light : Daylight

Aircraft : 1
Reference : X
ATC / Advisory.TRACON :
PCT Aircraft Operator : Air
Carrier
Make Model Name : B777 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Crew Size.Number Of Crew : 4
Operating Under FAR Part : Part
121 Flight Plan : IFR
Mission : Passenger
Nav In Use : FMS Or FMC
Flight Phase : Initial
Approach Route In
Use.STAR : HYPER7
Airspace.Class B : IAD

Aircraft : 2
Make Model Name : UAV - Unpiloted Aerial
Vehicle Operating Under FAR Part.Other
Flight Phase : Cruise
Airspace.Class B :
IAD

Person : 1
Reference : 1
Location Of Person.Aircraft : X
Location In Aircraft : Flight Deck
Reporter Organization : Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew : Captain
Function.Flight Crew : Pilot Not
Flying
Qualification.Flight Crew : Air Transport Pilot
(ATP) Experience.Flight Crew.Total : 9656
Experience.Flight Crew.Last 90 Days : 94
Experience.Flight Crew.Type : 674

286
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number : 1568419
Human Factors : Situational Awareness

Person : 2

287
Reference : 2
Location Of Person.Aircraft : X
Location In Aircraft : Flight Deck
Reporter Organization : Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew : First Officer
Function.Flight Crew : Pilot Flying
Qualification.Flight Crew : Air Transport Pilot
(ATP) Experience.Flight Crew.Total : 4516
Experience.Flight Crew.Type : 1553
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number : 1568407
Human Factors : Situational Awareness

Events
Anomaly.Conflict : Airborne
Conflict Detector.Person : Flight
Crew
Miss Distance.Vertical : 1000
When Detected : In-flight
Result.General : None Reported / Taken

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations : Airspace Structure
Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors
Primary Problem : Airspace Structure

Narrative: 1
Hyper 7 RNAV (STAR) over YACKK @ 4,000 ft. First Officer stated as he was looking
forward/down and something caught his attention. He stated "as we passed over it,
looking down at approximately 1,000 ft below us" it appeared to be a drone. This
was reported to Approach Control. After landing RWY 1R, IAD Tower requested a
verbal description and the First Officer described seeing the cross pattern of the
drone from above, half mile north of YACKK.

Narrative: 2
I was pilot flying approximately 1/2 mile N of YACKK fix on Hyper 7 Arrival. Saw what I
thought was a small balloon just to the right of our flight path and below us
approximately 1/4 mile ahead. I leaned forward to get a better view of the balloon as it
passed below us and it was clearly a drone. I saw the X pattern and white fuselage that
looked to me like a DJI Phantom drone (I fly drones and am familiar). The drone was
below our flight path but MUCH higher than the 400 ft altitude restriction on them. I am
just estimating but believe it was at approximately 2500-3000 ft. I could be off on
altitude somewhat but it was well above 400 ft. The other pilots did not see the drone.
By the time I realized what it was it was passing below us.

Synopsis
B-777 flight crew reported passing over a drone by 1000 feet while at 4000 feet on
the HYPER 7 ARRIVIAL into IAD.
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ACN: 1568336

(40 of 50)

Time / Day
Date : 201808
Local Time Of Day : 1201-1800

Place
Locale Reference.Airport : SAN.Airport
State Reference : CA

Environment
Light : Daylight

Aircraft : 1
Reference : X
ATC / Advisory.Tower : SAN
Aircraft Operator : Air
Carrier
Make Model Name : B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Crew Size.Number Of Crew : 2
Operating Under FAR Part : Part
121 Flight Plan : IFR
Mission : Passenger
Nav In Use : FMS Or
FMC Flight Phase : Taxi
Flight Phase : Final
Approach Airspace.Class B
: SAN

Aircraft : 2
Reference : Y
Make Model Name : UAV - Unpiloted Aerial
Vehicle Flight Phase : Cruise
Airspace.Class B : SAN

Person
Reference : 1
Location Of Person.Aircraft : X
Location In Aircraft : Flight Deck
Reporter Organization : Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew : Pilot Flying
Function.Flight Crew : Captain
Qualification.Flight Crew : Air Transport Pilot
(ATP) Qualification.Flight Crew : Instrument
Qualification.Flight Crew : Multiengine
Experience.Flight Crew.Last 90 Days : 249
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number : 1568336
Human Factors : Situational Awareness
Analyst Callback : Attempted

Events

289
Anomaly.Conflict : Ground Conflict, Less Severe
Anomaly.Conflict : Airborne Conflict
Detector.Person : Flight Crew
When Detected : Inflight When Detected :
Taxi
Result.General : None Reported / Taken

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations : Airspace Structure
Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors
Contributing Factors / Situations : Procedure
Primary Problem : Ambiguous

Narrative: 1
We were on short final for 27 in SAN. A military aircraft seemed to be hovering one or
two miles south of our path. I was hand flying the approach when the F/O (First Officer)
mentioned that the craft could be a drone. It was, and therefore much closer to our path
that what we originally believed. It stayed at a fairly safe distance and I refocused on
landing the aircraft. An aircraft was cleared for immediate takeoff and separation was
tight. During the landing roll, the drone reappeared in my peripheral vision as it passed
us on the taxiway. When we cleared the runway, it was now hovering over an (other
carrier) aircraft in our 12 o'clock position at [the] Terminal. I advised the Tower of the
encounter and its present location. The drone was black, probably two or three feet
wide. It was being flown in a very skilled way. The hovering and flight path was precise.
It was a professional instrument, not a toy. In my opinion, the intent was commercial;
perhaps filming. That is where I would lead an investigation.
This encounter highlights a safety issue of the highest level. A drone that size can be
used in a terminal area of a major US airport without the knowledge of ATC. One or
more can be used to cause catastrophic damage to commercial aircraft. The skill level of
drone operators as well as the maneuverability capability can be the greatest hazard we
face.
The same event at night would have been unknown from anyone. This is an eye opener. It
needs to be addressed.

Synopsis
B737 Captain reported sighting a drone while flying a visual approach to runway 27 at SAN
and then again hovering over a parked airplane upon landing.
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ACN: 1566714

(41 of 50)

Time / Day
Date : 201808
Local Time Of Day : 1801-2400

Place
Locale Reference.ATC Facility : I90.TRACON
State Reference : TX
Altitude.MSL.Single Value : 5000

Environment
Flight Conditions : VMC

Aircraft : 1
Reference : X
ATC / Advisory.TRACON :
I90 Aircraft Operator : Air
Carrier
Make Model Name : Large Transport, Low Wing, 2 Turbojet Eng
Crew Size.Number Of Crew : 2
Operating Under FAR Part : Part
121 Nav In Use : FMS Or FMC
Flight Phase : Climb
Route In Use.SID :
STYCK6 Airspace.Class B
: IAH

Aircraft : 2
Reference : Y
Make Model Name : UAV - Unpiloted Aerial
Vehicle Airspace.Class B : IAH

Person
Reference : 1
Location Of Person.Aircraft : X
Location In Aircraft : Flight Deck
Reporter Organization : Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew : Captain
Qualification.Flight Crew : Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number : 1566714

Events
Anomaly.Conflict : Airborne Conflict
Anomaly.Inflight Event / Encounter : Other /
Unknown Detector.Person : Flight Crew
When Detected : In-flight
Result.General : None Reported /
Taken

291
Assessments

292
Contributing Factors / Situations : Airspace Structure
Contributing Factors / Situations : Procedure
Primary Problem : Ambiguous

Narrative: 1
During our climb out of IAH on the STYCK 6 departure our cockpit jumpseater said that
we overflew a black quad copter drone. Our altitude was about five thousand feet and
climbing, and we estimated that the drone altitude was about 3500-4000 feet. We
reported this to ATC and continued on to our destination.

Synopsis
Air Carrier Captain reported sighting a quadcopter drone at approximately 4000 feet while
flying the STYCK6 departure out of IAH.
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ACN: 1562358

(42 of 50)

Time / Day
Date : 201807
Local Time Of Day : 1801-2400

Place
Locale Reference.ATC Facility : ZOA.ARTCC
State Reference : CA
Altitude.MSL.Single Value : 25000

Aircraft : 1
Reference : X
ATC / Advisory.Center :
ZOA Aircraft Operator :
Corporate
Make Model Name : Small
Transport Operating Under FAR
Part : Part 91 Flight Plan : IFR
Flight Phase : Climb
Airspace.Class A :
ZOA

Aircraft : 2
Reference : Y
ATC / Advisory.Center : ZOA
Aircraft Operator : Government
Make Model Name : UAV - Unpiloted Aerial
Vehicle Flight Plan : IFR
Mission : Tactical
Flight Phase :
Cruise

Person : 1
Reference : 1
Location Of Person.Facility : ZOA
Reporter Organization : Government
Function.Air Traffic Control : Enroute
Qualification.Air Traffic Control : Fully Certified
Experience.Air Traffic Control.Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) :
3 ASRS Report Number.Accession Number : 1562358
Human Factors : Confusion
Human Factors : Human-Machine
Interface Human Factors : Situational
Awareness Human Factors : Training /
Qualification Human Factors : Distraction

Person : 2
Reference : 2
Location Of Person.Facility : ZOA

294
Reporter Organization : Government
Function.Air Traffic Control :
Instructor Function.Air Traffic Control
: Enroute
Qualification.Air Traffic Control : Fully Certified

295
Experience.Air Traffic Control.Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) :
6 ASRS Report Number.Accession Number : 1562806
Human Factors : Training /
Qualification Human Factors :
Situational Awareness Human Factors
: Distraction
Human Factors : Human-Machine Interface

Events
Anomaly.ATC Issue : All Types
Anomaly.Conflict : Airborne
Conflict
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural : Published Material /
Policy Detector.Person : Air Traffic Control
When Detected : In-flight

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations : ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings
Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors
Contributing Factors / Situations : Procedure
Primary Problem : Procedure

Narrative: 1
I was working the R-side at Sector XX. I climbed Aircraft X and had a J-ring on Aircraft Y.
At the time when I climbed Aircraft X I thought I had enough room to climb him with no
problem. Aircraft Y was headed in a different direction. I got busy descending aircraft for
ZZZ and ZZZ1. Training was going on at the D-side position and the trainee was having
a hard time keeping up so I was doing a lot of the entries and telling the trainee what to
do. I feel like if I had a CPC D side or someone more experienced helping it would have
been easier to track everything. Aircraft Y was in a area of high traffic volume and
density.
Possibly traffic with ZZZ2 arrivals and departures and overflights in that area. Also with
him maneuvering there in the future I will use vertical separation and assign a heading
to Aircraft Y. My comfort level with Aircraft Y is low and thought he would be able to turn
faster.

Narrative: 2
I was an instructor training on the Radar Associate (D-side) position of the sector. The Rside had been making some unusual and not very effective moves which made his
workload much harder than it already was. There was weather deviations, and slow
performing aircraft mixed in with his traffic. Aircraft Y was flying much of the middle
portion of the sector at FL260. Aircraft X was climbing eastbound from the western part
of the sector. The R-side had traffic for Aircraft X at FL250 and asked the pilot if he was
able to climb to FL270, in which the pilot concurred. My trainee and I were discussing a
lot of different things since there was much going on in the sector, and my trainee may
have been doing landline coordination when the R-side gave the clearance to climb
Aircraft X. Aircraft Y had been orbiting the sector for some time, and the R-side did not
recognize Aircraft Y making the maneuver and turned into Aircraft X as it climbed.
Conflict alert activated which prompted the R-side to execute turns, but I believe the two
aircraft still lost proper enroute separation. With the advances in technology and having
ERAM and DATACOMM, maybe we should be able to be given the option to change data
block colors to distinguish it more from others, or maybe at least the new characters that
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surround the data block for datacomm (IE point outs, VCI, etc.). Most of what happened
was strictly the R-side's own doing, but maybe it would've helped him more if the slow
orbiting Aircraft Y in the middle of his sector stood out all the time from the rest of his
data blocks.
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Synopsis
ZOA Center Controllers reported a loss of separation between a UAV and a Small
Transport.

298

ACN: 1562024

(43 of 50)

Time / Day
Date : 201807
Local Time Of Day : 0601-1200

Place
Locale Reference.Airport : BOS.Airport
State Reference : MA
Altitude.AGL.Single Value : 200

Environment
Light : Daylight

Aircraft : 1
Reference : X
Aircraft Operator : Air Carrier
Make Model Name : B737-700
Crew Size.Number Of Crew : 2
Operating Under FAR Part : Part
121 Flight Plan : IFR
Mission : Passenger
Flight Phase :
Landing

Aircraft : 2
Reference : Y
Make Model Name : UAV - Unpiloted Aerial
Vehicle Flight Phase : Cruise

Person
Reference : 1
Location Of Person.Aircraft : X
Location In Aircraft : Flight Deck
Reporter Organization : Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew : First Officer
Function.Flight Crew : Pilot Not
Flying Qualification.Flight Crew :
Instrument
Qualification.Flight Crew : Air Transport Pilot
(ATP) Qualification.Flight Crew : Multiengine
Experience.Flight Crew.Last 90 Days : 513
Experience.Flight Crew.Type : 1985
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number : 1562024
Human Factors : Distraction

Events
Anomaly.Conflict : NMAC
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural : Published Material /
Policy Detector.Person : Flight Crew
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Miss Distance.Horizontal : 150

300
When Detected : In-flight
Result.General : None Reported /
Taken

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations : Human
Factors Contributing Factors / Situations :
Procedure Primary Problem : Human Factors

Narrative: 1
Aircraft X had near miss with a small drone off right wing about 150 feet away at 200 feet
AGL parallel to Runway 32 and the shore line.

Synopsis
B737 First Officer reported an NMAC with a drone during approach to BOS.
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ACN: 1561883

(44 of 50)

Time / Day
Date : 201807
Local Time Of Day : 0601-1200

Place
Locale Reference.Airport : SBP.Airport
State Reference : CA
Altitude.MSL.Single Value : 2500

Environment
Flight Conditions : VMC
Weather Elements / Visibility.Visibility :
10 Light : Daylight

Aircraft : 1
Reference : X
ATC / Advisory.TRACON :
SBA Aircraft Operator :
Personal
Make Model Name : Skyhawk 172/Cutlass
172 Crew Size.Number Of Crew : 1
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 91
Flight Plan : None
Mission : Personal
Flight Phase :
Descent
Airspace.Class D :
SBP

Aircraft : 2
Reference : Y
Make Model Name : UAV - Unpiloted Aerial
Vehicle Operating Under FAR Part.Other
Flight Phase : Cruise
Airspace.Class D : SBP

Person
Reference : 1
Location Of Person.Aircraft : X
Location In Aircraft : Flight Deck
Reporter Organization : Personal
Function.Flight Crew : Single
Pilot Function.Flight Crew : Pilot
Flying Qualification.Flight Crew :
Private Experience.Flight
Crew.Total : 242
Experience.Flight Crew.Last 90 Days :
14 Experience.Flight Crew.Type : 103
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ASRS Report Number.Accession Number : 1561883
Human Factors : Situational Awareness

Events

303
Anomaly.Conflict : NMAC
Anomaly.Inflight Event / Encounter : Other /
Unknown Detector.Person : Flight Crew
Miss Distance.Horizontal : 50
Miss Distance.Vertical : 50
When Detected : In-flight

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations : Human
Factors Primary Problem : Human Factors

Narrative: 1
While descending towards San Luis Obispo, I noticed a drone pass over my left wing
within 100 feet. I was descending through 2500 feet at the time, near Cal Poly
University, roughly 4nm north of the San Luis airport. I only spotted the drone for a
second before it disappeared past my wing and thus did not have enough time to
maneuver away from it.

Synopsis
C172 pilot reported a NMAC with a drone while descending into SBP.
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ACN: 1561479

(45 of 50)

Time / Day
Date : 201807
Local Time Of Day : 1201-1800

Place
Locale Reference.ATC Facility : LIMM.ARTCC
State Reference : FO
Altitude.MSL.Single Value : 34000

Environment
Flight Conditions : VMC

Aircraft : 1
Reference : X
ATC / Advisory.Center :
LIMM Aircraft Operator : Air
Carrier Make Model Name :
A330 Crew Size.Number Of
Crew : 4
Operating Under FAR Part : Part
121 Flight Plan : IFR
Mission : Passenger
Nav In Use : FMS Or
FMC Flight Phase :
Cruise

Aircraft : 2
Reference : Y
ATC / Advisory.Center : LIMM
Make Model Name : Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer

Person
Reference : 1
Location Of Person.Aircraft : X
Location In Aircraft : Flight Deck
Reporter Organization : Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew : Captain
Function.Flight Crew : Pilot Flying
Qualification.Flight Crew :
Multiengine
Qualification.Flight Crew : Air Transport Pilot
(ATP) Qualification.Flight Crew : Instrument
Experience.Flight Crew.Total : 20000
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number : 1561479
Human Factors : Situational Awareness
Human Factors : Distraction
Human Factors : Communication Breakdown
Communication Breakdown.Party1 : Flight Crew
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Communication Breakdown.Party2 : ATC

Events

306
Anomaly.Conflict : Airborne Conflict
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural : Published Material /
Policy Anomaly.Inflight Event / Encounter : Other /
Unknown Detector.Person : Flight Crew
When Detected : In-flight
Result.Flight Crew : Requested ATC Assistance /
Clarification Result.Flight Crew : Overcame Equipment
Problem Result.Air Traffic Control : Issued Advisory / Alert

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations : ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings
Contributing Factors / Situations : Environment - Non Weather Related
Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors
Primary Problem : Environment - Non Weather Related

Narrative: 1
Enroute, at 34000 feet flying up the Italian peninsula in Italian airspace we were having
great difficulty hearing center because of background noise. As Pilot Flying, I was helping
the Pilot Monitoring by inserting new frequencies. There was much chatter on guard
frequency. Guard frequency was so distracting both pilots were turning off the receiver
for guard to better hear Center. All of us discussed the communication threat we were
experiencing. I took a 10-minute break. The fourth pilot was in my seat and the First
Officer remained working the radios.
When I returned and was getting briefed, I noted what I first thought were balloons,
then drones or possibly UAV's. They did not appear on TCAS. They came from below and
passed below our left wing. While considering what this was, the Pilot monitoring
realized the guard frequency had not been regained contact with ATC. They said we had
been intercepted.
After we regained contact, the two objects I had seen before were now off our left wing,
and they peeled off in descending turns away from the aircraft. It is difficult to estimate
how distant they were. We had no ACARS message or SATCOM call alerting us to our loss
of communication. I estimate our loss of communication was about 10 minutes. No
aircraft used ICAO procedures for intercept. It is possible the targets I saw were fighters
who were observing our flight. ATC radio was difficult to hear and congestion on 121.5
caused both pilots to silence 121.5 to hear center. I suggest expand the use of CPDLC
(Controller Pilot DataLink Communication).

Synopsis
A330 Captain reported they lost communication with ATC and did not realize it until they
observed unidentifiable traffic near their aircraft.
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ACN: 1561264

(46 of 50)

Time / Day
Date : 201807
Local Time Of Day : 1201-1800

Place
Locale Reference.Airport : CXP.Airport
State Reference : NV

Environment
Flight Conditions :
VMC Light : Daylight

Aircraft : 1
Reference : X
ATC / Advisory.CTAF :
CXP Aircraft
Operator.Other
Make Model Name : Eurocopter AS 350/355/EC130 Astar/Twinstar/Ecureuil Operating Under FAR Part.Other
Airspace.Class G : CXP

Aircraft : 2
Reference : Y
Make Model Name : UAV - Unpiloted Aerial
Vehicle Operating Under FAR Part.Other
Flight Phase : Cruise
Airspace.Class G : CXP

Person
Reference : 1
Location Of Person : Hangar / Base
Function.Ground Personnel : Airport Personnel
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number :
1561264 Analyst Callback : Completed

Events
Anomaly.Inflight Event / Encounter : Object
Detector.Person : Flight Crew
Miss Distance.Horizontal : 0
Miss Distance.Vertical : 0
When Detected : In-flight
Result.General : Flight Cancelled / Delayed
Result.General : Maintenance Action
Result.General : Police / Security Involved
Result.Flight Crew : Landed As Precaution
Result.Aircraft : Aircraft Damaged

Assessments

308
Contributing Factors / Situations : Environment - Non Weather Related
Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors
Primary Problem : Human Factors

Narrative: 1
Aircraft X, (AS350) Eurocopter experienced a drone strike approximately 1 nm south of
CXP. Altitude unknown. Pilot in command (PIC) reported thought it was a bird strike, but
did not find evidence of bird. Reported sound of an object striking the aircraft and
subsequent vibration in tail section. PIC made an immediate landing on the CXP south
ramp. Follow-up inspection by company mechanic reported bent trim tab and located
dings on fuselage where object struck the aircraft. Repair conducted over next two days.
Aircraft departed CXP after two days. FAA FSDO (RNO) notified on morning after two
days. I was instructed to contact Carson City Sheriff's Office and request deputy to take a
police report.

Callback: 1
Reporter reiterated details contained in original report and stated that the helicopter
landed on the east circular landing zone on the south ramp at Carson City Airport (CXP).

Synopsis
An airport worker at CXP reported a midair collision between a helicopter and a drone.
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ACN: 1561150

(47 of 50)

Time / Day
Date : 201807
Local Time Of Day : 1201-1800

Place
Locale Reference.ATC Facility : ZBW.ARTCC
State Reference : NH
Altitude.MSL.Single Value : 19200

Environment
Flight Conditions :
VMC Light : Night

Aircraft : 1
Reference : X
ATC / Advisory.Center :
ZBW Aircraft Operator : Air
Carrier
Make Model Name : EMB ERJ 190/195 ER/LR
Crew Size.Number Of Crew : 2
Operating Under FAR Part : Part
121 Flight Plan : IFR
Mission : Passenger
Nav In Use : FMS Or FMC
Flight Phase : Descent
Route In Use.STAR :
ORW7 Airspace.Class A :
ZBW

Aircraft : 2
Make Model Name : UAV - Unpiloted Aerial
Vehicle Flight Plan : None
Airspace.Class A : ZBW

Person : 1
Reference : 1
Location Of Person.Aircraft : X
Location In Aircraft : Flight Deck
Reporter Organization : Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew : First Officer
Function.Flight Crew : Pilot Not
Flying
Qualification.Flight Crew : Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number : 1561150
Human Factors : Distraction

Person : 2
Reference : 2

310
Location Of Person.Aircraft : X
Location In Aircraft : Flight Deck
Reporter Organization : Air Carrier

311
Function.Flight Crew : Captain
Function.Flight Crew : Pilot
Flying
Qualification.Flight Crew : Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number : 1561153
Human Factors : Distraction

Events
Anomaly.Conflict : NMAC
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural : Published Material /
Policy Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural : FAR
Detector.Person : Flight Crew
Miss Distance.Horizontal : 0
Miss Distance.Vertical : 20
When Detected : In-flight
Result.General : None Reported / Taken

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations : Environment - Non Weather Related
Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors
Primary Problem : Ambiguous

Narrative: 1
While descending through 19,200 feet MSL on the ORW7 arrival into BOS, I saw what I
thought was a balloon coming towards our aircraft. A few seconds later as we flew
directly under it, missing it by about 10-20 feet, we noticed it was a drone. It was
directly above my windshield (the FO side) and probably about 2 feet wide. We were
approx 24NM west of PVD VOR. I immediately notified BOS center and they proceeded to
vector other aircraft away from that area. BOS center gave us their number to call them
on the ground for further information. I called and spoke with BOS center managment
and provided the information [they] requested in addition to my contact information.

Narrative: 2
We were flying the Norwich 7 (ORW7) arrival into BOS and we were approximately 24
miles west of PVD on the arrival near the OUTTT intersection. I was the Pilot Flying but
was heads down at the moment while I was giving a PA announcement to the
passengers. As we were passing through FL192 in the descent I looked up and saw what
appeared to be a black drone directly in front of us at the same altitude. I saw the drone
out of the FO's windshield and it quickly passed over the top of us. It appeared to be 1824 inch in diameter, oval shaped, solid black in color, and I believe it missed our aircraft
by about 20-50 feet.
The FO was certain it was a drone. She reported to me that she saw what appeared to be
a propeller on the top of it and something else hanging below it (possibly a camera). We
reported this to BOS ARTCC who immediately began to vector other aircraft away from
that area. The FO had a much better and longer visual look at the object and was certain
it was a drone. BOS ARTCC asked us to call them on the phone after landing which we
did.
They said a report would be filed on their end. I also reported this to the Chief Pilot.
Possibly a high altitude drone.

Synopsis
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ERJ-190 flight crew reported a NMAC with a Drone during the descent phase of flight.
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ACN: 1559150

(48 of 50)

Time / Day
Date : 201807
Local Time Of Day : 1201-1800

Place
Locale Reference.Airport :
ORD.Airport State Reference : IL
Altitude.AGL.Single Value : 1700

Environment
Flight Conditions :
VMC Light : Daylight

Aircraft : 1
Reference : X
Aircraft Operator : Air Carrier
Make Model Name : Regional Jet 200 ER/LR (CRJ200)
Crew Size.Number Of Crew : 2
Operating Under FAR Part : Part
121 Flight Plan : IFR
Flight Phase : Initial Approach

Aircraft : 2
Reference : Y
Aircraft Operator : Personal
Make Model Name : UAV - Unpiloted Aerial Vehicle

Person
Reference : 1
Location Of Person.Aircraft : X
Location In Aircraft : Flight Deck
Reporter Organization : Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew : Pilot Not
Flying Function.Flight Crew : First
Officer
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number : 1559150
Human Factors : Distraction

Events
Anomaly.Conflict : NMAC
Detector.Person : Flight Crew
Miss Distance.Horizontal : 200
When Detected : In-flight
Result.General : None Reported / Taken

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations : Airspace Structure
Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors

314
Primary Problem : Human Factors

315
Narrative: 1
On final for Runway 28C in Chicago, at approximately 1700 feet and 5 DME from the
localizer, we came in close proximity to a drone just south of the approach course. Drone
appeared to be within about 200 feet of the aircraft. We did not have to take evasive
action and landed without incident. Reported the drone to Tower who we then contacted
via phone after arrival at the gate.

Synopsis
CRJ-200 First Officer reported a UAV in close proximity to the aircraft.
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ACN: 1558327

(49 of 50)

Time / Day
Date : 201807
Local Time Of Day : 1201-1800

Place
Locale Reference.Airport :
ARB.Airport State Reference : MI
Altitude.AGL.Single Value : 200

Environment
Flight Conditions : VMC
Weather Elements / Visibility.Visibility :
40 Light : Daylight
Ceiling : CLR
RVR.Single Value : 10000

Aircraft : 1
Reference : X
ATC / Advisory.Tower :
ARB Aircraft Operator :
Personal
Make Model Name : Skyhawk 172/Cutlass
172 Crew Size.Number Of Crew : 1
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 91
Flight Plan : VFR
Mission : Personal
Flight Phase : Final
Approach Airspace.Class D
: ARB

Aircraft : 2
Reference : Y
Make Model Name : UAV - Unpiloted Aerial
Vehicle Operating Under FAR Part.Other
Flight Plan : None
Flight Phase : Cruise
Airspace.Class D :
ARB

Person
Reference : 1
Location Of Person.Aircraft : X
Location In Aircraft : Flight Deck
Reporter Organization : Personal
Function.Flight Crew : Pilot
Flying Function.Flight Crew :
Single Pilot Qualification.Flight
Crew : Private Experience.Flight

317
Crew.Total : 500
Experience.Flight Crew.Last 90 Days :
3 Experience.Flight Crew.Type : 400
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number : 1558327
Human Factors : Situational Awareness

318
Events
Anomaly.Conflict : NMAC
Detector.Person : Flight Crew
Miss Distance.Horizontal : 100
Miss Distance.Vertical : 20
When Detected : In-flight
Result.General : None Reported / Taken

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations : Airspace Structure
Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors
Contributing Factors / Situations : Procedure
Primary Problem : Ambiguous

Narrative: 1
On final approach to ARB runway 24 flying a Cessna C172 I noticed initially at 1:00 o'clock
position (horizontal) a bright "candy apple red and bright chrome" 4 engine drone.
Continued on final approach passing drone. Drone remained stationary in 3D space as
we passed. Notified ARB tower of drone hovering on ARB final approach.

Synopsis
C-172 pilot reported a NMAC with a drone while on final approach to Ann Arbor Municipal
Airport.
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ACN: 1549645

(50 of 50)

Time / Day
Date : 201806
Local Time Of Day : 1201-1800

Place
Locale Reference.Airport : HIO.Airport
State Reference : OR
Relative Position.Angle.Radial : 068
Relative Position.Distance.Nautical Miles :
4 Altitude.MSL.Single Value : 650

Environment
Flight Conditions : VMC
Weather Elements / Visibility : Haze / Smoke
Weather Elements / Visibility.Visibility : 10
Light : Daylight
Ceiling.Single Value : 5000

Aircraft : 1
Reference : X
ATC / Advisory.Tower : HIO
Aircraft Operator : Personal
Make Model Name :
Helicopter Crew Size.Number
Of Crew : 1
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 91
Flight Plan : None
Mission : Passenger
Flight Phase : Initial
Approach Route In Use :
Direct Airspace.Class D :
HIO

Aircraft : 2
Reference : Y
Make Model Name : UAV - Unpiloted Aerial
Vehicle Flight Phase : Cruise
Airspace.Class D : HIO

Person
Reference : 1
Location Of Person.Aircraft : X
Location In Aircraft : Flight Deck
Reporter Organization :
Personal Function.Flight Crew :
Pilot Flying Function.Flight Crew
: Single Pilot
Qualification.Flight Crew : Flight

320
Instructor Qualification.Flight Crew :
Instrument Qualification.Flight Crew :
Commercial Experience.Flight Crew.Total
: 2219 Experience.Flight Crew.Last 90
Days : 131

321
Experience.Flight Crew.Type : 255
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number : 1549645

Events
Anomaly.Conflict : NMAC
Anomaly.Inflight Event / Encounter : Other /
Unknown Detector.Person : Flight Crew
Miss Distance.Horizontal : 100
Miss Distance.Vertical : 50
When Detected : In-flight
Result.Flight Crew : Took Evasive Action

Assessments
Contributing Factors / Situations : Airspace Structure
Contributing Factors / Situations : Procedure
Primary Problem : Ambiguous

Narrative: 1
After being cleared into Class Delta airspace for landing at HIO, and instructed to
descend below 700 feet MSL, I had a near miss with a drone over highway 26, 4nm ENE
of HIO. I was at approximately 650 feet MSL and the drone was above me, just to the
right of my 12 o'clock. I turned left upon seeing it and got a good look at it. It appeared
to be grey in color and possibly of the DJI Phantom type of quadcopter. I have seen
plenty of these and it looked to be that style. I immediately reported to the Tower that I
had a near miss at the edge of their airspace and gave them approximate location,
altitude, and description of the UAV. I was traveling approximately 120 KTS IAS, with
light winds and good visibility other than light smoke in the area from prescribed burns. I
had two passengers on board, one in the front with me and one directly behind that
passenger.

Synopsis
Helicopter pilot reported a NMAC with a quadcopter drone at approximately 650 feet MSL
while inbound for landing.

